While the continuing discussion on vaccine mandates is most welcome, one thing that struck me as needing more attention being dedicate to is how do we cater to workers vaccine preferences and what are the corresponding duties of employers to provide such vaccines. As I have argued elsewhere (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20502877.2021.1959789) there is a part of the population that is not in principle opposed to vaccination in general, but might have objections to specific vaccines. Whether or not we accept vaccine mandates as ethical perhaps we need to discuss what employers should be doing to promote vaccination. While some of the authors of this paper have argued elsewhere (https://academic.oup.com/phe/article/14/3/242/6324053?login=true) that the only thing that matters is that the vaccine given is effective, particularly when a vaccine mandate is being put in place there seems to be an obligation to reduce the burden of that mandate on the workers. What I would wish to see is more debate on the obligations of employers (and the wider health service) to provide vaccines that staff deem personally acceptable. Even if there are no mandates, this might increase vaccination uptake. To return to the article at hand, it would be good if we had alternatives to influenza vaccines that were not made in he...
While the continuing discussion on vaccine mandates is most welcome, one thing that struck me as needing more attention being dedicate to is how do we cater to workers vaccine preferences and what are the corresponding duties of employers to provide such vaccines. As I have argued elsewhere (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20502877.2021.1959789) there is a part of the population that is not in principle opposed to vaccination in general, but might have objections to specific vaccines. Whether or not we accept vaccine mandates as ethical perhaps we need to discuss what employers should be doing to promote vaccination. While some of the authors of this paper have argued elsewhere (https://academic.oup.com/phe/article/14/3/242/6324053?login=true) that the only thing that matters is that the vaccine given is effective, particularly when a vaccine mandate is being put in place there seems to be an obligation to reduce the burden of that mandate on the workers. What I would wish to see is more debate on the obligations of employers (and the wider health service) to provide vaccines that staff deem personally acceptable. Even if there are no mandates, this might increase vaccination uptake. To return to the article at hand, it would be good if we had alternatives to influenza vaccines that were not made in hen's eggs so as to cater to vegan staff and it would be good to have vaccines not developed with HEK293 (or other similar cell lines) for whatever disease will come next to cater for staff who believe the use of such cell lines to be morally dubious.
Utilitarian ‘ethics’, as employed in this article, implicitly rejects all absolute values and associated rights, allowing for limited transgression of rights (including the right to life) for the sake of contemporaneous ‘benefits’ outweighing the ‘costs’. I maintain that this is a self-defeating paradigm; without absolute values there is no objective measure of benefits and costs, therefore no rational basis for the judgement of proportionality. In short, the utilitarian argument is logically circular and vicious. Once the veneer of proportionality is revealed as objectively ungrounded, utilitarian ethics amounts to little more than a public relations strategy for legitimising arbitrary exercises of power.
The argument from proportionality (benefits vs costs) cannot justify arbitrary violations of the right to life or the removal of the right to free medical consent, for the following reasons.
1. Vaccine mandates imply that all humans are born in a defective, inherently harmful state that must be biotechnologically augmented to allow their unrestricted participation in society, and this constitutes discrimination on the basis of healthy, innate characteristics of the human race. (This point derives from my paper published here: https://jme.bmj.com/content/48/4/240).
2. Medical consent must be free – not coerced – in order to be valid. Any discrimination against the unvaccinated is economic or social op...
Utilitarian ‘ethics’, as employed in this article, implicitly rejects all absolute values and associated rights, allowing for limited transgression of rights (including the right to life) for the sake of contemporaneous ‘benefits’ outweighing the ‘costs’. I maintain that this is a self-defeating paradigm; without absolute values there is no objective measure of benefits and costs, therefore no rational basis for the judgement of proportionality. In short, the utilitarian argument is logically circular and vicious. Once the veneer of proportionality is revealed as objectively ungrounded, utilitarian ethics amounts to little more than a public relations strategy for legitimising arbitrary exercises of power.
The argument from proportionality (benefits vs costs) cannot justify arbitrary violations of the right to life or the removal of the right to free medical consent, for the following reasons.
1. Vaccine mandates imply that all humans are born in a defective, inherently harmful state that must be biotechnologically augmented to allow their unrestricted participation in society, and this constitutes discrimination on the basis of healthy, innate characteristics of the human race. (This point derives from my paper published here: https://jme.bmj.com/content/48/4/240).
2. Medical consent must be free – not coerced – in order to be valid. Any discrimination against the unvaccinated is economic or social opportunity coercion, precluding the possibility of valid medical consent. The right to free, uncoerced medical consent is not negotiable, under any circumstances, because without it we have no rights at all; every other right can be subverted by medical coercion. Crucially, by accepting any medical treatment imposed by coercion we would be acquiescing to the taking away of the right to free medical consent not just from ourselves but from our children and from future generations, and we do not have the right to do this. Acquiescence to medical coercion is always unethical, even if the mandated intervention were a placebo.
