Conflict rationalisation: How family members cope with a diagnosis of brain stem death

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Abstract

Brain death, whether it be brain stem death in the UK, or whole-brain death in the USA, is a prerequisite for heart-beating organ donation. Understanding how brain death is perceived by family members approached about organ donation, its significance to them, and if it is accepted by them, are, therefore, important issues to explore as biomedicine expands the range of end of life technologies that blur the demarcation between life and death. To explore the concept of brain stem death and its meaning to family members the following research questions were posed: (i) what does the diagnosis of death based on brain stem testing mean to bereaved family members who have been approached and asked to consider a donation from a deceased relative, and (ii) how do family members understand the concept of brain stem death?

To address these research questions, a secondary analysis of 28 interviews sorted from two primary datasets was carried out. The primary datasets contained longitudinal and cross-sectional interviews carried out in the UK with family members who had been approached about organ donation and agreed to donate their relatives' organs. Data analysis was guided by constructionist grounded theory method and resulted in the theory of Paradoxical Death. In this process, family members and health professionals engage in a series of practical and psychological activities aimed at rationalising real or potential emotional and cognitive conflict resulting from a brain-based diagnosis of death, whilst faced with the physical image of a functioning body. Rationalising emotional and cognitive conflict is how family members and health professionals appeared to process this paradoxical death, a death that is contrary to conventional opinion.

Introduction

Youngner, Arnold, and Schapiro (1999) suggest that to diagnose death there needs to be a definition of death. The definition of death that was accepted until steps were taken to change it in the mid 1960s, was based on cardiopulmonary criteria “The organism is alive only when the vital bodily fluids, air and blood, continue to flow through the organism” (Brody, 1999: 73). The significance of air and blood in death can be traced back to early civilisations. The departure of the soul from the body as a marker of death was central to the ancient Egyptian civilisation and influenced the later Greek, Hebrew, Islamic and Christian concepts of death (Pallis & Harley, 1996). Classical Greek physicians gave prominence to the role of the heart in the diagnosis of death: they believed “the heart alone served as the seat of life” and that while death could begin in the lungs, the lungs served merely to support the heart (Pernick, 1988: 19). Early Hebrew scholars believed that man [sic] was made in the image of God and that when the spirit of God [ruach or Greek, pneuma] was taken away, then man was no more (Eckardt, 1972). Therefore ruach [can be translated as soul] or breath was primary in determining death as it marked the soul leaving the body.

The influence of these ideas is seen in later definitions of death such as that in Black's Law Dictionary (1951, 4th ed.), where death is defined as “The cessation of life, the ceasing to exist; defined by the physicians as a total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent thereupon, respiration and pulsation”. As developments in areas such as suspended animation, whereby organs were maintained after they had been removed from the dead body (Pernick, 1988), and resuscitation, by which previously fatal head injury patients were sustained and supported by mechanical devices such as respiratory ventilators (Lock, 2002) progressed, questions about the moment of death began to be posed.

In response to such questions formal debates about the need for a new definition of death that was brain-based commenced and resulted in the present day criteria of ‘brain stem death’ in the UK and ‘whole-brain death’ in the USA. Influential to these debates was the argument that patients sustained on ventilators were a valuable source of viable organs for transplantation. However, without a fixed time point of death, doctors were concerned that they were at risk of being accused of killing those patients from whom they removed organs such as the heart or kidneys (Tilney, 2003).

Although the guidelines for diagnosing brain death have been in existence since the mid 1970s in the UK and late 1960s in the USA, diagnosing brain death has not reached a stage of universal agreement between health professionals. Debates polarise around whether the criteria available to diagnose brain death [whole brain or brain stem] are biologically plausible (Potts & Evans, 2005), are consistent with present legal approaches to the diagnosis of death (Kerridge, Soul, Lowe, McPhee, & Williams, 2002), and whether the diagnosis of brain death corresponds to any coherent philosophical understanding of death (Jones, 2000, Truog and Robinson, 2003). This lack of agreement between health professionals is reflected to some extent by the public, who are reported to have concerns and a lack of knowledge regarding this diagnosis (Franz et al., 1997, Pearson et al., 1995, Siminoff et al., 2004, Siminoff et al., 2001, Siminoff et al., 2003).

Public concern has been clearly articulated in countries such as Denmark and Japan (Lock, 1999, Lock, 2002, Rix, 1999) where public views have been responsible for delaying intended legislation confirming the diagnosis of brain death. For example, in Japan debates have continued since the first heart transplant carried out there in 1968, after which the surgeon was accused of “illegal human experimentation”, and of exercising “dubious judgement in relation to the donor's death” (Bowman & Shawn, 2003: 212). Following many Bills to legitimise the diagnosis of brain death, all of which were opposed by the majority of the public (Bowman & Shawn, 2004), Japan passed a Bill in 1999, 31 years after the first transplant from a brain-dead donor.

