A major conceptual problem this paper suffers from is the suggestion
that those whose views do not accord with the majority are, by default,
not tolerable.
Such people, whom the authors assume are exclusively religious, are
twice said to possess an idiosyncratic view of the universe. These remarks
exclude the possibility that there might be good, even non-religious,
reasons for conscientious objections. Moreover...
A major conceptual problem this paper suffers from is the suggestion
that those whose views do not accord with the majority are, by default,
not tolerable.
Such people, whom the authors assume are exclusively religious, are
twice said to possess an idiosyncratic view of the universe. These remarks
exclude the possibility that there might be good, even non-religious,
reasons for conscientious objections. Moreover, they betray a contempt for
religious views.
These people are also said to have "ultimately arbitrary" views, and
that because it is "ultimately up to society to determine the scope of
professional practice", those who wish to conscientiously object should
leave the profession. Two things here are cause for alarm. The first,
relating to the previous point, is: the authors suggest that off-beat
views are nonsensical. This is a disrespectful posture which colours the
entire argument.
The second is the largely undefended assumption that society defines
the scope of the medical profession. This is intellectually untenable.
Professions have always enjoyed a degree of independence from the State.
This degree of autonomy prevents certain conflicts of interest, and allows
a profession to develop its own aims and standards. Professional standards
are not determined by plebiscite, but by rational reflection.
Of course, the professions are accountable to the State and the
nation, but not dictated by them. Only tyranny contradicts this. Simply,
it is not in the general interest for the professions to be merely a tool
of the government. Since the authors appear to suggest the opposite, that
the professions should acquiesce entirely to others' demands, their
attempted ethical argument is built upon political presuppositions. If
their argument is to stand, so must these political assumptions be
defended.
In conclusion, doctors of all stripes and beliefs should be most
distressed by the proposals laid out in this paper. Morality and medicine
are not issues to be settled, in the final analysis, democratically. The
professions should resist unreasonable interference from other bodies. It
would be most undesirable for them to bow to the absolutism of public
demand or government decree. Though the authors dismiss all analogy with
historic totalitarian regimes, they seem to suggest that conscientious
objection is never appropriate. And this is manifestly false.
Dear Editors,
I read with interest the recent article on the ethics of doctor's
strikes.1 I accept most of the arguments expressed in the article,
however, there is one shortcoming to the framework: its under-analysis of
the role that the social context can have when evaluating the ethics of
doctors strikes.2 I contend that there is a need to contextualise
industrial disputes of this nature, namely, reflecting on and ev...
Dear Editors,
I read with interest the recent article on the ethics of doctor's
strikes.1 I accept most of the arguments expressed in the article,
however, there is one shortcoming to the framework: its under-analysis of
the role that the social context can have when evaluating the ethics of
doctors strikes.2 I contend that there is a need to contextualise
industrial disputes of this nature, namely, reflecting on and evaluating
the nature of the healthcare system, its values and vision, and its
relationship to the prevailing socio-political landscape. Such an approach
would offer a more integrated ethical understanding of doctors decision to
strike and extend the value of the ethical framework being proposed.
Roberts does attempt to contextualise the strike, by referring to the
'party line' adopted by various government officials and departments that
the junior doctor strike exposes patients to serious harm 1(p.3), and how
the media can be used to promote the government position. However, the
link between the doctors' actions and the social context is not properly
formulated. Healthcare systems can be categorised into four basic models-
Beveridge model (UK), the social insurance model (e.g. Germany), the
national insurance model (e.g. Canada) and a market driven model (e.g.
India).3 Each of these systems employ different principles of healthcare.
It would be worth incorporating this dimension of health care to an
ethical framework for evaluating doctors' strikes.
In this article the NHS and the Department of Health are framed as the
doctors 'employers'. While this is factually correct, it is worth
remembering that the Department of Health and the NHS are also significant
social institutions, key apparatuses of the UK welfare state and
custodians of its principles of universality, equality and justice.4 In
this particular case, it would be appropriate to check the actions of the
government and that of the doctors decision to strike against these
principles.5 The NHS has undergone a period of profound restructuring and
reorganisation under the austerity driven focus of a conservative
coalition government (2011-2016) and more recently a majority conservative
government (2016-present).6 The 'better outputs with fewer resources'8
logic of austerity calls into question whether equality, access and
quality of health services can be achieved when fiscal rectitude rather
than universality is the operational mode.7 9 In the UK the annual health
spend per capita in real terms is slowly recovering from -1.3% in
2010(compared with 0.1% for the OECD average for the same year). In 2013
the figure was 0.6 %, however, this was still behind the 1.0% average for
the OECD. 6 This concerted strategy to underspend in the area of
healthcare also included a two year policy of pay freezes and staff
redundancies.6 It is clear that these political decisions have had an
impact on the delivery of healthcare, impacting of the range of services
provided and the working conditions for staff. Austerity then not only
amplifies health inequalities of society and but also erodes at the 'the
very principle of relatedness and mutuality'10 that defines these public
health services and initiatives.
