The target of moral bioenhancement

As Beauchamp notes, we write that ‘the core moral dispositions, which are the foremost objects of moral enhancement, are altruism and a sense of justice’ (p. 108).4 He complains that we do not say precisely how we understand these dispositions and why we focus on them to the exclusion of others, like benevolence and respectfulness. But we do something to clarify the notion of altruism. We claim that it involves (a) empathy in the sense of ‘a capacity to imagine from the inside what it would be like to be another conscious subject’, and (b) ‘sympathetic concern about the well-being of this subject for its own sake’ (p. 109).4 In virtue of including (b), we take altruism to include benevolence. So conceived altruism is obviously central to morality, since morality requires the setting aside of our own interests for the sake of others, though to what precise extent is a matter of controversy. Consequently, the extent to which the disposition of altruism should be enhanced is also a matter of controversy. As regards respectfulness, we do not view it as an attitude that is necessarily or essentially moral, since people often adopt it towards highly improper objects, such as ruthless dictators.

We concede, however, that we do not say much about the sense of justice or fairness, apart from speculating that it has evolved out of tit-for-tat reciprocity and a sense that we have a right to our psychophysical person and what we acquire or produce by means of its capacities and unowned natural resources. This is of course far from sufficient to clarify the purport of justice, but the problem is that the concept of justice is philosophically so controversial that you can hardly make any informative claim about it without having to provide a lengthy defence for it. You can relate it vaguely to other concepts like the concepts of desert, rights and equality, but once you try to be more precise about these relations, you are immediately deep in controversy. Nonetheless, there are some robust and universal intuitions about (in)justice: we all feel it is unjust if people do not return favours received, though they are perfectly capable of doing so; if they take what we have produced single-handedly; if we get a smaller piece of the cake for no apparent reason, and so on. In a book like Unfit, you can do little but to appeal to such intuitions in the hope that they will inject enough substance into its talk about justice.

Apart from the case that the notion of a sense of justice is more problematic than that of altruism, there also seems to be less experimental studies of biomedical means that might influence it. For these reasons, it occupies a smaller place in the book than altruism. Perhaps this is why two of our commentators reason as though our enhancement proposal did not include it. But this seriously reduces the plausibility of our proposal since, as Casal rightly remarks: ‘Doing the right thing, however, is not always a matter of greater altruism and empathy’. A problem is that altruism tends to be partial: we are more altruistically inclined towards those who are near and dear to us than those who are anonymous to us, and are distant in space and time. We imagine that such partiality could be rectified by a heightened sense of justice.

By reference to moral enhancement in the sense of enhancement of the central moral dispositions of altruism and a sense of justice, it is however possible to define moral enhancement in a wider sense, though we do not do so the book. Human beings have a number of strong motivational dispositions that are liable to interfere with their acting out of the central moral dispositions. Consider, for instance, the so-called seven deadly sins: gluttony, greed, lust, envy, wrath, pride and sloth. One could provide plausible evolutionary explanations of why humans have strong desires for food, material possessions, sex, social reputation and status, relaxation and rest. But these desires can obviously obstruct humans acting altruistically and justly. To this list, we could add cowardice, that is, the powerful emotion of fear—fear of loss of life, limb, property, reputation and so on—preventing them from doing what they think is the right thing. Likewise, weakness of will could make it difficult for them sticking to what they think is right. Moral enhancement in a wider sense consists in a weakening of such strong dispositions that are liable to interfere with action on the central moral dispositions of altruism and a sense of justice. Thereby, moral action is rendered more likely, just as it is by a strengthening of the central moral dispositions.

However, ‘moral enhancement’ could be understood in a still wider sense, namely the sense in which ‘morally enhancing people’ means something like making people morally better. In this sense, moral enhancement comprises enhancement of moral motivation and also enhancement of cognitive capacities of relevance for the making of moral judgements. Thus, making people morally better consists in making them more capable of finding out what is morally right and being more motivated to act accordingly. In the book, however, we didn't use ‘moral enhancement’ in this widest sense, not because we deny the moral relevance of cognitive capacities, but because these cognitive capacities may not feature anything specifically moral. This is so according to naturalist theories of moral judgement. By contrast, on non-naturalist or realist theories there is a specifically moral cognition, but we didn't want to get entangled in this metaethical dispute. Moreover, critics of moral bioenhancement typically concede the legitimacy of cognitive bioenhancement, for example, John Harris.

