Article Text
Abstract
In ‘Why Abortion is Immoral’, Don Marquis argues that abortion is wrong for the same reason that murder is wrong, namely, that it deprives a human being of an FLO, a ‘future like ours,’ which is a future full of value and the experience of life. Marquis’ argument rests on the assumption that the human being is somehow deprived by suffering an early death. I argue that Marquis’ argument faces the ‘Epicurean Challenge’. The concept of ‘deprivation’ requires that some discernible individual exists who can be deprived. But if death involves total annihilation, then no discernible individual exists to be so deprived. I argue that the Epicurean Challenge must be addressed before it can be proven that Marquis is correct to claim that abortion and murder are wrong because they deprive someone of an FLO.
- abortion
- ethics
- death
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Introduction
In ‘Why Abortion is Immoral’, Don Marquis argues that abortion is morally wrong for the same reason that murder is morally wrong.1–4 The action deprives an individual of a future like ours (FLO). Marquis describes an FLO as a future of value involving all the good things the individual could conceivably enjoy if she were to live out her natural days without the interruption of an early death. If Marquis’ argument is correct, it would explain not only why abortion is wrong, but also why murder is wrong. Both actions would deprive someone of her future of value.
Other authors have argued against Marquis’ argument because of its ambiguity,5 6,i its assumption that a ‘fetus’ necessarily has an FLO,7,ii and its difficulty in addressing distinctions between abortion and the use of contraceptives.8,iii Here, I want to push a different line. Marquis assumes that the individual is deprived by suffering an early death. This assumption opens the argument to what I call the ‘Epicurean Challenge.’ The concept of ‘deprivation’ requires that someone exists who can be deprived. But if death involves total annihilation, then the deceased cannot be deprived of an FLO in death, because no individual exists postmortem to be deprived. I argue that the Epicurean Challenge must be addressed before it can be proven that Marquis is correct to claim that abortion and murder are wrong because they deprive an individual of an FLO. I proceed by first presenting ‘Marquis’ argument’, then presenting my case ‘the Epicurean Challenge’ and finally responding to objections in ‘Objections and conclusion’.
Marquis’ argument
Marquis claims that abortion is wrong for the same reason it is wrong to kill any human being.1 Marquis says, ‘What makes killing us wrong, in general, is that it deprives us of a future of value. Thus, killing someone is wrong, in general, when it deprives her of a future like ours. I shall call this ‘an FLO’.2 If I kill someone, I deprive that individual of her future by cutting short the lifespan that she would otherwise have lived. In particular, I deprive her of a ‘FLO’. Presumably, depriving someone of her FLO involves an injustice of the most grievous sort, an injustice that denies a full lifespan to a fellow human being. At the same time, death is bad for the deceased because it deprives her of the ability to live out her FLO. Her untimely death means that she cannot experience all the joys that life would otherwise have had to offer.
Marquis applies this argument to abortion by noting that a fetus has the same potential for an FLO that an adult human being has. Murder is wrong because it deprives someone of her FLO. Abortion will be wrong for the same reason. It also deprives someone of an FLO. Formally, Marquis’ argument flows like this:
Human beings have an FLO.
Murder is morally wrong because it deprives a human being of an FLO.
A fetus also has an FLO.
Aborting a fetus deprives it of its FLO.
Therefore, abortion is morally wrong (for the same reason that murder is wrong).
The Epicurean challenge
Marquis has stipulated that murder (as well as abortion) is morally wrong because it deprives someone of her FLO. This feature of Marquis’ argument has similarities with an account known as the deprivationist view of death’s badness.9–13 According to the deprivationist view, death is bad ‘not because of any positive features but because of the desirability of what it removes’.9 What makes death bad for someone on this view is that death deprives her of the good things we assume she could have had if she had kept living. When she dies, she can never again enjoy a meal with friends, watching the sunset or going to the cinema. Death deprives her of these things; and this fact, according to the deprivationist account, is what makes death bad for her.
In keeping with the deprivationist account, Marquis claims that murder (and abortion) deprives someone of her future of value. Both the murdered individual and the aborted fetus are presumably deprived of any future they might have enjoyed, and that deprivation is what makes murder and abortion wrong.
However, Marquis’ acceptance of this deprivationist account opens his argument to the ‘Epicurean challenge’. The concept of ‘deprivation’ requires that someone exists who can be deprived. But an ambiguity exists about who death supposedly deprives that Marquis seems not to recognise.iv Two options are immediately available. First, it could be that the individual who is currently living (but not yet dead) is deprived. Second, it could be that the individual who is dead (and no longer living) is deprived.