Incidentally, this belief in state responsibility for the health of UK
citizens has proved a rallying call for some of the striking doctors.
During the escalation of the industrial strikes in April 2016, a make-
shift banner was posted on the wall of a NHS hospital near my place of
work. It read: 'The NHS will last as long as there are folk left with
faith to fight for it- Aneurin Bevan'. This poster betrays the striking
doctors' sympathy with the ethical vision of the founding father of the
NHS and adds further legitimacy to their actions.
It would appear that the values of the healthcare system and the type of
priority it is given or not by a government are also important factors to
consider when evaluating the reasons why doctors strike. I think that this
amendment is worth making and highlighting for consideration.
REFERENCES
1 Roberts AJ. A framework for assessing the ethics of doctors' strikes, J
Med Ethics Published Online First: 20 May 2016 doi:10.1136/medethics-2016-
103395.
2 Weinstein BD. Dental ethics. Philadelphia: Lea and Febiger 1993.
3 Physicians for a National Health Program. Healthcare systems-Four Basic
Models, http://pnhp.org/single-player-
resources/health_care_systems_four_basic_models.php (accessed 8 Jun
2016).
4 Weir S. 2015. The welfare state is dead - what is rising from the
grave?. http://opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/stuart-weir/welfare-state-is-
dead-%E2%80%93-what-is-rising-from-grave (accessed 7 Jun 2016).
5 Pearse N. 2015. Welfare debate marks opportunity to renew Beveridge's
legacy. http://opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/nick-pearse/welfare-debate-
marks-opportunity-to-renew-beveridge%E2%80%99s-legacy (accessed 7 Jun
2016).
6. OECD. Country Note: How does health spending in the United Kingdom
compare? 7 July 2015. OECD Heath Statistics http://www.oecd.org/health
(accessed 7 Jun 2016).
7 Quaglio GL, Karapiperis T, Van Woensel L, et al. 2013. Austerity and
Health in Europe. Health Policy 2013; 113: 13-19.
8 Thomas S, Burke S, Barry S. 2014. The Irish health-care system and
austerity: sharing the pain, Lancet, May 3, 2014; 383: 1545-1546.
9 Suhrcke M, Stuckler D. 2012. Will the recession be bad for our health?:
it depends. Soc Sci Med 2012; 74: 647-653.
10 Lynch, K. 'New managerialism' in education: the organisational form of
neoliberalism, Open Democracy, 16 Sept 2014.
https://opendemocracy.net/kathleen-lynch/'new-managerialism'-in-education-
organisational-form-of-neoliberalism (accessed 7 Jun 2016).
There is a hierarchy of means to access opinions and information
published in journals. This is unethical in a democracy which uses
citizens' information to contribute to debates- from which they are then
excluded.
This to some extent mirrors my position that it is unethical to with hold
information from clients in therapy. It is taking advantage of
vulnerability however it is dressed up but also creates a hierarchy of...
There is a hierarchy of means to access opinions and information
published in journals. This is unethical in a democracy which uses
citizens' information to contribute to debates- from which they are then
excluded.
This to some extent mirrors my position that it is unethical to with hold
information from clients in therapy. It is taking advantage of
vulnerability however it is dressed up but also creates a hierarchy of
the informed. There are some prospective clients who will be more
informed by reading up on the practice and many others who will rely
mainly or only on what is disclosed by the therapist. There is also the
problem of the therapist him/herself deciding who will be given how much
information. Which can be discriminatory. Withholding information can
also be used defensively by therapists to hide their own insecurities.
The claim that it is acceptable to 'benignly' deceive clients
undermines what is the more important component - trust .To deceive as a
means to an end is unethical and more likely to be a component which adds
to dissatisfaction if the therapy is unsuccessful.
A properly worded consent form must make risks transparent but if the
person has not even been asked to participate, discrimination is too
easily slipping in. Even giving the reason as duty of care can be mis/used
to eliminate some people - but their participation may be valuable as
well as ethical. There can be an unconscious bias to avoid difficulties
for researchers but discrimination will miss opportunities for the...
