@article {Husak200, author = {D N Husak}, title = {Killing, letting die and euthanasia.}, volume = {5}, number = {4}, pages = {200--202}, year = {1979}, doi = {10.1136/jme.5.4.200}, publisher = {Institute of Medical Ethics}, abstract = {Medical ethicists debate whether or not the moral assessment of cases of euthanasia should depend on whether the patient is {\textquoteright}killed{\textquoteright} or {\textquoteright}allowed to die{\textquoteright}. The usual presupposition is that a clear distinction between killing and letting die can be drawn so that this substantive question is not begged. I contend that the categorisation of cases of instances of killing rather than as instances of letting die depends in part on a prior moral assessment of the case. Hence is it trivially rather than substantively true that the distinction has moral significance. But even if a morally neutral (ie non-question begging) distinction could be drawn, its application to the euthanasia controversy is problematic. I illustrate the difficulties of employing this distinction to reach moral conclusions by critically discussing Philippa Foot{\textquoteright}s recent treatment of euthanasia. I conclude that even if an act of euthanasia is an instance of killing, and there exists a prima facie moral duty not to kill, and no more stringent duty overrides this duty, one still cannot determine such an act to be morally impermissible.}, issn = {0306-6800}, URL = {https://jme.bmj.com/content/5/4/200}, eprint = {https://jme.bmj.com/content/5/4/200.full.pdf}, journal = {Journal of Medical Ethics} }