@article {Fostermedethics-2020-106280, author = {Charles Foster}, title = {Withdrawing treatment from patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness: the presumption in favour of the maintenance of life is legally robust}, elocation-id = {medethics-2020-106280}, year = {2020}, doi = {10.1136/medethics-2020-106280}, publisher = {Institute of Medical Ethics}, abstract = {The question a judge has to ask in deciding whether or not life-sustaining treatment should be withdrawn is whether the continued treatment is lawful. It will be lawful if it is in the patient{\textquoteright}s best interests. Identifying this question gives no guidance about how to approach the assessment of best interests. It merely identifies the judge{\textquoteright}s job. The presumption in favour of the maintenance of life is part of the job that follows the identification of the question.The presumption is best regarded as a presumption of law. It has long been recognised as part of the way in which the English law discharges its obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to life). But even if it is a {\textquoteleft}mere{\textquoteright} evidential presumption it cannot, on the facts of most cases involving applications for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from patients in prolonged disorders of consciousness, be rebutted.}, issn = {0306-6800}, URL = {https://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2020/05/14/medethics-2020-106280}, eprint = {https://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2020/05/14/medethics-2020-106280.full.pdf}, journal = {Journal of Medical Ethics} }