We take altruism and a sense of justice to be central moral dispositions because they motivate us to act in accordance with plausible basic moral principles. Utilitarianism is a moral theory according to which the fundamental moral motivation is nothing but universal impartial altruism or benevolence. It has been criticised for being incapable of taking matters of justice into proper account. It has therefore been suggested that its principle of utility be supplemented with some principle of justice. Our postulation of two basic moral dispositions is in line with such a two-principle moral theory. Since we are sceptical of prominent deontological features of commonsense morality, like the act-omission doctrine and rights, we take it that a correct moral theory will have to be consequentialist in outline. But this does not imply a wholesale rejection of commonsense morality with its deontological features. For it may be that the structure of commonsense morality is so deeply embedded in our nature that it will have best consequences in terms of our underlying consequentialist theory if we try to live by something akin to commonsense morality, somewhat revised to be better aligned with the underlying consequentialist theory. Many consequentialist theories nowadays have this sort of two-level architecture: a ground level of true consequentialist principles—in our case about universal beneficence and justice—and a superstructure of literally false common-sensical principles, the endorsement of which is pragmatically justified by its good consequences, as determined by the ground-level consequentialism.

This is roughly the background of another remark of ours that Beauchamp quotes: ‘The morality that we are proposing is… a rather modest extension of common-sense morality, an extension which puts greater emphasis upon duties that common-sense morality already recognises, in particular the duty to benefit those in need’ (p. 123).4 As many of us are incapable of complying even with commonsense morality, and the proposed consequentialist extension or revision of it is more demanding, it is obvious that compliance with this extended morality will require an enhancement of the moral motivation of many of us. This brings us to the next topic.

The degree of moral bioenhancement

To what degree are we proposing that human beings be morally bioenhanced? Again, Beauchamp quotes a crucial passage: ‘the moral motivation of those of us who are less morally motivated (will) be increased so that it becomes as strong as the moral motivation of those of us who are by nature mostly morally motivated’ (p. 113).4 As he says, this ‘sets a rough threshold’ of the degree of moral bioenhancement that we are after. He adds, however, that he is not sure that this statement is ‘entirely consistent with the seemingly bolder programme of bioenhancement projected’ elsewhere in the book. After citing a similar passage from the book, Casal similarly remarks that it does not express well the degree of moral bioenhancement we are seeking. She goes on worrying about a ‘super moral enhancement’ which runs ‘the risk of changing human nature beyond recognition’ and making us lose our ‘moral compass’.3

But we do not see why coping with the problems to human civilisation which we discuss—weapons of mass destruction, anthropogenic climate change, and global poverty—should require such a radical moral bioenhancement. There are people who seem to be sufficiently motivated to mitigate these problems—idealists who devote most of their time and energy to peace, environmental or welfare organisations. Why couldn't liberal democracies come to grips with these problems if a decisive majority of their voters became motivated as fervent idealists actually are? We don't see what compels us to deny this and adopt a more extremist position on the degree of moral bioenhancement required.

We believe, however, that those who were modestly bioenhanced in the widest sense which includes enhancement of relevant cognitive abilities would be better placed to see how the project of moral enhancement could be taken forwards than we are, as Tom Douglas has perceptively observed.5 Thus, Casal's complaint that we reduce moral enhancement to ‘motivating ourselves to do what we already believe to be right’ is misguided. We do take moral enhancement in the widest sense to include enhancement of cognitive abilities necessary for finding out what is morally right. Consequently, in our view, a full-blown programme of moral enhancement would address the fact that many moral beliefs are mistaken and include a place for enhancing moral cognition and reasoning. In the meantime, however, we should begin by aiming at the low hanging fruit, like the removal of tendencies to break the law and strengthening tendencies to commit acts of charity—that is, things about which there is a consensus that they are morally wrong and that are a part of our moral education of children.