The potential organ donor has, usually, suffered an unexpected catastrophic brain injury that has resulted in the death of the brain stem. Patients who die in such a way are considered by the medical professions to be potential organ donors, and, therefore, will undergo specific testing to confirm death. The medical professional will make a request to the nominated or ‘qualifying person’, who is usually the next of kin, requesting their ‘appropriate consent’ for the organs and tissues of their deceased relative to be used in transplant operations (Human Tissue Act, 2004). Due to the technical nature of brain stem death, testing and diagnosis usually takes place in an Intensive Care Unit [ICU], where death is more usually, sudden, or as a result of a staged withdrawal of treatment.

The literature around the social organisation of death (Harvey, 1997) suggests that the strategic practice of withdrawing technological support from the dying patient in stages, aims to mimic the more gradual decline of natural death. This ‘technological regulation of death’ has two purposes: (i) it allows both the family and health care professionals time to adjust ‘emotionally’ to the patient's imminent death, and, (ii) it allows death to be presented in a less dramatic fashion (Harvey, 1997: 719). The procedure for this strategic withdrawal is that health care professionals aim to communicate a ‘death trajectory’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1968) by using ‘pessimistic communications’ (Seymour, 2001) regarding the seriousness of the critical injury, followed by communication of a deterioration in the patient's condition or failure to respond to treatment. There is usually the demarcation of a time-line within which, if no change takes place, this lack of change will be interpreted as prognostic of the futility of ongoing intervention. A discussion about withdrawing treatment will take place and, if agreed, drugs will be gradually reduced so as not to precipitate a sudden death, interventions will be minimised and equipment removed. Frequently, family members are left alone with the patient and time is allowed for extended family or important others to gather at the bedside. As Harvey (1997) states, “the withdrawal of technological support renders the process of ‘death’ very visible” (p. 725).

This is not the situation when organ donation is to take place. There are subtle but specific differences in the format of the regulation of death. Health professionals communicate a death trajectory using pessimistic communications regarding the seriousness of the critical injury, but interventions are then increased, for example, drugs are increased in an effort to maximise the quality of the potential organs for transplant operations, personnel are augmented with the addition of the transplant coordinator, and discussions take place regarding the time that the deceased will go to the operating theatre for donation to take place. The potential organ donor is not left alone with their family for extended periods of time as any change in their status must be dealt with immediately to maintain the quality of the potentially transplantable organs.

Therefore, unlike the ‘usual’ death facilitated within the ICU potential organ donors are not treated as though they are dead. What, if any, impact such contradictions may have on the experiences of the family members of potential organ donors was the stimulus for this study, which aimed to explore the concept of brain stem death by asking (i) what does the diagnosis of death based on brain stem testing mean to bereaved family members who have been approached and asked to consider donation from a deceased relative? and (ii) how do family members understand the concept of brain stem death?

Section snippets

Method

To address these research questions a secondary analysis of two primary datasets was conducted applying techniques from Charmaz's (2000) constructionist grounded theory method. Secondary analysis was used in this research as it has been shown to be beneficial in studies where the issues to be addressed are of a sensitive nature, where studies are difficult to repeat, or where the relevant research population may be elusive (Fielding, 2004), which was the case in this research. Two primary

Findings and discussion

As is usual in grounded theory, the findings are presented in combination with the discussion and for clarity in the form of three integrated propositions (1) paradoxical communication and the environment of the ICU contribute to emotional and cognitive conflict; (2) the technology of life support contradicts the diagnosis of brain stem death; and (3) family members and health care professionals seek to rationalise the emotional and cognitive conflict stimulated by the diagnosis of brain stem

Secondary analysis

Applying a secondary analysis has fulfilled the aims of (i) addressing a sensitive area of research, (ii) accessing a research population that may be ‘elusive’ (Fielding, 2004), and (iii) has facilitated the application of research questions which, whilst being linked to the substantive area of the primary research, explored different issues. Data collection, in the form of sorting transcripts that had enough detail about the experience of being involved in the diagnosis of brain stem death,

Limitations to the study

The secondary participant data accessed for this study was gathered from a specific population. That population was those family members who had been in receipt of a diagnosis of brain death in relation to a relative, and who had agreed for the organs of their relative to be donated and used in transplant operations [data from non-donating family members did not meet the sorting criteria for secondary analysis], therefore, the findings are limited to those individuals who agreed to organ

Conclusion

How individuals perceive death to have occurred is a fundamental issue in organ donation, and this work has indicated that their perception is not always congruent with medico-legal definitions of death. The diagnosis of brain death is a difficult issue due in part to the questions that it raises about life and death: what is death? When does it happen? And does life linger on after a diagnosis of brain death? But also, in part, to reported poor knowledge levels of family members and

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    We would like to acknowledge the family members who participated in this research. Their contribution is central to this work.

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