PT - JOURNAL ARTICLE AU - Marquis, Don TI - Strong's objections to the future of value account AID - 10.1136/jme.2010.038703 DP - 2011 Jun 01 TA - Journal of Medical Ethics PG - 384--388 VI - 37 IP - 6 4099 - http://jme.bmj.com/content/37/6/384.short 4100 - http://jme.bmj.com/content/37/6/384.full SO - J Med Ethics2011 Jun 01; 37 AB - According to Carson Strong, the future of value account of the wrongness of killing is subject to counterexamples. Ezio Di Nucci has disagreed. Their disagreement turns on whether the concepts of a future of value and a future like ours are equivalent. Unfortunately, both concepts are fuzzy, which explains, at least in part, the disagreement. I suggest that both concepts can be clarified in ways that seem plausible and that makes them equivalent. Strong claims that better accounts of the wrongness of killing exist. I show that those alternative accounts are unsatisfactory.