Animal ethics committees are supposed to perform critical cost–benefit evaluations for every single experiment that includes use of non-human animals. But what does this evaluation include? Whose costs and whose benefits are to be compared and evaluated? Many actors and many needs are included in the animal ethics reviews. Science “must” move forward. Patients “must” have better medicines and treatments. Laboratory animals “must” be treated in a responsible way. To understand how the cost–benefit evaluations are really carried out, it is important to look at how the ethical discussions are situated in (1) the individual members’ different interests and interpretations of the mission of animal ethics committees and (2) the context of the meeting.

Interviews with members of Swedish animal ethics committees show that there are individual interpretations of the mission of these committees. Here I discuss how these different views on ethics affect the ethical reviews and how ethics becomes situated in the context of the committee meeting. In what ways do the “outcomes” of the ethical discussions relate to the committee culture, where priorities of interpretation, relations between members, wishes for consensus, and expectations built on the past, present and future have strong impacts on the outcome of the ethical reviews? Benhabib’s concept of situated ethics and theories from the sociology of expectations are used for the analysis.1^–3

Background

In Sweden, seven local animal ethics committees examine applications for all non-human animal experiments. Each of the seven committees consists of a chairperson, six scientific experts and six laypersons. The scientific experts come from universities and drug companies; this category also includes animal technicians and veterinarians. The laypersons represent local political parties or animal-welfare organisations.4 In the committees you can find future Nobel Prize candidates, people who have never seen a laboratory and animal-rights activists. They are actors with dissimilar agendas and different backgrounds, and one can easily imagine how this committee composition could stimulate lively discussions and conflict situations at the meetings—and perhaps also rejection of applications. Despite this, 99 per cent of the 1733 applications handled in 2003 were approved—sometimes with requested modifications.5 Only 22 cases were rejected.6

The committees’ task is to make cost–benefit evaluations. Is the animals’ suffering counterbalanced by the expected benefits of the research? The committees are also supposed to discuss every single application on the basis of the three Rs: refinement, reduction and replacement.7 8 In the present article, committee members’ understanding of the three Rs is not discussed. The focus is instead on how they interpret what constitutes the ethical issue they are supposed to review, how they understand the cost–benefit evaluation and what interpretations characterise the discussions in the committee meetings.

METHODS

An ethnographic approach was used in the study to gain an understanding of how individual views on ethics are represented in the committees’ decisions. Twenty members were interviewed during 2006 and 2007. Among them, three persons represented animal-welfare or animal-rights movements, six were politically elected community members, 10 were scientific experts from various disciplines and the last one worked as an animal technician. The interviews, which were all in Swedish, were semistructured and participant driven. They lasted on average 1.2 hours. Questions were open-ended and allowed the members to elaborate on their thoughts. Interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. The translations of the quotes are mine. The interviewees’ names used here are pseudonyms.

The questions treated the members’ handling of dilemmas associated with animal experimentation in general (particularly with transgenic animals), definitions of ethics and their understanding of the three Rs, relations between committee members, the public debate and relations between humans and other animals and between different species. These themes were coded in the transcripts. The transcripts were also sent to the interviewees for approval.

Twelve meetings of six different committees were observed. Eight of the meetings were plenary meetings and four were held in preparatory groups. The observation protocols mostly focused on relations between members, if and how different dilemmas with a special focus on GM animals are articulated and discussed and how different species are discussed.

FINDINGS

Interpretations of the ethical evaluation

Almost all the interviewed members express the view that ethics is about making cost–benefit evaluations. The animals’ suffering must be seen in light of the purpose of the research. But when the committee members develop this question, different views on what this statement really means emerge. On a discursive level, they agree on what their mission is, but inside this framework, individual interpretations of what this cost–benefit evaluation refers to are set out. The definition of the ethical question the committee is supposed to discuss varies. I have found three different categories: ethics in the name of animals; ethics in the name of science; ethics in the name of patients.i The different views are categorised on the basis of whose point of view the committee members present when they talk about ethics. Who is going to benefit from the ethical evaluation?

In the name of animals

Most of the informants represent the view “ethics in the name of the animal”. The main concern of both scientific experts and laypersons is animal welfare. John (community member) summarises ethics thus: “It is to make sure the laboratory animals have a fair existence”. To Pia (animal technician) it means that the ethical questions that should be discussed are about the animals’ well-being, such as end points, housing and handling. Maria (scientific expert) talks about the social environment for the animals. These people focus on the animal in their ethical evaluation; they imply that this is what should be discussed at the committee meetings. Sofia (animal rights) also focuses on the animals:

My basic opinion is that animals have rights, and one of these rights is to not suffer. And almost every animal experiment causes some suffering, and it is just for our—human beings’—benefit that all animal experiments are done. I—So what I do in the committee is just fix the surface and improve the animals’ existence. (Sofia, animal rights)

Ethics in the name of the animal can be articulated in different ways. John, Maria and Pia talk about this category of ethics on a very practical level—as does Sofia, but she also wishes to raise questions to a theoretical level: do human beings have the right to use other animals for their own well-being? However, as there is no scope for animal-rights arguments in the committee meetings, she focuses on animal welfare instead of animal rights. No one besides other animal-rights spokespeople consider this type of argument to be relevant. Animal-welfare issues, on the other hand, are in focus most of the time, although not everyone considers animal-welfare to be the main aim of the discussions.

