PT - JOURNAL ARTICLE AU - Simkulet, William TI - The inconsistency argument: why apparent pro-life inconsistency undermines opposition to induced abortion AID - 10.1136/medethics-2020-107207 DP - 2022 Jul 01 TA - Journal of Medical Ethics PG - 461--465 VI - 48 IP - 7 4099 - http://jme.bmj.com/content/48/7/461.short 4100 - http://jme.bmj.com/content/48/7/461.full SO - J Med Ethics2022 Jul 01; 48 AB - Most opposition to induced abortion turns on the belief that human fetuses are persons from conception. On this view, the moral status of the fetus alone requires those in a position to provide aid—gestational mothers—to make tremendous sacrifices to benefit the fetus. Recently, critics have argued that this pro-life position requires more than opposition to induced abortion. Pro-life theorists are relatively silent on the issues of spontaneous abortion, surplus in vitro fertilisation human embryos, and the suffering and death of born persons due to lack of access to food, shelter and medical care. Colgrove et al call such arguments inconsistency arguments, arguing they ‘do not matter’ and mischaracterise them as ad hominem attacks. Here, I argue these are better understood as moral dilemmas. While some critics argue pro-life inaction is evidence that they do not really believe human fetuses are persons, I contend this inaction is likely the result of resolvable confusion rather than moral negligence.There are no data in this work.