A properly worded consent form must make risks transparent but if the
person has not even been asked to participate, discrimination is too
easily slipping in. Even giving the reason as duty of care can be mis/used
to eliminate some people - but their participation may be valuable as
well as ethical. There can be an unconscious bias to avoid difficulties
for researchers but discrimination will miss opportunities for the
unexpected to be revealed by the exclusion of risk. Intolerance of risk
means whole groups may not benefit from research carried out and they
subsequently may be treated incorrectly, that is in the same way as the
findings conclude for others with low risk.
Exeter University has carried out much ground breaking work to enable
wider participation in research by the public including via self referral
and genuine rather than tokenistic efforts to involve the wider community.
It has been promoted in other parts of the country by now but how much
the public is aware of it is questionable. (Patient and Public
Involvement Exeter web site) Open selection does not always happen
though as some projects still select participants via GPs acting as
gatekeepers. For example COBRA. (On Exeter web site) Researchers will
not always get it right and results can be skewed. It would be
interesting to see a comparison of the same or other studies conducted
both by self referral and via gatekeepers.
One area which could do more to become transparent to the public is,
although more loosely described as research , the issue of conferences and
events which are held by researchers/practitioners/professionals to debate
and share information with each other exclusively , any resulting write
ups are also exclusive. Many are not open to the public either because
admission is only for stated specialist groups or because the cost of
admission is entirely prohibitive for those who are not funded. These
events are using information given directly or indirectly by the public
and paid for by citizens. On these grounds as well as it being ethically
right to make debate inclusive to all citizens - events and conferences
which have an impact on or interest to the public should be made open
access.
The JME's peer reviewers failed to press the clinical issues before
publication of this flawed paper(1). The unoriginal idea of a 'ritual
nick' performed by health professionals in a harm limitation approach to
female genital mutilation (FGM) was proposed by the American Academy of
Pediatrics back in 2010(2), who rapidly replaced their statement(3) in the
face of worldwide condemnation(4) by the World Health Organisation...
The JME's peer reviewers failed to press the clinical issues before
publication of this flawed paper(1). The unoriginal idea of a 'ritual
nick' performed by health professionals in a harm limitation approach to
female genital mutilation (FGM) was proposed by the American Academy of
Pediatrics back in 2010(2), who rapidly replaced their statement(3) in the
face of worldwide condemnation(4) by the World Health Organisation, and
the UK Royal Colleges of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists and Paediatrics
and Child Health, amongst others.(5)
Many mistakes slipped through: (i) the authors say the prevalence of
FGM is stable, but provide figures showing it falling; (ii) they claim to
medically recategorise all procedures (amateur, accidental or surgical) -
matters beyond the scope of ethicists to judge; (iii) they state the
impacts of surgery on male and female genitals can be assumed to be
similar - they cannot; (iv) likewise, comparisons with adult surgery
(including cosmetic female genital surgery) are not relevant to children;
(v) there is no such thing as a "nick that heals completely" without
leaving scar tissue; (vi) indeed, they later admit that "de minimus"
procedures will involve "tissue being removed", the amount being difficult
to regulate; (vii) controversially, they describe asymptomatic healthy
children as "patients" thus generating an overweaning sense that doctors
owe a duty of care regarding social matters; (viii) despite arguing for
autonomy they did not suggest leaving parents with responsibility for
performing the 'nick'; (ix) far from seriously considering the
utilitarian calculus, they have no insight into the damage their proposal
has on trust in the medical profession; (x) the concept of 'harm
limitation' need not be applied(6) to justify changing the present global
consensus, especially without evidence of rising harm in countries where
FGM is illegal; (xi) they neglect entirely physicians' conflicted
pecuniary interest when surgically altering healthy children's genitals,
even if by request of loving parents for socio-cultural benefits; (xii)
revealingly, they use a self-referential test for acceptability based on
one gynaecologist's previous defence of male circumcision(7).
Surgeons should respect the basic ethical principles of 'first of
all, do no harm' and informed consent to irreversible surgery on the basis
of medical necessity, particularly when performed on children. In the USA
(but less so in Europe), there may presently remain a 'liberal' tolerance
of male circumcision whose protection appears to be the article's real
purpose. The weak arguments presented might lead to the opposite
conclusion: far from condoning renamed non-therapeutic procedures (no
doubt performed for a fee on defenceless girls), why not turn the
spotlight onto medically sanctioned traditional 'ritual' practices on male
infants?