In the name of science

The notion of ethics in the name of science is here expressed by two prominent researchers. To them, it is important to be part of the committee, because then they are able to empower scientific research:

You could be good at accentuating research matters in the committee work. So that important research does not get stuck there because there is some animal-rights person who does not like the experiments. That can easily happen. (Peter, scientific expert)

We have to be there [at the meetings] to make it easier for science. If we don’t work actively with these questions, they never get the right input from us. Then it is only the opposition that is heard. (Anders, scientific expert)

This view concerns opportunities for science to evolve. It becomes unethical not to use non-human animal experimentation in research. Both these men define themselves as basic researchers. They do not apply their research to patients; their primary concern is the science itself. They also highlight the enemies of research—the representatives of animal-rights or animal-welfare movements. These persons are defined as obstacles, their aim being to stop scientific progress and destroy the hopes and expectations of many severely ill people who are dependent on animal experiments. Both these scientists formulate a problem in the composition of the ethics committees. They see the representatives of animal-welfare organisations as their opponents, and Anders would like to include representatives of patient organisations—laypersons who would appreciate research instead of trying to stop it in the name of animals. This leads us to the next category.

In the name of patients

Marianne (scientific expert) has worked as a medical doctor. She talks a great deal about the different costs of not using animal experimentation—“for the individual patient, families, society. Everything.” Her main concern is the patients. This view is also represented among laypersons: “I don’t care about the animals at all, I just care for humans” (Birgit, community member). Any medical aim is almost always seen as a good enough purpose. The hope for human health legitimises the research.2 11 The hopes and expectations for medical improvement overshadow all other ethical aspects, a pattern that is recognisable in several debates on new biotechnologies.2 3

In the interviews, there are very few examples of how members question medical purposes. Marianne, for example, talks a great deal about the importance of scrutinising the purpose of the research. But when I ask her whether there are purposes that researchers question, she hesitates:

It can happen … I have no example, but it does not happen often. Often those projects have been stopped before the application for ethical evaluation has reached us. If a project has a strange purpose it has been stopped by supervisors and others. (Marianne, scientific expert)

No purpose is a bad enough to be rejected. The idea that the purpose of the research should be evaluated in relation to the suffering of animals is very seldom put into practice. The scientific experts agree that research is (almost) always necessary—in the name of science or in the name of the patients. The rhetoric varies, but the content is the same. It is not unethical to use animals in research. It is unethical not to do so.

Cost–benefit evaluations?

The notion that animal ethics committees should be evaluating the relation between suffering and benefit may include many different views on what this actually means. As shown above, it may focus on the research climate as well as on discussions of what constitutes necessary research, future patient benefits, animal rights or what kind of enrichment rats need in their cages. The definition of the committees’ mission varies greatly among the committee members. What are the implications of this variation? On the one hand, it is a problem, as there is no common sense of what aspects of animal experimentation they are going to evaluate. Therefore there is a risk that just one view will be expressed in the meetings. On the other hand, this variation could be a fantastic opportunity; the committee members can point out different ethical aspects at the meeting and contribute to an important discussion about costs and benefits, which is the very idea behind the committees’ composition.4 But how does the discussion unfold in the meetings? Are there any multi-faceted cost–benefit evaluations?

We are only discussing questions about details.—I would like to discuss more about the purpose of the experiment. (Sofia, animal rights)

A lot of what we are discussing—someone has even claimed that 99% of what we are discussing - isn’t ethics, it is something else. (Anders, scientific expert)

Most of the interviewees agree that the animal ethics committees are discussing the “wrong” questions. They all know that they are supposed to be conducting cost–benefit evaluations, but they are instead discussing experimental methodology. They talk almost exclusively about refinement questions, and not about research purposes, replacement and reduction. Why is this the case?

DISCUSSION

To understand the focus on technical questions, it is necessary to look at how the ethical evaluation is related to the context of the committee meeting. Here, ethics is viewed as something that is negotiated contextually and situationally. Benhabib calls this “situated ethics”.1 In different contexts and environments, unspoken strategies are created to make ethical dilemmas easier to handle.12^–14 Knorr-Cetina calls this process “the power of the lab”.15 Similar processes are probably developed at the ethics committees’ negotiating table; perhaps we are dealing with the “power of the committee meeting”, which results in 99 per cent of applications being approved. What are the unspoken strategies that characterise these meetings? Why does the context of the committee meeting invite discussions on technical questions rather than cost–benefit evaluations? Schuppli and Fraser point out the predominance of scientific experts as an explanation for why Canadian committees’ discussions often are centred on technical issues.16 In Sweden, laypersons comprise half the membership of each committee, and the discussions still focus on methodological and technical issues. I will suggest a few other explanations for this reduced ethical review.

