TY - JOUR T1 - Complexity of defining death: organismal death does not mean the cessation of all biological life JF - Journal of Medical Ethics JO - J Med Ethics SP - 754 LP - 755 DO - 10.1136/medethics-2017-104363 VL - 43 IS - 11 AU - Melissa Moschella Y1 - 2017/11/01 UR - http://jme.bmj.com/content/43/11/754.abstract N2 - Michael Nair-Collins and Franklin Miller are right to emphasise that, in order to deliberate responsibly about ethical and legal questions related to brain death and organ donation, it is crucial to answer the question of whether or not ‘brain death’i does indeed mark the biological death of the organism. Nonetheless, I disagree with the authors’ conclusion that brain death does not indicate the death of the human organism.Death can never be defined in merely biological terms, because any biological conception of death relies on metaphysical presuppositions regarding what it means to be an ‘organism as a whole’ (ie, to possess organismal unity), rather than an aggregate of cells and tissues. Death is a change in substance—that is, a change from one type of entity to another (or multiple others)—not the cessation of all biological life. Organismal death occurs well before all of the organism’s parts irreversibly cease vital activity and decompose into inorganic matter. Biological life in some form can and usually does continue after organismal death at least for a time, with recent evidence indicating that animal cell networks continue to perform complex functions like stress response, immune response and inflammation response up to several days postmortem.1 With external support, many cells and tissues can continue to perform their functions ex vivo for long periods of time or even indefinitely.2 Henrietta Lax died in 1951, but cells derived from her cancerous cervical cells … ER -