However, neither of these options makes much sense. To understand why, we must consider an argument that the ancient Greek philosopher, Epicurus, presents in his ‘Letter to Menoeceus’. Epicurus claims that death is ‘nothing’ to us, since no individual survives death to be affected. He writes: ‘So death, the worst of evils, is nothing to us, since when we are, death is not present, and when death is present, we are not’.14,v
This argument requires some unpacking. Let us first consider those who are already dead. Epicurus was a hedonist who believed that the only thing that matters in life is one’s experience of pleasure and pain. Pleasure alone has positive value and brings benefits, while pain alone has negative value and brings harm. Epicurus denies that someone can be in pleasure or pain and be unaware of it. Therefore, he claims that something can benefit or harm someone only if that individual exists and is able to experience that event. However, ‘when death is present, we are not’. This expression means that when we die, we no longer exist. Death involves total annihilation, both body and soul. Assuming Epicurus’ premise that death is final, then no individual survives death who can be affected either positively or negatively. Thus, no individual survives death to be benefitted or harmed. Death is therefore ‘nothing’ good or bad to those already dead and it cannot deprive them.vi
Now consider those who are currently alive. Epicurus claims that living humans cannot be affected by an event that has not yet happened to them if the event would not affect them after it occurred. When he says ‘when we are, death is not present’, he means only that the living are currently alive. Having already established that an individual does not survive death to be the subject of harm or benefit in the future, Epicurus is free to claim that death, causing ‘no annoyance when it is present’,14 is unworthy of apprehension in advance.vii Death cannot deprive those who are currently alive because it has not happened yet; and when death occurs, they will not exist to be deprived. Consequently, death is ‘nothing’ to the living either.
This argument forms the Epicurean Challenge to Marquis’ argument. If no one survives death to be affected either positively or negatively, then no one exists who can be deprived by murder. And if that individual cannot be deprived by murder, then saying that murder is morally wrong because it deprives someone of an FLO must be false. By extension, saying that abortion is wrong because it deprives a human being of an FLO would also be false. In both cases, no discernable individual persists through the action to be a subject of loss.
We may also think of the Challenge by contemplating a thought experiment. Consider two variations of a familiar scenario. First, suppose that my colleague brings me some coffee and sets it before me on my desk. Now imagine that another colleague struts in and snatches that divine brew from me. In this case, I would obviously be deprived of that coffee; it was mine, and I know I have been wronged. No doubt I will endure the rest of my day in a cantankerous funk because my coffee-thieving colleague has so wrongly deprived me.
Now consider an alternative scenario. My colleague delivers coffee to my office and sets it on my desk. But I am not in my office. I am at home grading papers, and I will remain there until long after the coffee has become unpalatable. Meanwhile, unbeknownst to me, my coffee-thieving colleague slips into my office and absconds with the drink. Here, we should struggle how to say I could really be ‘deprived’ of that coffee. I am not even aware that the coffee was left for me. I am not deprived, because I am not present in my office to be a legitimate subject of loss.
The contrast between these two scenarios illustrates that for deprivation to occur, it requires that an existing someone be deprived. Death is more (though imperfectly) like the second case than the first. It is unlike the first case because the dead have no ability to discover their demise, unlike how I can discover my colleague’s theft. The dead cannot be deprived of good things like I am when my coffee is snatched from my desk. For this reason, death is also imperfectly like the second example, because there I am conceivably able to realise my colleague’s theft later and feel disgruntled, even if I do not realise the theft immediately. But when I die (assuming death is annihilation) I no longer exist even in another spatial location. Therefore, no possibility exists for me to discover my condition. But death is relevantly like the second case in that, in both instances, when I die and when my colleague snatches the coffee from my untended office, I am not deprived. I cannot be deprived of coffee that I have no possibility of enjoying. This feature holds even truer in death, where no discernable subject exists to be deprived.