3. Vaccines are known to occasionally cause deaths of healthy people. When an employee is required to receive vaccination as a condition of employment, that employee is economically coerced to participate in an activity where some percentage of employees are expected to die ‘in the course of employment’ as a direct result of the mandated activity. This goes against the fundamental principles of medical ethics and workplace safety. It may be objected that infectious pathogens also kill people, but these two categories of deaths are not ethically equivalent. Infection with a pathogen for which there exists a vaccine is not mandated, whereas deaths resulting from mandatory vaccination are mandated deaths, a legalised killing of some people for the prospective benefit of the majority. Critically, any discrimination against the unvaccinated (or a privileged treatment of the vaccinated) amounts to a violation of the right to life, because a small percentage of the targeted population are expected to die as a result of this coercive treatment.
As Sanjeev Sabhlok, an Australian economist and politician, recently wrote: “Governments are not authorised by law - by analogy - to burn down additional homes and kill unaffected people in order to save those who might be at risk of being engulfed in a bushfire.”
An earlier version of these arguments were formally submitted to the Inquiry into Public Health Amendment Bill 2021 (No 2) ACT, Australia.
One of the most enlightening statements for me from the report of the WISH patient safety forum 2015 is, "The idea that saving patients’
lives demands heroism is a harmful misconception about health and medicine seen in popular culture. In the real-world, the true heroes are not just rescuing patients, they are voicing their concerns and taking proactive measures to reduce the risks, before a patient is potentially put in harm’s way".
We shouldn't need to rely on heroic rescue or expect it to be a normal part of our every day clinical practice. The idolisation of heroism damages attempts to improve systemic approaches to improving patient care because it neglects and belittles the under-appreciated grind of change to reduce the underlying risk of patient harm. Heroism should be less of an aspiration and more of a flag highlighting the need for organisational improvement.
The argument Jecker and Au mount against an elimination strategy for Covid-19 fails to account for the New Zealand experience. They discuss the question of excess mortality and suggest that tactics to reduce Covid-19 related deaths inadvertently increase deaths from other causes. Whilst this is intuitively true actual country wide data undermines their argument: https://blogs.otago.ac.nz/pubhealthexpert/mortality-declines-in-aotearoa... New Zealand experienced negative excess deaths for the years 2020-21 as did Australia and Taiwan. Had New Zealand experienced the same rate of excess deaths as the USA we could have expected 19,900 deaths which would have disproportionately affected ethnic minorities and the vulnerable. The elimination strategy in New Zealand was by far the best strategy to address health disparities, without it many more of those suffering disparities would have died.
Murdoch et al. give an excellent account of the law in Canada relating to consent to research in children when they mature. Laws must be based on moral principles, which always have a beneficial intention and are everywhere similar for both treatment and research, for both adults and children and for the publication of identifying data.
A competent adult can accept,reject or discontinue treatment. But a doctor must only provide treatment, which is beneficial physically or emotionally. In a publicly funded service she may need to balance the benefit to the individual against the needs of the community. The .patient is always free to consult a different doctor. A patient's personal details must not be revealed without express permission.
An adult can also accept, reject or stop participation in research intended to benefit others. Again he must not be identified without permission. He cannot require the eradication of data obtained because that would harm others.
A guardian, on behalf of a child, consents to treatment or research with the same rights and restrictions. As far as possible the informed consent of the child should be obtained.. When the child reaches maturity he must be fully informed and assumes responsibility for his own care. He can discontinue beneficial treatment but cannot demand that the doctor reverses it, because that would require her to cause harm. He can change doctors. He can stop participation in research but he cannot hav...
Murdoch et al. give an excellent account of the law in Canada relating to consent to research in children when they mature. Laws must be based on moral principles, which always have a beneficial intention and are everywhere similar for both treatment and research, for both adults and children and for the publication of identifying data.
A competent adult can accept,reject or discontinue treatment. But a doctor must only provide treatment, which is beneficial physically or emotionally. In a publicly funded service she may need to balance the benefit to the individual against the needs of the community. The .patient is always free to consult a different doctor. A patient's personal details must not be revealed without express permission.
An adult can also accept, reject or stop participation in research intended to benefit others. Again he must not be identified without permission. He cannot require the eradication of data obtained because that would harm others.
