PT  - JOURNAL ARTICLE
AU  - Paul Mũtuanyingĩ Mũrĩithi
TI  - Does the rejection of wrongful life claims rely on a conceptual error?
AID  - 10.1136/jme.2010.042051
DP  - 2011 Jul 01
TA  - Journal of Medical Ethics
PG  - 433--436
VI  - 37
IP  - 7
4099  - http://jme.bmj.com/content/37/7/433.short
4100  - http://jme.bmj.com/content/37/7/433.full
SO  - J Med Ethics2011 Jul 01; 37
AB  - There are four major arguments raised against wrongful life claims: first, that it is impossible to establish harm in wrongful life claims; second, that wrongful life claims are illogical or incoherent; third, that life is inviolable and sacred no matter the quality; and fourth, that there are no rights and duties towards non-existent persons. In this paper, I will examine and evaluate critically the first two arguments. I will reject these objections against wrongful life claims and demonstrate that they rely on a conceptual error/mistake. In doing so, I will reject the logic of comparing existence with non-existence in wrongful life claims. Instead, I will maintain that recognition of the infant's cause of action and recognition of the infant's harmed condition need not imply any preference for non-existence over existence, and it need not to be so severe as to make life not worth living. I will conclude by briefly giving an account of what seems to me to be the right conception of what it is to be harmed.