PT  - JOURNAL ARTICLE
AU  - DeGrazia, David
TI  - Moral enhancement, freedom, and what we (should) value in moral behaviour
AID  - 10.1136/medethics-2012-101157
DP  - 2014 Jun 01
TA  - Journal of Medical Ethics
PG  - 361--368
VI  - 40
IP  - 6
4099  - http://jme.bmj.com/content/40/6/361.short
4100  - http://jme.bmj.com/content/40/6/361.full
SO  - J Med Ethics2014 Jun 01; 40
AB  - The enhancement of human traits has received academic attention for decades, but only recently has moral enhancement using biomedical means – moral bioenhancement (MB) – entered the discussion. After explaining why we ought to take the possibility of MB seriously, the paper considers the shape and content of moral improvement, addressing at some length a challenge presented by reasonable moral pluralism. The discussion then proceeds to this question: Assuming MB were safe, effective, and universally available, would it be morally desirable? In particular, would it pose an unacceptable threat to human freedom? After defending a negative answer to the latter question – which requires an investigation into the nature and value of human freedom – and arguing that there is nothing inherently wrong with MB, the paper closes with reflections on what we should value in moral behaviour.