TY - JOUR T1 - Is the ‘serious’ factor in germline modification really relevant? A response to Kleiderman, Ravitsky and Knoppers JF - Journal of Medical Ethics JO - J Med Ethics SP - 151 LP - 152 DO - 10.1136/medethics-2019-105744 VL - 46 IS - 2 AU - Iñigo De Miguel Beriain Y1 - 2020/02/01 UR - http://jme.bmj.com/content/46/2/151.abstract N2 - Should we use human germline genome modification (HGGM) only when serious diseases are involved? This belief is the underlying factor in the article written by Kleiderman, Ravitsky and Knoppers to which I now respond. In my opinion, the answer to this question should be negative. In this paper, I attempt to show that there are no good reasons to think that this technology should be limited to serious diseases once it is sufficiently proven to be safe and efficient. In fact, opting otherwise would negatively harm human beings’ right to the highest standard of health that unmodified embryos could promote. Therefore, the issue should not be so much to define adequately what a serious disease is, but rather to elucidate whether this concept should play any role beyond the context of preimplantation genetic testing (PGT). This paper argues that we should not accept the similarity between technologies such as PGT and HGGM because they face different challenges and offer totally different possibilities. Therefore, we are in urgent need to build a completely new ethical architecture that covers the application of germline editing in human embryos. As a part of that process, a much deeper debate on the necessity of distinguishing different disease types is required. ER -