References
(1) Arora KS, Jacobs AJ. J Med Ethics Published Online First: 22nd
February 2016 doi:10.1136/
medethics-2014-102375
(2) American Academy of Pediatrics. Ritual genital cutting of female
minors. Pediatrics
2010; 125: 1088-93.
(3) American Academy of Pediatrics. Policy statement: ritual genital
cutting of female
minors. Pediatrics 2010; 126: 191.
(4) MacReady N. AAP retracts statement on controversial practice. Lancet
2010; 376: 15.
(5) Joint RCOG/RCPCH statement on the AAP policy statement on FGM. 12 May
2010
https://www.rcog.org.uk/en/news/joint-rcogrcpch-statement-on-the-aap-
policy-statement-on-fgm/
(6) Pearce AJ, Bewley S. Medicalization of female genital mutilation. Harm
reduction or unethical? Obstet Gynaecol Reprod Med 2014;24(1):29-30
(7) Jacobs AJ. The ethics of circumcision of male infants. Isr Med Assoc
J. 2013;15:60-5.
As an active participant in the debate that took place in the
province of Quebec concerning medical aid in dying (MAID), I would like to
take the liberty of commenting on an article by Udo Shuklenk published
recently in your journal: "Canada on course to introduce permissive
assisted dying regime". In my view, some of the factual information given
in this text needs more precision.
As an active participant in the debate that took place in the
province of Quebec concerning medical aid in dying (MAID), I would like to
take the liberty of commenting on an article by Udo Shuklenk published
recently in your journal: "Canada on course to introduce permissive
assisted dying regime". In my view, some of the factual information given
in this text needs more precision.
First of all, the chronology. In fact, the debate began in Quebec
long before and on other bases than in the rest of Canada (ROC). When
Gloria Taylor and Kay Carter's family decided to contest the Criminal Code
prohibition in British Columbia (BC) in 2009 and 2010, the public debate
was already going on in Quebec, where the drive to change was not a court
action but a political decision. On December 4, 2009, the National
Assembly created a special commission to discuss the issue of end-of-life
care in public. When the BC Supreme Court rendered its decision in favour
of the plaintiffs in June 2012, this commission had already completed its
report, which was submitted on March 22, 2012. And when the Supreme Court
of Canada (SC) released its decision in Carter in February 2015, Quebec
had already adopted its Act Respecting End-of-Life Care. Adopted on June
5, 2014, the Act has been in force since December 2015. As to the report
of the Royal Society of Canada's expert panel, of which the author was a
member, it was submitted in November 2011.
So, this "high-profile report of an international expert panel", as
the author puts it, may have had a great influence on the SC decision. And
it is evident enough that the SC decision itself had a great influence in
the debate. But it is a little difficult to follow the author when he
concludes:
"The other lesson, from Canada at least, is that what was required to
drive the change that is now coming was court action."
And it becomes almost impossible to follow him when he says, concerning
the debate in Quebec:
"At the last minute opponents of assisted dying succeeded in raising the
access threshold from being a competent adult suffering an irreversibly
low quality of life which that adult does not consider worth living by
adding a further access criterion: the person must also be towards the end
of their lives."
I really don't know where this information can have come from. In fact,
for many reasons that it would be interesting to discuss more seriously
because they are not only contextual, the debate in Quebec was, from start
to finish, limited to end-of-life care. This has nothing to do with the
opponents' arguments, who were against any opening at all, all along.
I think it is important to be extremely clear about the facts because
it might change the perspective on controversial issues such as access
criteria or conscientious objection.
With respect to access criteria or scope, the author does not seem
capable of even imagining that providing limited access to people near
their natural death can be a defensible position. He explains that two
committees addressed the issue in their reports since the election of a
new parliament in Ottawa at the end of 2015: a provincial-federal expert
panel and a parliamentary-senate special joint committee.
"These two documents combined arguably constitute the Canadian consensus
on this subject matter. Both conclude--in line with the SC decision--that
terminal illness should not be an access threshold criterion."
Arguably indeed. Why should that kind of overlapping consensus simply
override the only one in Canada reached after a vast public discussion and
enacted as law? Surely this is a moral and political question worth
discussing.
With respect to conscientious objection, the author explains:
"Doctors' lobby groups, such as the Canadian Medical Association and
religious doctors' groups clearly overplayed their hand when they decided
to take a hardline stance on the question of conscientious objection. They
lobbied governments to be given the right to refuse to provide either
assistance or transfer patients on to a professional who would provide the
service."
