PT - JOURNAL ARTICLE AU - Robert F Card TI - The Market View on conscientious objection: overvalued AID - 10.1136/medethics-2018-105173 DP - 2019 Mar 01 TA - Journal of Medical Ethics PG - 168--172 VI - 45 IP - 3 4099 - http://jme.bmj.com/content/45/3/168.short 4100 - http://jme.bmj.com/content/45/3/168.full SO - J Med Ethics2019 Mar 01; 45 AB - Ancell and Sinnott-Armstrong argue that medical providers possess wide freedoms to determine the scope of their practice, and therefore, prohibiting almost any conscientious objections is a bad idea. They maintain that we could create an acceptable system on the whole which even grants accommodations to discriminatory refusals by healthcare professionals. Their argument is premised upon applying a free market mechanism to conscientious objections in medicine, yet I argue their Market View possesses a number of absurd and troubling implications. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the fundamental logic of their main argument is flawed. Thinkers who wish to address the issues raised in this debate in general or by discriminatory conscience objections in particular should avoid the Market View and instead envisage theories that assess the reasons underlying conscientious refusals in medicine.