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Why the wrongness of intentionally impairing children in utero does not imply the wrongness of abortion
- Correspondence to Dr Simon Cushing, Philosophy, University of Michigan-Flint, Flint, MI 48502, USA; simoncu{at}umich.edu
Citation
Why the wrongness of intentionally impairing children in utero does not imply the wrongness of abortion
Publication history
- Received August 13, 2022
- Accepted August 24, 2022
- First published September 5, 2022.
Online issue publication
May 18, 2023
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- Previous version (28 April 2023).
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© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2023. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.
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