PT  - JOURNAL ARTICLE
AU  - S Vehmas
AU  - P Mäkelä
TI  - A realist account of the ontology of impairment
AID  - 10.1136/jme.2006.019042
DP  - 2008 Feb 01
TA  - Journal of Medical Ethics
PG  - 93--95
VI  - 34
IP  - 2
4099  - http://jme.bmj.com/content/34/2/93.short
4100  - http://jme.bmj.com/content/34/2/93.full
SO  - J Med Ethics2008 Feb 01; 34
AB  - This paper provides a philosophical analysis of the ontology of impairment, in part social and in part not. The analysis is based on the division between two categories of facts concerning the world we live in: “brute” and institutional facts. Brute facts are those that require no human institution for their existence. To state a brute fact requires naturally the institution of language, but the fact stated is not the same as the statement of it. For example, regardless of any human institution or opinion, the presence of an extra chromosome 21 is a brute fact, and despite of people’s constructions or deconstructions, this fact remains. As for the lives of people with extra chromosome 21, the social reality and human institutions enter the picture. The social and moral status of these people is never a matter of brute fact.