A guardian, on behalf of a child, consents to treatment or research with the same rights and restrictions. As far as possible the informed consent of the child should be obtained.. When the child reaches maturity he must be fully informed and assumes responsibility for his own care. He can discontinue beneficial treatment but cannot demand that the doctor reverses it, because that would require her to cause harm. He can change doctors. He can stop participation in research but he cannot have existing data eradicated, because that would harm others..
Jurisdictions differ about the age at which children should assume adult responsibility. They may depute to ethics committees decisions about research and to the Courts other problems, such as the competence of a particular individual to make a specific decision. The Courts may adjudicate when treatment is demanded, which doctors see as harmful, unhelpful or an unfair use of resources.
Fifty years later: the significance of the Nuremberg Code
E Shuster 1 Affiliations expand, PMID: 9358142 DOI: 10.1056/NEJM199711133372006
Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA.
---- https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/10557112/
The prosecution of doctors guilty of appalling human rights abuses at Nuremberg was achieved on the mistaken premise that the research community already had a code of conduct which, if applied, would have made such abuses impossible. In fact, not only was there no such code but when the 'Nuremberg Code' was published after the trial it continued to be ignored by many doctors for some thirty years afterwards. Indeed its central principle of informed consent has itself been eroded by subsequent international agreements on the ethics of medical research. This review shows that the mechanisms for approval of medical research which have now been promulgated in England and Wales, in practice, are applied on a very variable basis. Research in vulnerable groups unable to give fully informed consent such as children, prisoners and the incompetent elderly require the application of more rigorous standards of ethical control than those currently in operation. The use of vulnerable populations in the developing world and the application of international standards to them is also considered. A number of suggestions for improvements in current proce...
Fifty years later: the significance of the Nuremberg Code
E Shuster 1 Affiliations expand, PMID: 9358142 DOI: 10.1056/NEJM199711133372006
Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA.
---- https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/10557112/
The prosecution of doctors guilty of appalling human rights abuses at Nuremberg was achieved on the mistaken premise that the research community already had a code of conduct which, if applied, would have made such abuses impossible. In fact, not only was there no such code but when the 'Nuremberg Code' was published after the trial it continued to be ignored by many doctors for some thirty years afterwards. Indeed its central principle of informed consent has itself been eroded by subsequent international agreements on the ethics of medical research. This review shows that the mechanisms for approval of medical research which have now been promulgated in England and Wales, in practice, are applied on a very variable basis. Research in vulnerable groups unable to give fully informed consent such as children, prisoners and the incompetent elderly require the application of more rigorous standards of ethical control than those currently in operation. The use of vulnerable populations in the developing world and the application of international standards to them is also considered. A number of suggestions for improvements in current procedures in all these areas are put forward. The proposals for the United Kingdom would meet the requirements of the European Convention on bioethical research and the recent government consultation paper on medical treatment and research in incompetent adults.
The vulnerabilities of pharmacists would appear to be invisible in the euthanasia/assisted suicide debates.
As healthcare systems and societies are changing, the social positions of doctors, pharmacists, nurses and patients within them were changing too. In the past, clinical experts’ authority and patients’ autonomy have been in conflict. The current patient-centered / person-centered model of medical care, aims to establish egalitarian relationships between patients and healthcare clinicians and providers .
Vulnerability can be defined as a lack of autonomy and independence, bodily and psychological insecurity, marginalized or deviant status, lack of acknowledgement within the society (1).Vulnerable groups are exposed to discrimination, intolerant attitude, subordination. Vulnerability is usually seen as an inherent quality of certain social groups (but not others). However it has many dimensions and might be attributed to relatively “powerful” groups (2). Doctors, pharmacists and nurses i.e. so called powerful groups, are rarely characterized as vulnerable groups, but within certain circumstances, they can be recognized as “vulnerable”.
Doctors, pharmacists and nurses are in a situation where they are becoming more controlled by the patients. There is an emphasis on the myth that citizens (patients) should be autonomous and the inevitability and normality of dependency is not recognised (3). Dependency is an unavoidable feature of...
The vulnerabilities of pharmacists would appear to be invisible in the euthanasia/assisted suicide debates.
As healthcare systems and societies are changing, the social positions of doctors, pharmacists, nurses and patients within them were changing too. In the past, clinical experts’ authority and patients’ autonomy have been in conflict. The current patient-centered / person-centered model of medical care, aims to establish egalitarian relationships between patients and healthcare clinicians and providers .
Vulnerability can be defined as a lack of autonomy and independence, bodily and psychological insecurity, marginalized or deviant status, lack of acknowledgement within the society (1).Vulnerable groups are exposed to discrimination, intolerant attitude, subordination. Vulnerability is usually seen as an inherent quality of certain social groups (but not others). However it has many dimensions and might be attributed to relatively “powerful” groups (2). Doctors, pharmacists and nurses i.e. so called powerful groups, are rarely characterized as vulnerable groups, but within certain circumstances, they can be recognized as “vulnerable”.
