RT Journal Article SR Electronic T1 Abortion and the Epicurean challenge JF Journal of Medical Ethics JO J Med Ethics FD BMJ Publishing Group Ltd and Institute of Medical Ethics SP 273 OP 274 DO 10.1136/medethics-2019-105771 VO 46 IS 4 A1 Karl Ekendahl YR 2020 UL http://jme.bmj.com/content/46/4/273.abstract AB In a recent article in this journal, Anna Christensen raises an ‘Epicurean challenge’ to Don Marquis’ much-discussed argument for the immorality of abortion. According to Marquis’ argument, abortion is pro tanto morally wrong because it deprives the fetus of ‘a future like ours’. Drawing on the Epicurean idea that death cannot harm its victim because there is no subject to be harmed, Christensen argues that neither fetuses nor anyone else can be deprived of a future like ours by dying. Thus, Christensen suggests, the moral wrongness of abortion (and other killings) cannot be grounded in the relevant individual’s being deprived of a future like ours. In this reply, I argue that on no interpretation of Christensen’s Epicurean challenge does it succeed.