RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Could it be permissible to prevent the existence of morally enhanced people?
JF Journal of Medical Ethics
JO J Med Ethics
FD BMJ Publishing Group Ltd and Institute of Medical Ethics
SP 692
OP 693
DO 10.1136/medethics-2012-100831
VO 38
IS 11
A1 Ingmar Persson
YR 2012
UL http://jme.bmj.com/content/38/11/692.abstract
AB This paper discusses Nicholas Agar's argument in Humanity's End, that it can be morally permissible for human beings to prevent the coming into existence of morally enhanced people because this can harm the interests of the unenhanced humans. It contends that Agar's argument fails because it overlooks the distinction between morally permissible and morally impermissible harm. It is only if the harm to them would be of the morally impermissible kind that humans are provided with a reason to prevent the coming into existence of enhanced people. But if their enhancement includes moral enhancement, it is unlikely that the enhanced people will cause morally impermissible harm.