Pre-vital and post-mortem non-existence

F Kaufman - American Philosophical Quarterly, 1999 - JSTOR
XJ/picurus's famous pronouncement that" death is nothing to us" continues to shock and to
fascinate. 1 For on the assumption that death entails the permanent extinction of personal …

Death and deprivation; or, why Lucretius' symmetry argument fails

F Kaufman - Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1996 - Taylor & Francis
Assuming that death is the permanent extinction of conscious personal existence, the
natural reaction to one's impending death is dismay. Under normal conditions, our death is …

Speciesism and the Argument from Misfortune

F Kaufman - Journal of Applied Philosophy, 1998 - Wiley Online Library
Is there a morally relevant difference between a brain‐damaged human being and a
nonhuman animal at the same cognitive and emotional level to justify, say, performing …

An answer to Lucretius' symmetry argument against the fear of death

F Kaufman - J. Value Inquiry, 1995 - HeinOnline
Assuming that death is the permanent extinction of personal conscious existence, what are
we to make of our death? Epicurus says," nothing." He argues that," so long as we exist …

The end of sustainability

F Kaufman - International Journal of Sustainable Society, 2009 - inderscienceonline.com
The concept of sustainability is in danger of being used to serve the ends of a mass
consumer society, if it promises to allow us to continue our consumerist way of life but …

Machines, sentience, and the scope of morality

F Kaufman - Environmental Ethics, 1994 - pdcnet.org
Environmental philosophers are often concerned to show that non-sentient things, such as
plants or ecosystems, have interests and therefore are appropriate objects of moral concern …

Thick and thin selves: Reply to Fischer and Speak

F Kaufman - Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2000 - pdcnet.org
On the assumption that one's death is the permanent extinction of conscious personal
existence, death is bad, when it is bad, because it deprives one of the goods of life that …

Lucretius and the Fear of Death

F Kaufman, M Cholbi - Immortality and the Philosophy of Death, 2016 - books.google.com
Many people, perhaps even most people, conceive of their deaths as just another step in the
continuation of their lives. For them the question of whether their death is an evil poses no …

Disease: definition and objectivity

F Kaufman - What is disease?, 1997 - Springer
The concept of disease has been the subject of intense philosophical scrutiny, with much at
stake. Is the notion of a disease purely descriptive, like the concept of triangularity, or is the …

Coming into and going out of existence

F Kaufman - Exploring the philosophy of death and dying, 2020 - taylorfrancis.com
Death can be bad for us because it can deprive us of additional good life, but coming into
existence can never be bad for us because it is simply not possible (in the relevant sense of …