PT  - JOURNAL ARTICLE
AU  - Husak, D N
TI  - Killing, letting die and euthanasia.
AID  - 10.1136/jme.5.4.200
DP  - 1979 Dec 01
TA  - Journal of Medical Ethics
PG  - 200--202
VI  - 5
IP  - 4
4099  - http://jme.bmj.com/content/5/4/200.short
4100  - http://jme.bmj.com/content/5/4/200.full
SO  - J Med Ethics1979 Dec 01; 5
AB  - Medical ethicists debate whether or not the moral assessment of cases of euthanasia should depend on whether the patient is 'killed' or 'allowed to die'. The usual presupposition is that a clear distinction between killing and letting die can be drawn so that this substantive question is not begged. I contend that the categorisation of cases of instances of killing rather than as instances of letting die depends in part on a prior moral assessment of the case. Hence is it trivially rather than substantively true that the distinction has moral significance. But even if a morally neutral (ie non-question begging) distinction could be drawn, its application to the euthanasia controversy is problematic. I illustrate the difficulties of employing this distinction to reach moral conclusions by critically discussing Philippa Foot's recent treatment of euthanasia. I conclude that even if an act of euthanasia is an instance of killing, and there exists a prima facie moral duty not to kill, and no more stringent duty overrides this duty, one still cannot determine such an act to be morally impermissible.