Doctors, pharmacists and nurses are in a situation where they are becoming more controlled by the patients. There is an emphasis on the myth that citizens (patients) should be autonomous and the inevitability and normality of dependency is not recognised (3). Dependency is an unavoidable feature of any society and it is not a feature that is taken into account from the liberal perspective. The recognition of universal vulnerability suggests that the autonomy model will have to re thought (4).
Ethics has not paid attention to vulnerability for three possible reasons (5):
• Vulnerability is the antithesis of the individualistic ethics predominating in Western societies.
• Vulnerability is not addressed in ethics because philosophy ignores the body.
• Ethics has been prominently rationalist and therefore feelings have been displaced or have not been taken into account.
It is methodologically important not to define certain groups as (not) vulnerable by default (2). There are many potential sources of vulnerability, and each of these constitutes a different, overlapping layer. This metaphor of layers presents a contextual and variable concept of vulnerability, moving away from the fixed and static view (6). The vulnerability of professionals e.g. pharmacists remains invisible as it does not correspond with their social position. The sufferings (existential and moral) of pharmacists in particular are invisible, denied and ignored in the euthanasia/assisted suicide debates.
All forms of euthanasia and physician assisted suicide require lethal medications. The role of pharmacists in the pharmaceutical care/medication use process at the end of life is often ignored, written out or overlooked. In the main doctors and nurses are included in “conscientious objection” legislative protections. Pharmacists are often excluded from protection of their human right to freedom of conscience and the derived right of “conscientious objection”. Pharmacists in all working environments (pharmaceutical industry , community pharmacy, hospital pharmacy, palliative care pharmacy, long term care, care of people with disabilities including intellectual disabilities, general practice pharmacists, etc. ) will be part of the process (7).
We can understand our humanity in a broader sense only by recognizing our universal vulnerability and interdependence (8). Pharmacists and their patients and colleagues are vulnerable and autonomous. The end of life medication use process (natural death or intentional death ) is dependent on the involvement and expertise of pharmacists. Failure to recognise this makes individual pharmacists and the pharmacy profession vulnerable.
References
1. Liamputtong, P. Researching the Vulnerable: A Guide to Sensitive Research Methods; SAGE: London, UK; Thousand Oaks, CA, USA, 2007; 246p.
2. Societies 2020, 10(1), 5; https://doi.org/10.3390/soc10010005
3. Fineman, Martha A., The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency, New York, The New Press, 2004.
4. Rodriguez, Janet Delgalo. The Relevance of the Ethics of Vulnerability in Bioethics. The Ethics Forum. Volume 12, Issue 2–3, Automne 2017, p. 154–179 https://doi.org/10.7202/1051280
5. Hoffmaster, Barry, “What Does Vulnerability Mean?”, Hastings Center Report, vol. 36, no. 2, 2006, pp. 38-45.
6. Luna, Florencia, “Vulnerabilidad: la metáfora de las capas”, Jurisprudencia Argentina, IV, 1, 2008, pp. 60-67.
7. Flood, Bernadette. Pharmacists and assisted dying. BMJ 2020 https://www.bmj.com/content/368/bmj.m1139.full
Dahlquist and Kugelberg (2021) correctly notice as the many non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) which have been introduced to stop or slow down the COVID-19 pandemic through coercion are not publicly justified through a scientific consensus on the factual propositions that are used to support the policies, and as such, they would be illegitimate. It has been an unfortunate circumstance of this pandemic, that not only the NPIs but also the therapeutic approaches have been the subject of media misinterpretation, at the expense of a correct debate in between the scientific community, with scientists expressing opinions not welcomed by the media routinely abused for doing their work. Examples of policies lacking every scientific support, but still approved by the media, are everywhere. To find a working solution to the pandemic, definitively we do need free science “on the top”, rather than “on the tap” or even “on a leash”, limiting the interference by governments and corporations directly and through the media serving their interests. Misinformation by media is what has made the response to COVID-19 less effective than what could have been listening to the majority of the scientists. The response to COVID-19 of many countries has been dictated so far by the media, or better by those who control the media, rather than the scientists. To find a solution, scientists should be free of this conditioning.
