PT  - JOURNAL ARTICLE
AU  - Elizabeth Chloe Romanis
TI  - Artificial womb technology and the significance of birth: why gestatelings are not newborns (or fetuses)
AID  - 10.1136/medethics-2019-105723
DP  - 2019 Nov 01
TA  - Journal of Medical Ethics
PG  - 728--731
VI  - 45
IP  - 11
4099  - http://jme.bmj.com/content/45/11/728.short
4100  - http://jme.bmj.com/content/45/11/728.full
SO  - J Med Ethics2019 Nov 01; 45
AB  - In a recent publication, I argued that there is a conceptual difference between artificial womb (AW) technology, capable of facilitating gestation ex utero, and neonatal intensive care, providing incubation to neonates born prematurely. One of the reasons I provided for this distinction was that the subjects of each process are different entities. The subject of the process of gestation ex utero is a unique human entity: a ‘gestateling’, rather than a fetus or a newborn preterm neonate. Nick Colgrove wrote a response to my paper, claiming that my distinction between the subject of an AW and a newborn (in intensive care) was false. He claims that I have not accounted for the proper definition of ‘birth’ and that gestatelings are not a distinct product of human reproduction. Further, Colgrove posits that even if I can successfully distinguish gestatelings from preterms, such a distinction is morally irrelevant because the entities would have the same moral status. In this paper, I address the three challenges raised and defend the claim that gestatelings are unique entities. Moreover, I argue that moral status should not be considered ipso facto determinative in the debate about AWs.