One of the most enlightening statements for me from the report of the WISH patient safety forum 2015 is, "The idea that saving patients’
lives demands heroism is a harmful misconception about health and medicine seen in popular culture. In the real-world, the true heroes are not just rescuing patients, they are voicing their concerns and taking proactive measures to reduce the risks, before a patient is potentially put in harm’s way".
We shouldn't need to rely on heroic rescue or expect it to be a normal part of our every day clinical practice. The idolisation of heroism damages attempts to improve systemic approaches to improving patient care because it neglects and belittles the under-appreciated grind of change to reduce the underlying risk of patient harm. Heroism should be less of an aspiration and more of a flag highlighting the need for organisational improvement.
The argument Jecker and Au mount against an elimination strategy for Covid-19 fails to account for the New Zealand experience. They discuss the question of excess mortality and suggest that tactics to reduce Covid-19 related deaths inadvertently increase deaths from other causes. Whilst this is intuitively true actual country wide data undermines their argument: https://blogs.otago.ac.nz/pubhealthexpert/mortality-declines-in-aotearoa... New Zealand experienced negative excess deaths for the years 2020-21 as did Australia and Taiwan. Had New Zealand experienced the same rate of excess deaths as the USA we could have expected 19,900 deaths which would have disproportionately affected ethnic minorities and the vulnerable. The elimination strategy in New Zealand was by far the best strategy to address health disparities, without it many more of those suffering disparities would have died.
Murdoch et al. give an excellent account of the law in Canada relating to consent to research in children when they mature. Laws must be based on moral principles, which always have a beneficial intention and are everywhere similar for both treatment and research, for both adults and children and for the publication of identifying data.
A competent adult can accept,reject or discontinue treatment. But a doctor must only provide treatment, which is beneficial physically or emotionally. In a publicly funded service she may need to balance the benefit to the individual against the needs of the community. The .patient is always free to consult a different doctor. A patient's personal details must not be revealed without express permission.
An adult can also accept, reject or stop participation in research intended to benefit others. Again he must not be identified without permission. He cannot require the eradication of data obtained because that would harm others.
A guardian, on behalf of a child, consents to treatment or research with the same rights and restrictions. As far as possible the informed consent of the child should be obtained.. When the child reaches maturity he must be fully informed and assumes responsibility for his own care. He can discontinue beneficial treatment but cannot demand that the doctor reverses it, because that would require her to cause harm. He can change doctors. He can stop participation in research but he cannot hav...
Murdoch et al. give an excellent account of the law in Canada relating to consent to research in children when they mature. Laws must be based on moral principles, which always have a beneficial intention and are everywhere similar for both treatment and research, for both adults and children and for the publication of identifying data.
A competent adult can accept,reject or discontinue treatment. But a doctor must only provide treatment, which is beneficial physically or emotionally. In a publicly funded service she may need to balance the benefit to the individual against the needs of the community. The .patient is always free to consult a different doctor. A patient's personal details must not be revealed without express permission.
An adult can also accept, reject or stop participation in research intended to benefit others. Again he must not be identified without permission. He cannot require the eradication of data obtained because that would harm others.
A guardian, on behalf of a child, consents to treatment or research with the same rights and restrictions. As far as possible the informed consent of the child should be obtained.. When the child reaches maturity he must be fully informed and assumes responsibility for his own care. He can discontinue beneficial treatment but cannot demand that the doctor reverses it, because that would require her to cause harm. He can change doctors. He can stop participation in research but he cannot have existing data eradicated, because that would harm others..
Jurisdictions differ about the age at which children should assume adult responsibility. They may depute to ethics committees decisions about research and to the Courts other problems, such as the competence of a particular individual to make a specific decision. The Courts may adjudicate when treatment is demanded, which doctors see as harmful, unhelpful or an unfair use of resources.
Fifty years later: the significance of the Nuremberg Code
E Shuster 1 Affiliations expand, PMID: 9358142 DOI: 10.1056/NEJM199711133372006
Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA.
---- https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/10557112/
The prosecution of doctors guilty of appalling human rights abuses at Nuremberg was achieved on the mistaken premise that the research community already had a code of conduct which, if applied, would have made such abuses impossible. In fact, not only was there no such code but when the 'Nuremberg Code' was published after the trial it continued to be ignored by many doctors for some thirty years afterwards. Indeed its central principle of informed consent has itself been eroded by subsequent international agreements on the ethics of medical research. This review shows that the mechanisms for approval of medical research which have now been promulgated in England and Wales, in practice, are applied on a very variable basis. Research in vulnerable groups unable to give fully informed consent such as children, prisoners and the incompetent elderly require the application of more rigorous standards of ethical control than those currently in operation. The use of vulnerable populations in the developing world and the application of international standards to them is also considered. A number of suggestions for improvements in current proce...
Fifty years later: the significance of the Nuremberg Code
E Shuster 1 Affiliations expand, PMID: 9358142 DOI: 10.1056/NEJM199711133372006
Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA.