REFERENCES
1. Dahlquist M, Kugelberg HD. (2021). Public j...
Dahlquist and Kugelberg (2021) correctly notice as the many non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) which have been introduced to stop or slow down the COVID-19 pandemic through coercion are not publicly justified through a scientific consensus on the factual propositions that are used to support the policies, and as such, they would be illegitimate. It has been an unfortunate circumstance of this pandemic, that not only the NPIs but also the therapeutic approaches have been the subject of media misinterpretation, at the expense of a correct debate in between the scientific community, with scientists expressing opinions not welcomed by the media routinely abused for doing their work. Examples of policies lacking every scientific support, but still approved by the media, are everywhere. To find a working solution to the pandemic, definitively we do need free science “on the top”, rather than “on the tap” or even “on a leash”, limiting the interference by governments and corporations directly and through the media serving their interests. Misinformation by media is what has made the response to COVID-19 less effective than what could have been listening to the majority of the scientists. The response to COVID-19 of many countries has been dictated so far by the media, or better by those who control the media, rather than the scientists. To find a solution, scientists should be free of this conditioning.
REFERENCES
1. Dahlquist M, Kugelberg HD. (2021). Public justification and expert disagreement over non-pharmaceutical interventions for the COVID-19 pandemic. J. Med. Ethics, Published Online First: 12 October 2021. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2021-107671
Words/Nga Kupu*
The suggestion of a “Words” column focussing particularly on words from a non-western ethical tradition is great. We are journeying through perilous waters and will need to adapt our ethical framework to the new reality. A value of diversity is that we can draw on concepts from other traditions. Of course, a “Word” in a language you do not speak is of no use. The word is part of a language, which is the embodiment of a culture, and ethics is inevitably culture bound. Even words shared between cultures do not necessarily share exact meanings. A consideration of Justice within the bioethical community culture would be incomplete without reference to Rawls. A consideration of Justice within a Māori community would be centred around Te Tiriti o Waitangi/ The Treaty of Waitangi(1). A simple translation is not enough. The definition of Whakawhanaungatanga is a good starting place, but more depth is needed. It is embedded in a Māori concept of health(2), and the richness of the concepts cannot be appreciated without appreciating the context in which it is used. Whilst it is a Māori word it is now also a New Zealand word. A whole generation of medical students have been taught Māori concepts of health, including Whakawhanaungatanga, significantly spearheaded by the work of Pitama and Lacey(3). Parry as a 5th year student wrote a heart-warming case study that illustrated the value of using these concepts(4). The New Zealand ethical landscape is an example of t...
Words/Nga Kupu*
The suggestion of a “Words” column focussing particularly on words from a non-western ethical tradition is great. We are journeying through perilous waters and will need to adapt our ethical framework to the new reality. A value of diversity is that we can draw on concepts from other traditions. Of course, a “Word” in a language you do not speak is of no use. The word is part of a language, which is the embodiment of a culture, and ethics is inevitably culture bound. Even words shared between cultures do not necessarily share exact meanings. A consideration of Justice within the bioethical community culture would be incomplete without reference to Rawls. A consideration of Justice within a Māori community would be centred around Te Tiriti o Waitangi/ The Treaty of Waitangi(1). A simple translation is not enough. The definition of Whakawhanaungatanga is a good starting place, but more depth is needed. It is embedded in a Māori concept of health(2), and the richness of the concepts cannot be appreciated without appreciating the context in which it is used. Whilst it is a Māori word it is now also a New Zealand word. A whole generation of medical students have been taught Māori concepts of health, including Whakawhanaungatanga, significantly spearheaded by the work of Pitama and Lacey(3). Parry as a 5th year student wrote a heart-warming case study that illustrated the value of using these concepts(4). The New Zealand ethical landscape is an example of the extent to which ethics is culture bound. Whilst traditional ethical principles remain they are increasingly augmented by Māori concepts. The related word Whanaungatanga is one of the principles in “Te Ture Whakaruruhau Code Of Ethical Principles For Public Health in Aotearoa New Zealand”(5). I look forward to further contributions.
* Māori language translation of words.
1. Mutu M. ‘To honour the treaty, we must first settle colonisation’ (Moana Jackson 2015): the long road from colonial devastation to balance, peace and harmony. Journal of the Royal Society of New Zealand. 2019;49(sup1):4-18.
2. Durie M. Whaiora Maori Health Development. Second Edition ed. Melbourne Australia: Oxford University Press; 1998.
3. Lacey C, Huria T, Beckert L, Gilles M, Pitama S. The Hui Process: a framework to enhance the doctor–patient relationship with Māori. Journal of the New Zealand Medical Association. 2011;124(1347).
4. Parry R, Jones B, Gray B, Ingham T. Applying a Māori-centred consultation approach for engaging with Māori patients: an undergraduate medical student case study. Journal of Primary Health Care. 2014;6(3):254-60.
5. Public Health Association of New Zealand Incorporated. Te Ture Whakaruruhau Code Of Ethical Principles For Public Health in Aotearoa New Zealand. Wellington New Zealand2012 [Available from: https://www.pha.org.nz/page-18201.
