TY - JOUR T1 - On Loland’s conception of fair equality of opportunity in sport JF - Journal of Medical Ethics JO - J Med Ethics SP - 595 LP - 596 DO - 10.1136/medethics-2020-106748 VL - 46 IS - 9 AU - Lynley C Anderson AU - Taryn Rebecca Knox Y1 - 2020/09/01 UR - http://jme.bmj.com/content/46/9/595.abstract N2 - In his latest paper, Loland1 tackles the question of whether athletes with differences of sexual development (DSD) may compete in the women’s division. The topic is one of the most complex in sport and, as such, is fraught with debate. On one hand, the higher testosterone levels of athletes with DSD means they have an unfair performance advantage over their female competitors. On the other hand, it is argued that women with DSD should be able to compete in the gender division with which they identify, especially as many will have been raised with a clear gender identity.Loland uses the Rawlsian notion of ‘fair equality of opportunity’ (FEO) in which individuals with similar talents and ambitions should have roughly equivalent prospects for competitive success. For example, in most situations in society, one’s age, biological sex, ethnic and religious background, colour of skin, or sexual orientation are irrelevant to whether an individual should be given a job or is eligible for social welfare. In addition to being irrelevant, these factors are also stable—they are inequalities that ‘individuals cannot control or impact in any significant way’.1 However, Loland recognises that some stable inequalities, such as biological sex and body size, are relevant to FEO in sport. For example, a featherweight boxer may have similar talents and … ER -