If that is true for doctors in the ROC, it is clearly false for doctors
practicing in Quebec who have long been obliged to help the patient find
another doctor in the event of conscientious objection. This obligation
was reaffirmed in the Act Respecting End-of-Life Care. Besides, it is
evident that conscientious objection is much less of a problem when a
large part of the population, including doctors, has actively participated
in creating the consensus, which has clearly been the case in Quebec. So,
there are alternatives to simply taking away conscientious objection
rights.
With that information in mind, it is not so easy to conclude that
Canada is on course to introduce a permissive assisted dying regime. Maybe
this will happen in the long run, but, for now, the fact is that in June
2016 the Parliament of Canada finally voted, despite the recommendations
of the advisors they appointed, for a MAID regime somewhat less limited
than the Act Respecting End-of-Life Care but much more restrictive than
the author anticipated.
From the beginnings of our lives as doctors, we are taught about
professionalism. Professionalism encourages and enables doctors to
maintain focus on the patient's needs and treatment.
Kissing a child oversteps the boundary of professionalism. Such
contact shifts thinking from the patient to the professional and meets the
professional's emotional needs rather than the patient's.
From the beginnings of our lives as doctors, we are taught about
professionalism. Professionalism encourages and enables doctors to
maintain focus on the patient's needs and treatment.
Kissing a child oversteps the boundary of professionalism. Such
contact shifts thinking from the patient to the professional and meets the
professional's emotional needs rather than the patient's.
Physical contact with patients can be an important way of
demonstrating warmth and humanity, but I would argue that in the situation
that Mr Alamri describes, such comfort should come from the parent. This
helps the child to develop boundaries about physical contact, understand
that their bodies are their own and prevent confusion.
Earp and Moen demonstrate the absence of a relevant difference
between the use of prostitutes by disabled people and by shy, ugly,
libidinous, able-bodied people, and the impossibility of circumscribing
the latter[1]. This is incorporated into a case for the full legalisation
of prostitution based on: (a) the absence of a justification for its
prohibition; and (b) the "needs" it meets. We posit that (b) misrepresents
pro...
Earp and Moen demonstrate the absence of a relevant difference
between the use of prostitutes by disabled people and by shy, ugly,
libidinous, able-bodied people, and the impossibility of circumscribing
the latter[1]. This is incorporated into a case for the full legalisation
of prostitution based on: (a) the absence of a justification for its
prohibition; and (b) the "needs" it meets. We posit that (b) misrepresents
prostitution and then outline a response to (a).
Earp and Moen develop Thomsen's argument[2] as follows:
(1) Many or most persons have a sexuality that generates strong needs
for sexual relations, and
(2) Some disabled [or any] persons are partially or entirely incapable of
satisfying this need except through the purchase of sexual services from a
prostitute.
(C) There is a prima facie case for legalising prostitution.
The notion that "the purchase of sexual services from a prostitute"
is a response to "strong needs for sexual relations" is problematic.
Evidence suggests that men who use prostitutes do not consider themselves
to be satisfying such a "need". Punternet.com, a website where men rate
their experiences with prostitutes, found that only 28% of punters[i]
considered themselves unable to find "free sex"[3]. Similarly only 1 in 5
London punters "[c]an't get what he wants sexually or emotionally in his
current relationship"[4]. Men use prostitutes not out of necessity but
choice. Outside the simple framework Earp and Moen create, the purported
"need for sexual relations" is not fulfilled by the use of a prostitute.
This desire is subsidiary to the human drive for social intimacy, to which
the mutual giving and receiving of sex contributes. As McKinnon states,
"The consideration for sex is sex (and if there's some other consideration
then it's something else)"[5]. The Crown Prosecution Service of England
and Wales considers it appropriate that "prostitution is addressed as
sexual exploitation"[6]. When 55% of men who use prostitutes believe that
the majority of women in prostitution have been "lured, tricked or
trafficked"[4], this confirms that the behaviour is usually a gratuitous
act of conscious abuse.
Given the facts about prostitution, the Nordic model of
legislation[5] mentioned by Thomsen[2] is a more appropriate way forward.
Indeed, this model deals more effectively with the authors' presented
concerns. Earp and Moen correctly point out that prohibition does not make
women safer[1]. Criminalising women makes it harder for them to leave
prostitution and find a safer way of living. In many settings they are
vulnerable to police corruption and violence[5]. This must end.