---- https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/10557112/
The prosecution of doctors guilty of appalling human rights abuses at Nuremberg was achieved on the mistaken premise that the research community already had a code of conduct which, if applied, would have made such abuses impossible. In fact, not only was there no such code but when the 'Nuremberg Code' was published after the trial it continued to be ignored by many doctors for some thirty years afterwards. Indeed its central principle of informed consent has itself been eroded by subsequent international agreements on the ethics of medical research. This review shows that the mechanisms for approval of medical research which have now been promulgated in England and Wales, in practice, are applied on a very variable basis. Research in vulnerable groups unable to give fully informed consent such as children, prisoners and the incompetent elderly require the application of more rigorous standards of ethical control than those currently in operation. The use of vulnerable populations in the developing world and the application of international standards to them is also considered. A number of suggestions for improvements in current procedures in all these areas are put forward. The proposals for the United Kingdom would meet the requirements of the European Convention on bioethical research and the recent government consultation paper on medical treatment and research in incompetent adults.
The vulnerabilities of pharmacists would appear to be invisible in the euthanasia/assisted suicide debates.
As healthcare systems and societies are changing, the social positions of doctors, pharmacists, nurses and patients within them were changing too. In the past, clinical experts’ authority and patients’ autonomy have been in conflict. The current patient-centered / person-centered model of medical care, aims to establish egalitarian relationships between patients and healthcare clinicians and providers .
Vulnerability can be defined as a lack of autonomy and independence, bodily and psychological insecurity, marginalized or deviant status, lack of acknowledgement within the society (1).Vulnerable groups are exposed to discrimination, intolerant attitude, subordination. Vulnerability is usually seen as an inherent quality of certain social groups (but not others). However it has many dimensions and might be attributed to relatively “powerful” groups (2). Doctors, pharmacists and nurses i.e. so called powerful groups, are rarely characterized as vulnerable groups, but within certain circumstances, they can be recognized as “vulnerable”.
Doctors, pharmacists and nurses are in a situation where they are becoming more controlled by the patients. There is an emphasis on the myth that citizens (patients) should be autonomous and the inevitability and normality of dependency is not recognised (3). Dependency is an unavoidable feature of...
The vulnerabilities of pharmacists would appear to be invisible in the euthanasia/assisted suicide debates.
As healthcare systems and societies are changing, the social positions of doctors, pharmacists, nurses and patients within them were changing too. In the past, clinical experts’ authority and patients’ autonomy have been in conflict. The current patient-centered / person-centered model of medical care, aims to establish egalitarian relationships between patients and healthcare clinicians and providers .
Vulnerability can be defined as a lack of autonomy and independence, bodily and psychological insecurity, marginalized or deviant status, lack of acknowledgement within the society (1).Vulnerable groups are exposed to discrimination, intolerant attitude, subordination. Vulnerability is usually seen as an inherent quality of certain social groups (but not others). However it has many dimensions and might be attributed to relatively “powerful” groups (2). Doctors, pharmacists and nurses i.e. so called powerful groups, are rarely characterized as vulnerable groups, but within certain circumstances, they can be recognized as “vulnerable”.
Doctors, pharmacists and nurses are in a situation where they are becoming more controlled by the patients. There is an emphasis on the myth that citizens (patients) should be autonomous and the inevitability and normality of dependency is not recognised (3). Dependency is an unavoidable feature of any society and it is not a feature that is taken into account from the liberal perspective. The recognition of universal vulnerability suggests that the autonomy model will have to re thought (4).
Ethics has not paid attention to vulnerability for three possible reasons (5):
• Vulnerability is the antithesis of the individualistic ethics predominating in Western societies.
• Vulnerability is not addressed in ethics because philosophy ignores the body.
• Ethics has been prominently rationalist and therefore feelings have been displaced or have not been taken into account.
It is methodologically important not to define certain groups as (not) vulnerable by default (2). There are many potential sources of vulnerability, and each of these constitutes a different, overlapping layer. This metaphor of layers presents a contextual and variable concept of vulnerability, moving away from the fixed and static view (6). The vulnerability of professionals e.g. pharmacists remains invisible as it does not correspond with their social position. The sufferings (existential and moral) of pharmacists in particular are invisible, denied and ignored in the euthanasia/assisted suicide debates.
All forms of euthanasia and physician assisted suicide require lethal medications. The role of pharmacists in the pharmaceutical care/medication use process at the end of life is often ignored, written out or overlooked. In the main doctors and nurses are included in “conscientious objection” legislative protections. Pharmacists are often excluded from protection of their human right to freedom of conscience and the derived right of “conscientious objection”. Pharmacists in all working environments (pharmaceutical industry , community pharmacy, hospital pharmacy, palliative care pharmacy, long term care, care of people with disabilities including intellectual disabilities, general practice pharmacists, etc. ) will be part of the process (7).
We can understand our humanity in a broader sense only by recognizing our universal vulnerability and interdependence (8). Pharmacists and their patients and colleagues are vulnerable and autonomous. The end of life medication use process (natural death or intentional death ) is dependent on the involvement and expertise of pharmacists. Failure to recognise this makes individual pharmacists and the pharmacy profession vulnerable.
