@article {Simkulet536, author = {William Simkulet}, title = {Nudging, informed consent and bullshit}, volume = {44}, number = {8}, pages = {536--542}, year = {2018}, doi = {10.1136/medethics-2017-104480}, publisher = {Institute of Medical Ethics}, abstract = {Some philosophers have argued that during the process of obtaining informed consent, physicians should try to nudge their patients towards consenting to the option the physician believes best, where a nudge is any influence that is expected to predictably alter a person{\textquoteright}s behaviour without (substantively) restricting her options. Some proponents of nudging even argue that it is a necessary and unavoidable part of securing informed consent. Here I argue that nudging is incompatible with obtaining informed consent. I assume informed consent requires that a physician tells her patient the truth about her options and argue that nudging is incompatible with truth-telling. Instead, nudging satisfies Harry Frankfurt{\textquoteright}s account of bullshit.}, issn = {0306-6800}, URL = {https://jme.bmj.com/content/44/8/536}, eprint = {https://jme.bmj.com/content/44/8/536.full.pdf}, journal = {Journal of Medical Ethics} }