Plausible assumptions, questionable assumptions and post hoc rationalizations: Will the real IAT, please stand up?
Section snippets
Theory testing
Consider some psychological theories that might be of interest to a psychologist. Fig. 1 presents examples using the traditional schematic for representing causal models. The top panel presents the causal model that would be tested by a researcher who wants to predict college students’ identification with math from their attitudes towards math and arts. Based on the path coefficients that this researcher has hypothesized, math identification should be predicted from the attitude towards math,
An empirical evaluation
We now present data that explores issues central to Nosek and Sriram’s critique. In a study using a convenience sample of 132 male and female college students, we administered an attitude inventory that measured two attitudes that a consumer psychologist might target with an IAT task. These were (1) attitudes towards apples and (2) attitudes towards oranges. The attitude towards apples was measured with three (11-point) items and the attitude towards oranges was measured with three separate
Reverse-scored IAT indicators: A justified assumption
In the psychometric model we tested for the IAT in our original article, we noted that the two measured IAT response latencies (one for the compatible task and the other for the incompatible task) should be negatively correlated with one another, once systematic confounds due to general processing speed are removed. Accordingly, as one’s true preference for whites relative to blacks increases, (1) response latencies for the compatible task of the black-white IAT (pairing whites with positive
Distractions
At the risk of being drawn into nonproductive exchanges, we feel we should respond to two of the false and misleading statements Nosek and Sriram made concerning our original analyses. Each of these statements represents a distraction that might draw readers’ attention away from the more fundamental intellectual differences between us.
Distraction 1: The IAT Is Not Double-Barreled. In our original article, we observed that the IAT question format is double-barreled. Specifically, we stated that
Closing thoughts
We have now published three critiques of the IAT (Blanton and Jaccard, 2006a, Blanton and Jaccard, 2006b; Blanton et al., 2006), but each of these papers has been categorically rejected by IAT researchers (Greenwald et al., 2006, Greenwald, Rudman et al., 2006, Nosek and Sriram, 2007). Although we are satisfied with how we have defended our work (Blanton and Jaccard, 2006c, Blanton and Jaccard, 2006d, Jaccard and Blanton, 2006), we cannot help but notice that we have had little influence on how
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