Priority of interpretation

One reason why mostly technical issues are on the committees’ agenda may concern who—and what discourse—has the priority of interpretation in this context. Even if the scientific experts are not in the majority, they have power over the agenda. Observations from the committee meetings show that the priority of interpretation belongs—exclusively—to scientific ideals. There is no room for ethical questions about research purposes and animal suffering in this context. This becomes an unspoken issue, even though members agree that this is their mission.

The discourse used in the discussions is scientific, and the ethical issues discussed are related to the experiment itself. Representatives of animal-welfare and animal-rights organisations have often adopted this discourse, and they talk about minimising suffering from a scientific point of view. They have often read scientific journals, are informed about new—more humane—technical solutions and talk about animal experimentation in scientific terms. Using this strategy, they are included in the discussion, and listened to. When they try to raise questions about animal rights, they are considered radical activists and therefore easily dismissed.

The community members’ mission is to serve as an interface between the public and the research institutions, and raising ethical questions is difficult to carry through.11 17 Attitude surveys also show that the public is concerned about ethics, safety and value in relation to using non-human animals in research.18 But in the committee discussions, the public's view is limited to a patient-oriented desire for biomedical solutions. This priority of interpretation prevents a discussion from including issues of animal concerns and worries of the public. Instead, the scientific experts confront the lay people with “the best solution”.18 19

Consensus

Another reason why mainly technical problems are discussed is that, on these issues, members can reach a consensus. Moreno shows the importance of consensus in the culture of bioethics.20 As we have seen, it may be difficult for members to reach a consensus if the research purpose is—or is not—good enough to justify animal suffering. The cost–benefit evaluation becomes too complex in a context where consensus is supposed to be reached—and therefore it becomes a non-issue in the committee. But one theme all members can agree on is how to minimise the suffering of animals. Solutions can be found in relation to the most technical aspects, and at least they can agree on a humane end point, when the animal will be put to death. Better technical solutions benefit scientific research as well as the animals. They probably also benefit patients. Decreasing suffering can be done in the name of science, in the name of patients and in the name of animals.

In the committee meetings, there can also be a consensus surrounding hope. Those who cannot understand the magic and greatness of scientific progress are seen as fundamentalists—in this case “animal-rights activists”. The social construction of “The Other” in debates on biotechnologies is a strong force in strategies used to reach a consensus about the “right” decision.ii

Expectations

The hegemonic social discourse is that biotechnology, including, for example, use of transgenic animals and embryonic stem cell research, is the modern salvation—the hope for humanity. In the public discourse, biotechnologies are almost synonymous with the language and imagery of futuristic breakthroughs.2 In this discourse, a medical reason is always a good enough reason to use animals as well as embryos for health purposes. The hope of biotechnological salvation overshadows concerns about experimental animals. The expectations of technology are performative, because they mobilise the future into the present using mutually binding promises and agendas, often articulated as “progress” or “the good life”.22

At the same time, the scientific experts, who have the priority of interpretation, use historical narratives, in which animal-rights activists are able to stop scientific breakthroughs. Thus, ethics is situated in the context of the committee meeting and also, as Brown writes, is temporally situated in “relation to memories of past futures and future presents”.2 Narratives about history and the future have a strong influence on the ethics of the present. The discursive fear of historical animal-rights activism, and the hopeless future that would follow in its tracks, overshadows opportunities to question animal experimentation from any point of view.

CONCLUSIONS

Members of the Swedish animal ethics committees agree that they are supposed to perform cost–benefit evaluations and scrutinise research aims in relation to animal suffering. But the individual interpretations of why they are doing this, and in whose name, differ. Ethical reviews can be made in the name of science, of patients and of animals. This intersection of different views could be an interesting foundation for complex cost–benefit evaluations, but in the meetings the discussions focus on technical and methodological improvements instead of on weighing research aims against animal suffering.

This reduced ethical evaluation can be understood from the perspective of situated ethics. The ethics is situated in the context of the committee meeting and the relations between committee members. The committee culture is strongly characterised by a scientific priority of interpretation and a desire for consensus. The discussions on use of animals are also situated in the future and in the past: in the hopes for scientific progress, medical solutions, but also in narratives about the historical threats posed by animal-rights activists. A discussion climate, with focus on present research and conflicts rather than consensus, could build a better foundation for real cost–benefit evaluations, and offer better possibilities for committee members to fulfil their mission.