RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Prolonging dying is the same as prolonging living--one more response to Long.
JF Journal of Medical Ethics
JO J Med Ethics
FD BMJ Publishing Group Ltd and Institute of Medical Ethics
SP 205
OP 206
DO 10.1136/jme.17.4.205
VO 17
IS 4
A1 H Kuhse
A1 P Singer
YR 1991
UL http://jme.bmj.com/content/17/4/205.abstract
AB In earlier publications, we had argued that Paul Ramsey is inconsistent because he simultaneously asserts that (i) 'all our days and years are of equal worth' and (ii) 'that it is permissible to refrain from prolonging the lives of some dying patients'. Thomas Long has suggested that we have not shown that Paul Ramsey is inconsistent. Ramsey and we, he holds, start from incommensurable metaphysical views: for Ramsey, the dying process has religious significance--God is calling his servant home. While it is normally a good thing to keep a patient alive, it would, for Ramsey, show deafness to God's call to keep a dying patient alive. It is true we do not share Paul Ramsey's religious views. It is, however, not necessary to rely on any particular metaphysical views to refute Ramsey's position. For Ramsey's view to be internally consistent, Ramsey would have to be able to distinguish between dying and non-dying patients. We examine some of Ramsey's examples and show that his practical judgements do not allow us to draw this distinction. This means that, contra Long, we hold fast to our charge that Ramsey's view is inconsistent.