@article {Libermanmedethics-2017-104411, author = {Alida Liberman}, title = {Disability, sex rights and the scope of sexual exclusion}, elocation-id = {medethics-2017-104411}, year = {2017}, doi = {10.1136/medethics-2017-104411}, publisher = {Institute of Medical Ethics}, abstract = {In response to three papers about sex and disability published in this journal, I offer a critique of existing arguments and a suggestion about how the debate should be reframed going forward. Jacob M. Appel argues that disabled individuals have a right to sex and should receive a special exemption to the general prohibition of prostitution. Ezio Di Nucci and Frej Klem Thomsen separately argue contra Appel that an appeal to sex rights cannot justify such an exemption. I argue that Appel{\textquoteright}s argument fails, but not (solely) for the reasons Di Nucci and Thomsen propose, as they have missed the most pressing objection to Appel{\textquoteright}s argument: Appel falsely presumes that we never have good reasons to restrict someone{\textquoteright}s sexual liberty rights. More importantly, there is a major flaw in the way that all three authors frame their positive accounts. They focus on disability as a proxy for sexual exclusion, when these categories should be pulled apart: some are sexually excluded who are not disabled, while some who are disabled are not sexually excluded. I conclude that it would be less socially harmful and more productive to focus directly on sexual exclusion per se rather than on disability as a proxy for sexual exclusion.}, issn = {0306-6800}, URL = {https://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2017/11/03/medethics-2017-104411}, eprint = {https://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2017/11/03/medethics-2017-104411.full.pdf}, journal = {Journal of Medical Ethics} }