The effectiveness of moral bioenhancement

Agar dedicates the whole of his commentary to argue: ‘Moral worsenings are the almost inevitable result of attempts to significantly improve moral motivation by biomedical means’. Why does he believe that moral bioenhancement is bound to fail to achieve its ends and rather result in the opposite? He hypothesises that there are ‘cognitive, emotional, and motivational sub-capacities that feed into moral thinking’. As already remarked, we agree that making and acting on sound moral judgements involves cognitive–intellectual capacities and motivational, or affective–conative capacities. But, to repeat, what we had in mind when we talked about moral bioenhancement in the book was enhancement of some special motivational capacities by biomedical means. This is not intended to downplay the role that intellectual capacities, or reason, play as regards moral judgement, or that these capacities can be enhanced by biomedical means. However, we have argued previously6 that cognitive enhancement alone—without being coupled with enhancement of moral motivation—is likely to increase the threats to human civilisation. For this reason, we wanted to concentrate in the book on what is distinctive of moral bioenhancement, as opposed to cognitive bioenhancement.

Now the reason why Agar thinks that attempted moral bioenhancement will almost inevitably result in ‘moral worsenings’ seems to be that it cannot establish a proper balance between these subcapacities: ‘There are deep obstacles to working out…a balanced bioenhancement of moral cognition, moral emotion, and moral motivation’. He considers two ways in which the disposition of altruism can be enhanced. (Actually, he uses the term ‘empathy’, but unless he means by this what we mean by empathy and sympathy, ie, altruism, he fails to discuss our view.) Its scope can be broadened, so that it encompasses more sentient beings, or it can be deepened, that is, made more intense. He notes, as we do, that oxytocin's primary effect seems to be to deepen this attitude or make it more intense. So he concludes: ‘It tends to reinforce our tendency to endorse solutions that inflict suffering on strangers to protect our nearest and dearest from less significant suffering’.

As Agar is well aware, this is not news to us. He quotes us as saying that oxytocin treatment ‘would have to go hand in hand with reasoning which undercuts race, sex etc. as grounds for moral differentiation. But that oxytocin by itself does not suffice for requisite moral enhancement does not show that it cannot be an indispensable aid’ (p. 120).4 He objects, however: ‘We need more than additional reasons to neutralise oxytocin's destabilising effect on our moral thinking. We need enhanced compliance with reason, possibly biomedical interventions to strengthen reason's control over our behaviour.’ Certainly, a mere intellectual insight that race, sex, and so on, are not adequate grounds for moral differentiation is not enough to transform a racist into an antiracist. Such conversions require sustained moral reflection over a longish period of time. Still, experience shows that such conversions do happen, so they are possible. And we do not rule out that cognitive bioenhancement could help us to effect such conversions more readily, but we weren't talking about moral enhancement in the widest sense of making people morally better. We entirely agree with Agar that ‘Moral bioenhancers will fail to morally enhance when they strengthen to too great a degree one or some among the diverse influences on moral judgment’. But we weren't attempting to offer a full-blown programme of moral enhancement in the widest sense.

In short, we do not see those ‘deep obstacles’ to ‘balanced bioenhancement’ that worry Agar. Nor do we see what is ‘the bypassing of reason that makes moral bioenhancement so unlikely to succeed’. As we have already pointed out, although bioenhancement of the powers of reason and intellect is not part of what we mean by moral bioenhancement, this doesn't imply that these powers can be bypassed or rendered superfluous if we want to achieve moral improvement. It only implies that being moral isn't solely or exclusively a matter of the operation of intellectual or rational powers, but this is something that few would deny.

Beauchamp suggests that moral bioenhancement might be counterproductive in another way

… it would not be difficult for moral bioenhancements to exacerbate rather than diminish existing social prejudices and distributive unfairness. It seems likely that those who will obtain initial access to the means of moral bioenhancement will be the affluent classes with the means to make their children and other selected parties morally better, much as they now work to make their children more competitive university applicants… persons born with negative dispositions and unable to gain access to bioenhancement techniques will likely be rendered worse off, relative to the more advantaged, than they now are.

This is obviously a genuine risk with respect to all biomedical advances: in the political and socioeconomic conditions of current societies, the better-off will certainly benefit most from them and, thus, the gap between the better-off and the worse-off will widen.

Nevertheless, on behalf of moral bioenhancers it could be claimed that they are less prone than other bioenhancers—that enhance cognitive or physical capacities, or health and life expectancy—to increase inequality. Almost by definition, those who are morally enhanced will be inclined to reduce immoral inequalities; they will sympathise with those who suffer because of their own success and be disposed to help them.