We should be careful of the way we talk. Human society can be described as a long conversation about what matters. In this conversation, the language we use to describe our healthcare and social care practices not only reveals our attitudes and virtues, it shapes them. In order to promote self-worth and respect for individuals who use professional services there must be an understanding of how the language used in a profession influences professionals and the individuals with whom professionals work. The term ‘ service user’ or ‘client’ may be one reluctantly used by many healthcare professionals. The language of ‘service user’ or ‘client’ is acceptable at the political level. However it may be potentially detrimental to those it labels in healthcare and may also be damaging to the underlying ethical practices of many healthcare professions.
Language is a means of communication in healthcare, it can indicate attitudes and it is an integral part of social and professional life and behaviour. The particular meaning we attach to words reveal the underlying values and attitudes we hold about the people or things to which we are referring. Language exerts hidden power as our words may be simple descriptions or they may change lives. This power may not be detected by the vulnerable/underserved in society and by those with less power . Power and status in healthcare and social care interactions determine how each party behaves e.g. The term ‘service user’ or ‘cl...
We should be careful of the way we talk. Human society can be described as a long conversation about what matters. In this conversation, the language we use to describe our healthcare and social care practices not only reveals our attitudes and virtues, it shapes them. In order to promote self-worth and respect for individuals who use professional services there must be an understanding of how the language used in a profession influences professionals and the individuals with whom professionals work. The term ‘ service user’ or ‘client’ may be one reluctantly used by many healthcare professionals. The language of ‘service user’ or ‘client’ is acceptable at the political level. However it may be potentially detrimental to those it labels in healthcare and may also be damaging to the underlying ethical practices of many healthcare professions.
Language is a means of communication in healthcare, it can indicate attitudes and it is an integral part of social and professional life and behaviour. The particular meaning we attach to words reveal the underlying values and attitudes we hold about the people or things to which we are referring. Language exerts hidden power as our words may be simple descriptions or they may change lives. This power may not be detected by the vulnerable/underserved in society and by those with less power . Power and status in healthcare and social care interactions determine how each party behaves e.g. The term ‘service user’ or ‘client’ may be described as ‘depersonalising’.
Care of people who are unable to care for themselves and compassion towards people who are vulnerable has been a basic tenet of medicine since ancient times . We need to be aware of our own language, values and attitudes to enable us to create a collaborative relationship with people that is person centred, respectful, non-judgmental, encourages personal responsibility and takes into account ethical and professional considerations.
We need to be particularly careful of language in the care of the dying. Euphemisms are place-holders for important concepts. They may disguise a practice which one might abhor if it were given another name.
Those who use the phrase ‘dying with dignity’, by avoiding the negative connotations of suicide and euthanasia /intentional killing , expect that it will be perceived as less alarming than euthanasia and assisted suicide, and that there is a problem with people being treated with ‘dignity. The use of the term ‘dying with dignity’ creates a halo of benignity and generates greater support for and muted opposition to any proposed law. Similarly, the euphemisms ‘physician assisted suicide’ , ‘medical assistance in dying’ or ‘assistance with dying’ are meant to be reassuring.
The use of ‘detoxifying language’ can lead to a situation where physicians, pharmacists, nurses and others can turn from healers/those who maintain or improve health, to those who intentionally take human life. In Nazi Germany during World War II, euphemisms were used to desensitize physicians, pharmacists, nurses and society to the horrors of a program of intentional killing /euthanasia .
The consistent application of euphemisms for medicalized killing significantly weakens arguments against assisted intentional killing of a human being.
Reference:
Mitchell CB. Of Euphemisms and Euthanasia: The Language Games of the Nazi Doctors and Some Implications for the Modern Euthanasia Movement. OMEGA - Journal of Death and Dying. 2000;40(1):255-265. doi:10.2190/K68E-
While the continuing discussion on vaccine mandates is most welcome, one thing that struck me as needing more attention being dedicate to is how do we cater to workers vaccine preferences and what are the corresponding duties of employers to provide such vaccines. As I have argued elsewhere (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20502877.2021.1959789) there is a part of the population that is not in principle opposed to vaccination in general, but might have objections to specific vaccines. Whether or not we accept vaccine mandates as ethical perhaps we need to discuss what employers should be doing to promote vaccination. While some of the authors of this paper have argued elsewhere (https://academic.oup.com/phe/article/14/3/242/6324053?login=true) that the only thing that matters is that the vaccine given is effective, particularly when a vaccine mandate is being put in place there seems to be an obligation to reduce the burden of that mandate on the workers. What I would wish to see is more debate on the obligations of employers (and the wider health service) to provide vaccines that staff deem personally acceptable. Even if there are no mandates, this might increase vaccination uptake. To return to the article at hand, it would be good if we had alternatives to influenza vaccines that were not made in he...
