TY - JOUR T1 - The inconsistency argument: why apparent pro-life inconsistency undermines opposition to induced abortion JF - Journal of Medical Ethics JO - J Med Ethics SP - 461 LP - 465 DO - 10.1136/medethics-2020-107207 VL - 48 IS - 7 AU - William Simkulet Y1 - 2022/07/01 UR - http://jme.bmj.com/content/48/7/461.abstract N2 - Most opposition to induced abortion turns on the belief that human fetuses are persons from conception. On this view, the moral status of the fetus alone requires those in a position to provide aid—gestational mothers—to make tremendous sacrifices to benefit the fetus. Recently, critics have argued that this pro-life position requires more than opposition to induced abortion. Pro-life theorists are relatively silent on the issues of spontaneous abortion, surplus in vitro fertilisation human embryos, and the suffering and death of born persons due to lack of access to food, shelter and medical care. Colgrove et al call such arguments inconsistency arguments, arguing they ‘do not matter’ and mischaracterise them as ad hominem attacks. Here, I argue these are better understood as moral dilemmas. While some critics argue pro-life inaction is evidence that they do not really believe human fetuses are persons, I contend this inaction is likely the result of resolvable confusion rather than moral negligence.There are no data in this work. ER -