Concurrently, it is reasonable to focus on, and even consider punishing,
punters. Just as Earp and Moen proposed using the law as a tool to change
social attitudes, this model transfers the stigma away from prostituted
women - recognising the complexity of their situation - and instead
stigmatises male customers who recklessly participate in abuse. The
combination of punter stigma and sanction is likely to reduce demand and
in turn decrease trafficking[5]. Analysis of 150 countries found that the
degree to which full legalisation expands punter demand far outstrips any
increase in legal prostitutes. Countries with legalized prostitution have
experienced greater human trafficking inflow[7].
Earp and Moen claim that people are usually granted autonomy
regarding choice of work[1]. Trafficked women are evidently denied this,
but autonomy can also be influenced and diminished by external factors
commonly associated with prostitution such as adverse childhood
experiences and grooming. Prospective cohort research shows that child
sexual abuse victims are more likely to be prostituted in adulthood than
victims of other abuse and neglect [8]. When Earp and Moen speculate "it
is likely to be people who are already in very difficult situations who
would find it worthwhile to sell sexual services"[1], perhaps that "very
difficult situation" includes living with the long-term psychosocial
consequences of sexual abuse and trauma. However, they are wrong to assert
that reliving this confusing cycle is a positive act of autonomy; it is an
act more redolent of a person who needs care, compassion and support to re
-establish control over her life. The Nordic Model involves resourcing and
training women to find other sources of income, thus expanding their
financial autonomy[7]. The authors may not agree that women deserve active
help to exit prostitution but, given the extent of trafficking and abuse
in the sex industry, this ought to be a priority. Commitment to autonomy
of choice of work would include education, training, and resourcing to
ensure the choice of prostitution was truly free.
The so-called "need for sexual relations", disabled or otherwise, is
penis- rather than person-centric and irrelevant: the use of a prostitute
is a different category of act. The best response is to reduce demand and
maximise the autonomy of prostitutes.
Footnotes
i. This is London slang for customer and a common term used to
describe the men who use prostitutes.
References
1. Earp BD, Moen OM. Paying for sex??only for people with
disabilities? J Med Ethics 2016. Published Online First: 5 Nov 2016.
doi:10.1136/medethics-2015-103064
2. Thomsen FK. Prostitution, disability and prohibition. J Med Ethics
2015;41:451-9.
3. Myth: punters are lonely single men. Nordicmodelnow.org/myths-
about-prostitution/myth-punters-are-lonely-single-men
4. Farley M, Bindel J, Golding JM. Men Who Buy Sex: Who They Buy and
What They Know 2009. London: Eaves and San Francisco: Prostitution
Research & Education.
5. McKinnon CA. Trafficking, prostitution, and inequality. Harvard
Civil Rights Civil Liberties Law Review 2011;46(2):271-309.
6. Legal Guidance: Prostitution and exploitation of prostituted.
Crown Prosecution Service.
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/prostitution_and_exploitation_of_prostitution/#a15
7. Cho SY, Dreher A, Neumayer E. Does Legalized Prostitution Increase
Human Trafficking? World Development 2013;41(1):67-82
8. Wisdom CS, Ames MA. Criminal consequences of childhood sexual
victimization. Child Abuse & Neglect 1994;18(4):303-18
There are surely situations where responses of disgust and other
reactions to extreme violence must be respected. How much they effect
the justice system as well as the medical professionals' ability to act
strictly according to laws and ethical guidelines is probably difficult to
investigate. The case of Peter Sutcliffe - a violent mass murderer in UK
is not quite the same scenario as the article describes but it is...
There are surely situations where responses of disgust and other
reactions to extreme violence must be respected. How much they effect
the justice system as well as the medical professionals' ability to act
strictly according to laws and ethical guidelines is probably difficult to
investigate. The case of Peter Sutcliffe - a violent mass murderer in UK
is not quite the same scenario as the article describes but it is
questionable in some ways whether the horror outweighed impartiality in
law and how he was treated medically.
Peter Sutcliffe was sentenced initially to a life sentence for his
terribly cruel crimes. Other prisoners have described how viciously he
was treated in jail and that this was entirely predictable. He was not
diagnosed as mentally ill when sentenced yet three years later was
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. It is well known that solitary
confinement and constant fear can induce mental illness. Was it right to
incarcerate him in such conditions?