Show MoreUtilitarian ‘ethics’, as employed in this article, implicitly rejects all absolute values and associated rights, allowing for limited transgression of rights (including the right to life) for the sake of contemporaneous ‘benefits’ outweighing the ‘costs’. I maintain that this is a self-defeating paradigm; without absolute values there is no objective measure of benefits and costs, therefore no rational basis for the judgement of proportionality. In short, the utilitarian argument is logically circular and vicious. Once the veneer of proportionality is revealed as objectively ungrounded, utilitarian ethics amounts to little more than a public relations strategy for legitimising arbitrary exercises of power.
The argument from proportionality (benefits vs costs) cannot justify arbitrary violations of the right to life or the removal of the right to free medical consent, for the following reasons.
1. Vaccine mandates imply that all humans are born in a defective, inherently harmful state that must be biotechnologically augmented to allow their unrestricted participation in society, and this constitutes discrimination on the basis of healthy, innate characteristics of the human race. (This point derives from my paper published here: https://jme.bmj.com/content/48/4/240).
2. Medical consent must be free – not coerced – in order to be valid. Any discrimination against the unvaccinated is economic or social op...
Show MoreOne of the most enlightening statements for me from the report of the WISH patient safety forum 2015 is, "The idea that saving patients’
lives demands heroism is a harmful misconception about health and medicine seen in popular culture. In the real-world, the true heroes are not just rescuing patients, they are voicing their concerns and taking proactive measures to reduce the risks, before a patient is potentially put in harm’s way".
We shouldn't need to rely on heroic rescue or expect it to be a normal part of our every day clinical practice. The idolisation of heroism damages attempts to improve systemic approaches to improving patient care because it neglects and belittles the under-appreciated grind of change to reduce the underlying risk of patient harm. Heroism should be less of an aspiration and more of a flag highlighting the need for organisational improvement.
The argument Jecker and Au mount against an elimination strategy for Covid-19 fails to account for the New Zealand experience. They discuss the question of excess mortality and suggest that tactics to reduce Covid-19 related deaths inadvertently increase deaths from other causes. Whilst this is intuitively true actual country wide data undermines their argument: https://blogs.otago.ac.nz/pubhealthexpert/mortality-declines-in-aotearoa... New Zealand experienced negative excess deaths for the years 2020-21 as did Australia and Taiwan. Had New Zealand experienced the same rate of excess deaths as the USA we could have expected 19,900 deaths which would have disproportionately affected ethnic minorities and the vulnerable. The elimination strategy in New Zealand was by far the best strategy to address health disparities, without it many more of those suffering disparities would have died.
Murdoch et al. give an excellent account of the law in Canada relating to consent to research in children when they mature. Laws must be based on moral principles, which always have a beneficial intention and are everywhere similar for both treatment and research, for both adults and children and for the publication of identifying data.
A competent adult can accept,reject or discontinue treatment. But a doctor must only provide treatment, which is beneficial physically or emotionally. In a publicly funded service she may need to balance the benefit to the individual against the needs of the community. The .patient is always free to consult a different doctor. A patient's personal details must not be revealed without express permission.
An adult can also accept, reject or stop participation in research intended to benefit others. Again he must not be identified without permission. He cannot require the eradication of data obtained because that would harm others.
A guardian, on behalf of a child, consents to treatment or research with the same rights and restrictions. As far as possible the informed consent of the child should be obtained.. When the child reaches maturity he must be fully informed and assumes responsibility for his own care. He can discontinue beneficial treatment but cannot demand that the doctor reverses it, because that would require her to cause harm. He can change doctors. He can stop participation in research but he cannot hav...
Show MoreFifty years later: the significance of the Nuremberg Code
E Shuster 1 Affiliations expand, PMID: 9358142 DOI: 10.1056/NEJM199711133372006
Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA.
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https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/10557112/
The prosecution of doctors guilty of appalling human rights abuses at Nuremberg was achieved on the mistaken premise that the research community already had a code of conduct which, if applied, would have made such abuses impossible. In fact, not only was there no such code but when the 'Nuremberg Code' was published after the trial it continued to be ignored by many doctors for some thirty years afterwards. Indeed its central principle of informed consent has itself been eroded by subsequent international agreements on the ethics of medical research. This review shows that the mechanisms for approval of medical research which have now been promulgated in England and Wales, in practice, are applied on a very variable basis. Research in vulnerable groups unable to give fully informed consent such as children, prisoners and the incompetent elderly require the application of more rigorous standards of ethical control than those currently in operation. The use of vulnerable populations in the developing world and the application of international standards to them is also considered. A number of suggestions for improvements in current proce...
