RT Journal Article SR Electronic T1 Could it be permissible to prevent the existence of morally enhanced people? JF Journal of Medical Ethics JO J Med Ethics FD BMJ Publishing Group Ltd and Institute of Medical Ethics SP 692 OP 693 DO 10.1136/medethics-2012-100831 VO 38 IS 11 A1 Persson, Ingmar YR 2012 UL http://jme.bmj.com/content/38/11/692.abstract AB This paper discusses Nicholas Agar's argument in Humanity's End, that it can be morally permissible for human beings to prevent the coming into existence of morally enhanced people because this can harm the interests of the unenhanced humans. It contends that Agar's argument fails because it overlooks the distinction between morally permissible and morally impermissible harm. It is only if the harm to them would be of the morally impermissible kind that humans are provided with a reason to prevent the coming into existence of enhanced people. But if their enhancement includes moral enhancement, it is unlikely that the enhanced people will cause morally impermissible harm.