Interestingly, at one point, Marquis appears to agree that having no discernible subject of loss would mean that loss cannot possibly be incurred. This reference appears in response to an objection that other philosophers have raised against Marquis’ view. The objection is that every time contraception is employed, it would prohibit an FLO from coming to fruition, and thus Marquis might count it as ‘murder’.8 15,viii Marquis responds that contraception is not problematic for his account because no identifiable subject of harm exists in contraception. He writes: ‘This alternative (interpretation of contraception) does not yield an actual subject of harm either. Accordingly, the immorality of contraception is not entailed by the loss of a future-like-ours argument simply because there is no nonarbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss’.1 He says the idea more strongly in a more recent version of the argument: ‘But if there is no such subject of harm, then no determinate thing was harmed. If no determinate thing was harmed, then no wrong has been done’.2
In these passages, Marquis recognises that the absence of any discernible subject of harm must mean that no harm can occur. The ovum is not deprived of life by contraception; it cannot be deprived because it is not an identifiable subject of harm. But Marquis’ argument also extends to the Epicurean Challenge. If death involves total annihilation, as the Challenge assumes, then in death, just as in contraception, no discernable subject exists to be harmed or deprived. We cannot tell who is supposedly harmed on Marquis’ account. In that case, Marquis’ murdered individuals and aborted fetuses cannot be deprived of any FLO, and his argument that murder is wrong on deprivationist grounds is not yet proven.
Objections and conclusion
I have argued that, if death involves total annihilation, then no individual exists to be deprived of her FLO. Someone may object that my argument depends on the claim that an individual can be deprived only if she is aware of being deprived. But it certainly seems that an individual may be deprived even if she is unaware of any deprivation. Perhaps my colleague’s coffee-thieving really does deprive me somehow, even if I remain unaware of it. Analogously, perhaps abortion and murder really do deprive fetuses and adult human beings of an FLO even if they remain unaware of their demise.
Thomas Nagel provides two examples to advance this counterargument. The first describes someone whose friend betrays her behind her back.9 Suppose ‘Susie’ thinks her life is going well. Unbeknownst to Susie, her best friend has viciously betrayed her. Although Susie is unaware of this betrayal, it may still appear that this betrayal harms her. Nagel’s second example describes someone who receives a brain injury. Suppose ‘Julie’ is a great scientist. But when Julie suffers horrific trauma in an accident, her mind becomes incapable of higher reasoning. Consequently, it may seem that the accident has harmed Julie, even though Julie remains unaware of her state. Nagel argues that if we accept that either Susie or Julie is harmed, then we agree that their awareness is irrelevant to the question of whether they are harmed. Then, if we accept that these cases are relevantly analogous to death, the Epicurean Challenge would be undermined.
Though one could write pages and pages on this question (indeed, some scholars have),10 11 16–20 it is sufficient for my purposes to note that Nagel’s examples fail to be analogous to death for the same reason that my second coffee-theft example was imperfectly analogous. These examples illustrate cases in which a definite (and arguably identical) individual persists through the critical event. I exist when grading papers, whether I am in my office or not; so there is a small sense in which I could be affected by my thieving colleague (eg, if I return later and discover the theft). Likewise, Susie is the same individual before and after the betrayal, in the sense that she persists through the event without significant changes to her constitution or personality. But this does not mean that Susie would remain unharmed if she were to discover the betrayal, or if she were to feel the effects of the betrayal in other ways. Similarly, Julie is at least physically continuous with her previously uninjured self. Accordingly, these individuals can be harmed, because they persist in some way through the event that harms them. But the crucial difference is that, in death, no subject persists through the death event. The individual who dies ceases to exist. So death is unlike Nagel’s examples and my purloined coffee case. Thus, I am correct to challenge Marquis’ premise that murder is wrong because it deprives someone of her FLO.
Another objection concerns whether Epicurus’ argument is credible.ix Epicurus’ argument addresses the worry that death involves subjective suffering by explaining that individuals do not survive death to be negatively affected. But perhaps what bothers people about death is the loss of objective value, that is, the value of what they could have done in a continued life. Individuals invest their lives with meaning by making long-term plans and projecting themselves into the future. They plan to marry, write a novel or open a restaurant, but death cuts short those plans and all possible value obtained from completing them. Marquis’ FLO argument captures the sense that cutting short these projects is what really harms individuals, and one might question whether the Epicurean Challenge can cogently address such worries.
