Pharmaceuticals, political money, and public policy: a theoretical and empirical agenda

PD Jorgensen - Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 2013 - cambridge.org
PD Jorgensen
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 2013cambridge.org
The point, for the 946,326 th time is that people get elected to office by currying the favor of
powerful interest groups. They don't get elected for their excellence as political philosophers.
Congress has consistently failed to solve some serious problems with the cost,
effectiveness, and safety of pharmaceuticals. In part, this failure results from the
pharmaceutical industry convincing legislators to define policy problems in ways that protect
industry profits. By targeting campaign contributions to influential legislators and by …
The point, for the 946,326th time is that people get elected to office by currying the favor of powerful interest groups. They don’t get elected for their excellence as political philosophers.Congress has consistently failed to solve some serious problems with the cost, effectiveness, and safety of pharmaceuticals. In part, this failure results from the pharmaceutical industry convincing legislators to define policy problems in ways that protect industry profits. By targeting campaign contributions to influential legislators and by providing them with selective information, the industry manages to displace the public’s voice in developing pharmaceutical policy.
Cambridge University Press