RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Strong's objections to the future of value account
JF Journal of Medical Ethics
JO J Med Ethics
FD BMJ Publishing Group Ltd and Institute of Medical Ethics
SP 384
OP 388
DO 10.1136/jme.2010.038703
VO 37
IS 6
A1 Marquis, Don
YR 2011
UL http://jme.bmj.com/content/37/6/384.abstract
AB According to Carson Strong, the future of value account of the wrongness of killing is subject to counterexamples. Ezio Di Nucci has disagreed. Their disagreement turns on whether the concepts of a future of value and a future like ours are equivalent. Unfortunately, both concepts are fuzzy, which explains, at least in part, the disagreement. I suggest that both concepts can be clarified in ways that seem plausible and that makes them equivalent. Strong claims that better accounts of the wrongness of killing exist. I show that those alternative accounts are unsatisfactory.