To reply, it is helpful to borrow from the Roman Epicurean, Lucretius, who writes that mourners bemoan one’s death, saying, ‘Never again can you enjoy prosperous circumstances or be a bulwark to your descendants’.21 However, what the mourners neglect, Lucretius writes, is that ‘No craving for these things remains with you any longer’.21 Lucretius emphasises that, despite what the mourners might think, the dead are not harmed by the abrupt termination of long-term projects they might otherwise have expected to complete (such as caring for their descendants). The dead cannot be harmed in that way because they no longer have existing desires since death extinguishes the individual’s desires along with the individual.x The original Epicurean argument about death also applies here. If the dead are not affected by the actual termination of their projects, they also should not be affected by the future termination of them.
One may wonder at the psychological efficacy of this argument. After all, none of us knows exactly what death is like, and the mental discipline required to convince ourselves that death is nothing to us may be beyond ordinary human ability. However, the philosophical view is worth consideration even if it has little psychological effectiveness because it captures a significant truth. Suppose that I do not desire to complete a painting I began years ago. From one perspective (namely, my subjective view), it is odd to say that I am ‘deprived of’ the value of that experience when I simply lack interest in the project. From another perspective (namely, your external view), you may feel justified in saying that I ‘miss out on’ something by not completing the project. You may also feel disappointed that you will not see the painting completed. However, I am incapable of recognising what you perceive about the situation. Since I have no desire to finish the painting, I cannot see how I would be missing out by not completing it.
We must distinguish between the subjective and external perspectives, because the same considerations apply even more to the deceased. These considerations suggest that much of the difficulty rests in disassociating ourselves, living, from our sympathies regarding the imagined plight of the dead. Crucially, Marquis’ FLO argument assumes that murder is wrong because those who die suffer loss and not because the survivors suffer loss.1,xi But if the deceased’s desire to invest herself in long-term projects dies with her, then the loss of value cannot be to her as Marquis stipulates. The loss can only apply to those external observers who have not yet died, in particular, the survivors who mourn the dead. This point allows that survivors can mourn a death as wrong, because the survivors have indeed lost something of value. In the same way that you might feel sorry about not seeing my completed painting or think that I have ‘missed out’ by not completing it, so survivors can mourn the objective loss caused by a brutal murder. But if the deceased herself does not exist, then the objective loss is not hers. Thus, Marquis’ premise that murder is wrong because it deprives someone of her FLO is not yet proven.
However, it is worth taking stock of my conclusion. All that my analysis shows is that the wrongness of murder is not that it deprives someone of her FLO. Though murder is not wrong because it deprives someone of an FLO, murder can be still wrong for another reason. It also leaves open the possibility that abortion is morally wrong, and even that abortion is wrong for the same reason that murder is wrong. But the explanation that murder is wrong because it deprives someone of an FLO is insufficient when it is considered with the view that no individual survives death to be so deprived. Consequently, we need another explanation for the moral wrongness of murder and, by extension, a different argument for the moral impermissibility of abortion.
Acknowledgments
The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments from the referees at the Journal of Medical Ethics, and thanks Christiane Merritt for valuable past conversations.
Footnotes
↵i Brown argues that Marquis commits the fallacy of equivocation by not differentiating two ways of understanding ‘future of value’.5 Cudd argues that Marquis conflates the ideas that the fetus has rights and that those rights are absolute.6
↵ii McInerney argues that Marquis’ premise that the fetus has an FLO is ‘unexamined’.7
↵iii Norcross argues that Marquis fails to distinguish ‘morally’ between contraception and abortion, remaining unconvinced by Marquis’ claim that contraception harms no ‘arbitrarily identifiable subject of loss’.8
↵iv Brown also recognises an ambiguity, but regarding two ways to understand FLO,5 not regarding the identity of the individual supposedly harmed.
↵v My translation uses the LOEB text of Ep. Men. 125.
↵vi This argument assumes that death is final. Anyone believing in an afterlife or immortal soul will remain unconvinced. But the view that death is annihilation is consistent with Marquis’ position when Marquis claims that murder terminates an individual’s future.
↵vii This point clarifies that Epicurus writes about death, the interminable time after one has died, rather than the process of dying.
↵viii See note (iii), above.
↵ix I thank an anonymous referee for encouraging me to consider this point.
↵x Warren makes a similar point: ‘the deceased will not be deprived of these goods since after death he will have no desire for them’.(36)20 The key, though, is that death extinguishes those desires.
↵xi Marquis calls it ‘hubris’ to think that ‘what makes killing us wrong is the great loss others would experience due to our absence’.(189)
Contributors AC is the sole author and contributor of this essay.
Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests None declared.
Patient consent Not required.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
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