RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Respect for autonomy: deciding what is good for oneself
JF Journal of Medical Ethics
JO J Med Ethics
FD BMJ Publishing Group Ltd and Institute of Medical Ethics
SP 769
OP 775
DO 10.1136/medethics-2015-103340
VO 42
IS 12
A1 Kious, Brent Michael
YR 2016
UL http://jme.bmj.com/content/42/12/769.abstract
AB Paternalistic interference in autonomous decisions is typically impermissible. This has several explanations, among which is a view I call the agent-constitution of the good: that the autonomous agent not only knows what is best for herself, but determines what is best for herself through her desires, goals and so on (her aims). For instance, it might seem that if an autonomous person does choose not to take insulin for her diabetes, then not only is it inappropriate to force treatment upon her, it is also not in her best interest to take insulin. Here I argue that agent-constitution, though appealing, is false. In fact, autonomous agents can be mistaken about their good, even when it seems to depend only upon their aims. Agent-constitution appears true only because we typically fail to notice constraints on a person's good in private, self-regarding decisions where paternalism might be considered.