PT  - JOURNAL ARTICLE
AU  - J Cassell
TI  - Against medical ethics: opening the can of worms.
AID  - 10.1136/jme.24.1.8
DP  - 1998 Feb 01
TA  - Journal of Medical Ethics
PG  - 8--17
VI  - 24
IP  - 1
4099  - http://jme.bmj.com/content/24/1/8.short
4100  - http://jme.bmj.com/content/24/1/8.full
SO  - J Med Ethics1998 Feb 01; 24
AB  - In a controversial paper, David Seedhouse argues that medical ethics is not and cannot be a distinct discipline with it own field of study. He derives this claim from a characterization of ethics, which he states but does not defend. He claims further that the project of medical ethics as it exists and of moral philosophy do not overlap. I show that Seedhouse's views on ethics have wide implications which he does not declare, and in the light of this argue that Seedhouse owes us a defence of his characterization of ethics. Further, I show that his characterization of ethics, which he uses to attack medical ethics, is a committed position within moral philosophy. As a consequence of this, it does not allow the relation between moral philosophy and medical ethics to be discussed without prejudice to its outcome. Finally, I explore the relation between Seedhouse's position and naturalism, and its implications for medical epistemology. I argue that this shows us that Seedhouse's position, if it can be defended, is likely to lead to a fruitful and important line of inquiry which reconnects philosophy and medical ethics.