The worry might instead be that because they provide less of a competitive edge than other bioenhancers, moral bioenhancers will attract only those who need them least, namely those who are already comparatively highly morally motivated. Possibly, this is what Casal has in mind when she speculates ‘Perhaps those who are already of above-average moral goodness are the ones that are most susceptible to further improvement’. This is one reason why we do not propose that moral bioenhancement should only be applied to those who voluntarily choose to undergo it, but that children should undergo it just as they have to undergo traditional moral education (another reason for this proposal is that bioenhancement is likely to be more effective at this early stage).

In this context, it should be recognised that moral motivation enhancers are already in use: antilibidinal agents for paedophiles, Ritalin for children and adults to reduce impulsive aggression7 and various strategies to improve impulse control, including administration of fish oil.

The safety of moral bioenhancement

Various aspects of the safety of moral bioenhancement figure prominently in Beauchamp's and Casal's comments. Casal writes that ‘in the absence of the relevant information about the various effects of bioenhancement—such as its effectiveness, distribution or risks—we cannot decide on its desirability’. In a similar vein, Beauchamp writes that ‘the delivery of forms of moral bioenhancement clearly will be experimental in the face of a sea of uncertainty’. However, he also draws attention to how cautious our proposal actually is. We are certainly not proposing a rushed application of whatever means of moral bioenhancement we happen to lay our hands on. In addition to the passages to which Beauchamp refers, it might be worth quoting a bit from the book's Introduction

… this line of research is still in its infancy, so it has as yet produced no convincing results, and perhaps it will not do so in time even if diligently pursued. Consequently, it is also too early in the day to tell what a programme of more extensive moral bioenhancement could look like and how it could be fitted in with more thoroughgoing traditional moral education and with various possible reforms of laws and other social institutions. Our ambition is merely to put some proposals on the agenda, not to launch any definitive and detailed solution to the mega-problems that we discuss (p. 11).4

Beauchamp ends by sketching a dilemma which is essentially the same as what we call the boot-strapping problem, to the effect that since it is morally imperfect humans who have to handle the techniques of moral bioenhancement, there is an ineliminable risk that they might be misapplied as other pieces of scientific technology have been (p. 124).4 Beauchamp writes:

On the one hand, we will need moral bioenhancement tools of the sort Persson and Savulescu envision—for example, emotional controls and altruistic boosts—to support public policies that help us move from unfit to fit by getting the right tools into the right hands to create a more just global order. On the other hand, we will also need public policies that constrain science, public policy, and markets from pursuing bioenhancement research and tools that ill-serve society.2

But it seems we cannot be reasonably certain to get such policies unless we are morally enhanced. So, we cannot discern any foolproof way out of this quandary. Should we then sit back and despair? We are, instead, proposing a way out which, though risky in the beginning, gets more secure the longer we succeed in walking it.

But is it not rather unlikely that programmes for large-scale moral bioenhancement will be developed and implemented? Beauchamp, again: ‘With escalating health care costs out of control virtually everywhere, public resources for large-scale bioenhancement will almost certainly be deemed unaffordable’.2 But we are actually contending that moral enhancement—probably including bioenhancement—is needed for us to cope with the greatest problems facing the world today, not making predictions about whether this need will in fact be filled.

There are vast numbers of people seeking social and political solutions to these problems and spectacularly failing. Few people are looking for psychological contributions, and even fewer for biological contributions. But we are convinced that so grave are these problems that all avenues of research must be pursued.

Nearly everyone (including Agar, Beauchamp and Casal) except moral nihilists believe that moral progress is possible through moral education, implementation of political and social reform, and so on. These are all human activities that can be augmented by understanding the biology and psychology of the human beings involved in them, and perhaps by optimising these. Evolution has had no time for selection as regards the kind of moral progress we need today. The moral normalcy that Agar appeals to (his example of it is, incredibly, Joseph Stalin) is far from good enough.

Agar cites, as an example of moral progress, Steven Pinker's ‘magisterial account of the decline of violence in his book The Better Angels of our Nature’.8 But Pinker's claims are compatible with the message of our book. However, it should be stressed that, while the number of acts of violence may be decreasing, the harm potential of single acts increases as technological power increases. Luckily, the most powerful weapons of mass destruction have not yet been put to use. But they have been in our possession only for a few decades, and we would like human civilisation to persist for centuries without them—and presumably their even more powerful descendants—being put to use. In our opinion, a tolerable reduction of such threats to our survival calls for research into novel methods of moral enhancement, including enhancement by biomedical means.