He was then after three years transferred to a secure psychiatric
institution where against his will he was medicated and force fed. He
constantly stated that he wished to die by refusing food and water. After
35 years in the institution he was diagnosed as no longer
mentally ill. How did the treatment, which he resisted bring about such a
change - is there a way of knowing whether such an illness would run it's
course after such a long period of time?
Peter Sutcliffe is now again in prison and at risk presumably of being
made ill again - as that was the consequence of the way he was treated the
first time he was imprisoned. Is he now allowed to enforce his decision
to refuse food and drink in order to die and avoid further what he
considers inhumane and cruel treatment? Does he have the right to make an
Advance Directive?
Obviously I am just flagging up issues that are difficult to think about
as his crimes were so horrendous - yet has his treatment been strictly
according to the law or has the medical profession and the justice system
been unable to truly respect the rights of such a man not to be subjected
to cruel and inhumane treatment himself.
We read with great interest Daoust and Racine's contribution to the
ongoing debate about brain death and its ethical and medical implications
[1]. The authors argue that little is known about how the public
understands the concept of death determined by neurological criteria
(DNC). They set out to trace common sources of public confusion about DNC
and seek to "better define the relationship between expert and lay views...
We read with great interest Daoust and Racine's contribution to the
ongoing debate about brain death and its ethical and medical implications
[1]. The authors argue that little is known about how the public
understands the concept of death determined by neurological criteria
(DNC). They set out to trace common sources of public confusion about DNC
and seek to "better define the relationship between expert and lay views
of death". We wish to comment on the issue of whether or not public
confusion "reflects public confusion in the media or perhaps a more
profound insight into the nature of academic debates among experts".
Although the authors recognize that "recent critiques have made any clear
meaning of DNC more challenging and even counterintuitive", they position
themselves, with no further explanation, on one side of the debate by
stating that "landmark contributions and guidelines of professional
societies have brought clarity and credence to the standard definition of
DNC". With that, they imply that current determination of death and organ
transplantation practices are rigorous and that media coverage distorts
the actual process of declaring a person dead based on neurological
criteria.
The two premises-- that the standard of DNC has clarity and credence
and that producing a clear meaning of DNC is both challenging and
counterintuitive-- are logically irreconcilable. The authors,
nevertheless, conclude that all discussions in the media and with patient-
families should "reinforce the genuine nature of neurological
determination of death as a criterion to establish death...". Either (a)
the philosophical rationale proposed in the President's Council on
Bioethics "White Paper" [2] seeking to validate the concept of DNC, and
the criteria and tests for determining DNC outlined in the guidelines by
professional societies, definitively settled the issue, or (b) the critics
have been raising legitimate concerns and have successfully challenged the
validity of this concept. Regarding the President's Council of Bioethics'
philosophical validation of DNC, the debate is ongoing and indeed has
intensified [3-5]. In regard to professional societies' guidelines, the
American Academy of Neurology has assigned level "U" (i.e., unknown,
conflicting or insufficient evidence) to several recommendations in the
DNC [6]. Generally, for clinical practice guidelines to be trustworthy,
the Institute of Medicine requires the recommendations to be supported by
a much higher level of evidence than "U" [7].
The authors also mention that some articles refer to the brain-dead
patient as being "kept alive" by artificial methods rather than as being
dead. Yet this brings out the fact that it is odd to declare an individual
with functioning circulation and respiration (in the sense of cellular
exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide-- ventilator-dependence is
irrelevant to the issue of whether a person is alive or dead) dead as is
done in brain-dead patients. Even though the authors ostensibly
acknowledge the academic debate about the validity of brain-death
criteria, de facto they ignore it, claiming (though not arguing) that both
discussions between the patient's family (note the use of the word
"patient," which does not make sense if the patient is dead) and
information shared with the general public should reflect the view that
brain death criteria are "genuine". Therefore, Daoust and Racine's
recommendation to reinforce the genuine nature of neurological
determination of death is not only premature but, if followed through,
would deprive the public of informed decision making about organ donation
following DNC. More importantly, merely repeating the claim that brain-
death criteria are "genuine" does not make them so.
Maintaining the professional integrity of medicine and public trust
is a responsibility shared by the global medical community. This
responsibility demands honesty, truthfulness and transparency with the
general public regarding healthcare issues (e.g., organ donation at the
end of life). Daoust and Racine report that critics of DNC have argued
that DNC "merely represents a convenient 'redefinition' of death solely
for the purpose of transplant medicine." Many in the medical community
would agree with the critics. After several decades, the cumulative
clinical experience with many kinds of brain-dead patients over decades,
combined with logic has disproved the neurologic criterion of death.
