RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Conscientious objection to referrals
JF Journal of Medical Ethics
JO J Med Ethics
FD BMJ Publishing Group Ltd and Institute of Medical Ethics
SP 277
OP 279
DO 10.1136/medethics-2018-105067
VO 45
IS 4
A1 Thomas Finegan
YR 2019
UL http://jme.bmj.com/content/45/4/277.abstract
AB Christopher Cowley1 has recently put forward three arguments against the legal accommodation of a general practitioner’s conscientious objection (CO) to abortion referrals.i He claims that the adoption of these arguments does not undermine a more general right to CO to involvement in abortion. I argue that Cowley is seriously mistaken. His three arguments, especially the second and third, proceed on a path directed towards the outright rejection of a right to CO in healthcare contexts. A common problem with Cowley’s three arguments is that they overlook the peremptory significance for CO analysis of both the internal, deliberating perspective of those with a CO and the good of moral integrity. This paper supports the view that either there are strong prima facie grounds for holding that a right to CO extends in principle to the issue of referrals or the claim of a general right to CO is easily assailable.