Show MoreThe vulnerabilities of pharmacists would appear to be invisible in the euthanasia/assisted suicide debates.
As healthcare systems and societies are changing, the social positions of doctors, pharmacists, nurses and patients within them were changing too. In the past, clinical experts’ authority and patients’ autonomy have been in conflict. The current patient-centered / person-centered model of medical care, aims to establish egalitarian relationships between patients and healthcare clinicians and providers .
Vulnerability can be defined as a lack of autonomy and independence, bodily and psychological insecurity, marginalized or deviant status, lack of acknowledgement within the society (1).Vulnerable groups are exposed to discrimination, intolerant attitude, subordination. Vulnerability is usually seen as an inherent quality of certain social groups (but not others). However it has many dimensions and might be attributed to relatively “powerful” groups (2). Doctors, pharmacists and nurses i.e. so called powerful groups, are rarely characterized as vulnerable groups, but within certain circumstances, they can be recognized as “vulnerable”.
Doctors, pharmacists and nurses are in a situation where they are becoming more controlled by the patients. There is an emphasis on the myth that citizens (patients) should be autonomous and the inevitability and normality of dependency is not recognised (3). Dependency is an unavoidable feature of...
Show MoreDahlquist and Kugelberg (2021) correctly notice as the many non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) which have been introduced to stop or slow down the COVID-19 pandemic through coercion are not publicly justified through a scientific consensus on the factual propositions that are used to support the policies, and as such, they would be illegitimate. It has been an unfortunate circumstance of this pandemic, that not only the NPIs but also the therapeutic approaches have been the subject of media misinterpretation, at the expense of a correct debate in between the scientific community, with scientists expressing opinions not welcomed by the media routinely abused for doing their work. Examples of policies lacking every scientific support, but still approved by the media, are everywhere. To find a working solution to the pandemic, definitively we do need free science “on the top”, rather than “on the tap” or even “on a leash”, limiting the interference by governments and corporations directly and through the media serving their interests. Misinformation by media is what has made the response to COVID-19 less effective than what could have been listening to the majority of the scientists. The response to COVID-19 of many countries has been dictated so far by the media, or better by those who control the media, rather than the scientists. To find a solution, scientists should be free of this conditioning.
REFERENCES
Show More1. Dahlquist M, Kugelberg HD. (2021). Public j...
Words/Nga Kupu*
Show MoreThe suggestion of a “Words” column focussing particularly on words from a non-western ethical tradition is great. We are journeying through perilous waters and will need to adapt our ethical framework to the new reality. A value of diversity is that we can draw on concepts from other traditions. Of course, a “Word” in a language you do not speak is of no use. The word is part of a language, which is the embodiment of a culture, and ethics is inevitably culture bound. Even words shared between cultures do not necessarily share exact meanings. A consideration of Justice within the bioethical community culture would be incomplete without reference to Rawls. A consideration of Justice within a Māori community would be centred around Te Tiriti o Waitangi/ The Treaty of Waitangi(1). A simple translation is not enough. The definition of Whakawhanaungatanga is a good starting place, but more depth is needed. It is embedded in a Māori concept of health(2), and the richness of the concepts cannot be appreciated without appreciating the context in which it is used. Whilst it is a Māori word it is now also a New Zealand word. A whole generation of medical students have been taught Māori concepts of health, including Whakawhanaungatanga, significantly spearheaded by the work of Pitama and Lacey(3). Parry as a 5th year student wrote a heart-warming case study that illustrated the value of using these concepts(4). The New Zealand ethical landscape is an example of t...
We should be careful of the way we talk. Human society can be described as a long conversation about what matters. In this conversation, the language we use to describe our healthcare and social care practices not only reveals our attitudes and virtues, it shapes them. In order to promote self-worth and respect for individuals who use professional services there must be an understanding of how the language used in a profession influences professionals and the individuals with whom professionals work. The term ‘ service user’ or ‘client’ may be one reluctantly used by many healthcare professionals. The language of ‘service user’ or ‘client’ is acceptable at the political level. However it may be potentially detrimental to those it labels in healthcare and may also be damaging to the underlying ethical practices of many healthcare professions.
Language is a means of communication in healthcare, it can indicate attitudes and it is an integral part of social and professional life and behaviour. The particular meaning we attach to words reveal the underlying values and attitudes we hold about the people or things to which we are referring. Language exerts hidden power as our words may be simple descriptions or they may change lives. This power may not be detected by the vulnerable/underserved in society and by those with less power . Power and status in healthcare and social care interactions determine how each party behaves e.g. The term ‘service user’ or ‘cl...
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