@article {Pickering893, author = {Neil John Pickering and Giles Newton-Howes and Simon Walker}, title = {Risk-related standards of competence are a nonsense}, volume = {48}, number = {11}, pages = {893--898}, year = {2022}, doi = {10.1136/medethics-2021-108107}, publisher = {Institute of Medical Ethics}, abstract = {If a person is competent to consent to a treatment, is that person necessarily competent to refuse the very same treatment? Risk relativists answer no to this question. If the refusal of a treatment is risky, we may demand a higher level of decision-making capacity to choose this option. The position is known as asymmetry. Risk relativity rests on the possibility of setting variable levels of competence by reference to variable levels of risk. In an excellent 2016 article in Journal of Medical Ethics (JME), Rob Lawlor defends asymmetry of this kind by defending risk relativity, using and developing arguments and approaches found in earlier work such as that of Wilks. He offers what we call the two-scale approach: a scale of risk is to be used to set a standard of competence on a scale of decision-making difficulty. However, can this be done in any rational way? We argue it cannot, and in this sense, and to this extent, risk relativity is a nonsense.There are no data in this work.}, issn = {0306-6800}, URL = {https://jme.bmj.com/content/48/11/893}, eprint = {https://jme.bmj.com/content/48/11/893.full.pdf}, journal = {Journal of Medical Ethics} }