Persistent denial of caveats that donors are not certainly dead may be
leading to grievously unethical medical practice namely: (1) the lack of
truly informed consent in the donation process, (2) the strategic campaign
of rhetoric, partial information, and misinformation designed to induce
people to check the donor box on drivers licenses and to induce families
to authorize donation from a "brain-dead" loved one, (3) the nondisclosure
of financial conflict of interest on the part of organ procurement
representatives whose job is to convince grieving families to donate.
The media have been fulfilling their primary duties of disclosing to
the general public scientific, ethical and cultural controversies about
neurologic criteria [8,9]. The conclusion of Daoust and Racine that
"public discussions should reinforce the genuine nature of neurological
determination of death as a criterion to establish death" and "scholarly
debates need to be contextualized to avoid undue collateral damage to
public confidence in DNC and organ donation practices" can also be
construed as a call for censorship of media and suppression of scholarly
debates. Costas-Lombardia and Castiel have criticized the control of
information in Spain by the transplantation industry: "disinformation of
society is an indispensable condition for the success of the 'Spanish
Model'" [10]. Organ procurement and transplantation practice generate
billions of dollars in a commodified US health care system annually [11].
The call for control of media and scholarly debates to avoid collateral
damage to organ transplantation practice may indeed violate public trust
in the medical profession and the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
Michael Potts, Ph.D., Department of Philosophy, Methodist University,
Fayetteville, North Carolina, USA
Joseph L. Verheijde, PhD, MBA, PT, Department Physical Medicine and
Rehabilitation, Mayo Clinic, Phoenix, Arizona, USA
David W. Evans, MA, MD, FRCP, Queens' College, Cambridge, UK
Mohamed Y. Rady, MB BChir MA MD (Cantab), Department of Critical Care
Medicine, Mayo Clinic Hospital, Phoenix, Arizona, USA
D. Alan Shewmon, MD Olive View-UCLA Medical Center, Sylmar, CA, USA
References
1. Daoust A, Racine E. Depictions of 'brain death' in the media:
medical and ethical implications. J Med Ethics.2013:Published Online
First: 12 April 2013 doi:2010.1136/medethics-2012-101260
2. The President's Council on Bioethics. Controversies in the
determination of death. A White Paper of the President's Council on
Bioethics. 2008; http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/death/.
Accessed 10 April 2013.
3. Shewmon A. Brain Death: Can It Be Resuscitated? Hastings Cent
Rep.2009; 39(2):18-23.
4. Joffe AR. Brain death is not death: a critique of the concept,
criterion, and tests of brain death. Rev. Neurosci.2009; 20(3-4):187-198.
5. Nair-Collins M. "Brain Death, Paternalism, and the Language of
"Death"." Kennedy Inst Ethics J.2013; 23(1):53-104.
6. Wijdicks EF, Varelas PN, Gronseth GS, Greer DM. Evidence-based
guideline update: Determining brain death in adults: Report of the Quality
Standards Subcommittee of the American Academy of Neurology.
Neurology.2010; 74(23):1911-1918.
7. Institute of Medicine (IOM) -National Academy of Sciences.
Clinical Practice Guidelines We Can Trust. 2011;
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13058. Accessed 10 April, 2013.
8. Rady MY, McGregor JL, Verheijde JL. Mass media campaigns and organ
donation: managing conflicting messages and interests. Med Health Care
Philos.2012; 15(2 ):229-241.
9. Rady M, McGregor J, Verheijde J. Transparency and accountability
in mass media campaigns about organ donation: a response to Morgan and
Feeley. Med Health Care Philos.2013:Published online: 25 January 2013. DOI
2010.1007/s11019-11013-19466-11014.
10. Costas-Lombardia E, Fereres Castiel J. The Easy Success of the
Spanish Model for Organ Transplantation. Artif Organs.2011; 35(9):835-837.
11. Bentley TS, Hanson SG, Hauboldt RH. Milliman Research Report.
2011 U.S. organ and tissue transplant cost estimates and discussion. 2012;
http://publications.milliman.com/research/health-rr/pdfs/2011-us-organ-
tissue.pdf. Accessed April 1, 2013.
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We read with great interest Daoust and Racine's contribution to the ongoing debate about brain death and its ethical and medical implications [1]. The authors argue that little is known about how the public understands the concept of death determined by neurological criteria (DNC). They set out to trace common sources of public confusion about DNC and seek to "better define the relationship between expert and lay views...
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