References
1. Liamputtong, P. Researching the Vulnerable: A Guide to Sensitive Research Methods; SAGE: London, UK; Thousand Oaks, CA, USA, 2007; 246p.
2. Societies 2020, 10(1), 5; https://doi.org/10.3390/soc10010005
3. Fineman, Martha A., The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency, New York, The New Press, 2004.
4. Rodriguez, Janet Delgalo. The Relevance of the Ethics of Vulnerability in Bioethics. The Ethics Forum. Volume 12, Issue 2–3, Automne 2017, p. 154–179 https://doi.org/10.7202/1051280
5. Hoffmaster, Barry, “What Does Vulnerability Mean?”, Hastings Center Report, vol. 36, no. 2, 2006, pp. 38-45.
6. Luna, Florencia, “Vulnerabilidad: la metáfora de las capas”, Jurisprudencia Argentina, IV, 1, 2008, pp. 60-67.
7. Flood, Bernadette. Pharmacists and assisted dying. BMJ 2020 https://www.bmj.com/content/368/bmj.m1139.full
Dahlquist and Kugelberg (2021) correctly notice as the many non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) which have been introduced to stop or slow down the COVID-19 pandemic through coercion are not publicly justified through a scientific consensus on the factual propositions that are used to support the policies, and as such, they would be illegitimate. It has been an unfortunate circumstance of this pandemic, that not only the NPIs but also the therapeutic approaches have been the subject of media misinterpretation, at the expense of a correct debate in between the scientific community, with scientists expressing opinions not welcomed by the media routinely abused for doing their work. Examples of policies lacking every scientific support, but still approved by the media, are everywhere. To find a working solution to the pandemic, definitively we do need free science “on the top”, rather than “on the tap” or even “on a leash”, limiting the interference by governments and corporations directly and through the media serving their interests. Misinformation by media is what has made the response to COVID-19 less effective than what could have been listening to the majority of the scientists. The response to COVID-19 of many countries has been dictated so far by the media, or better by those who control the media, rather than the scientists. To find a solution, scientists should be free of this conditioning.
REFERENCES
1. Dahlquist M, Kugelberg HD. (2021). Public j...
Dahlquist and Kugelberg (2021) correctly notice as the many non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) which have been introduced to stop or slow down the COVID-19 pandemic through coercion are not publicly justified through a scientific consensus on the factual propositions that are used to support the policies, and as such, they would be illegitimate. It has been an unfortunate circumstance of this pandemic, that not only the NPIs but also the therapeutic approaches have been the subject of media misinterpretation, at the expense of a correct debate in between the scientific community, with scientists expressing opinions not welcomed by the media routinely abused for doing their work. Examples of policies lacking every scientific support, but still approved by the media, are everywhere. To find a working solution to the pandemic, definitively we do need free science “on the top”, rather than “on the tap” or even “on a leash”, limiting the interference by governments and corporations directly and through the media serving their interests. Misinformation by media is what has made the response to COVID-19 less effective than what could have been listening to the majority of the scientists. The response to COVID-19 of many countries has been dictated so far by the media, or better by those who control the media, rather than the scientists. To find a solution, scientists should be free of this conditioning.
REFERENCES
1. Dahlquist M, Kugelberg HD. (2021). Public justification and expert disagreement over non-pharmaceutical interventions for the COVID-19 pandemic. J. Med. Ethics, Published Online First: 12 October 2021. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2021-107671
Words/Nga Kupu*
The suggestion of a “Words” column focussing particularly on words from a non-western ethical tradition is great. We are journeying through perilous waters and will need to adapt our ethical framework to the new reality. A value of diversity is that we can draw on concepts from other traditions. Of course, a “Word” in a language you do not speak is of no use. The word is part of a language, which is the embodiment of a culture, and ethics is inevitably culture bound. Even words shared between cultures do not necessarily share exact meanings. A consideration of Justice within the bioethical community culture would be incomplete without reference to Rawls. A consideration of Justice within a Māori community would be centred around Te Tiriti o Waitangi/ The Treaty of Waitangi(1). A simple translation is not enough. The definition of Whakawhanaungatanga is a good starting place, but more depth is needed. It is embedded in a Māori concept of health(2), and the richness of the concepts cannot be appreciated without appreciating the context in which it is used. Whilst it is a Māori word it is now also a New Zealand word. A whole generation of medical students have been taught Māori concepts of health, including Whakawhanaungatanga, significantly spearheaded by the work of Pitama and Lacey(3). Parry as a 5th year student wrote a heart-warming case study that illustrated the value of using these concepts(4). The New Zealand ethical landscape is an example of t...
Words/Nga Kupu*
The suggestion of a “Words” column focussing particularly on words from a non-western ethical tradition is great. We are journeying through perilous waters and will need to adapt our ethical framework to the new reality. A value of diversity is that we can draw on concepts from other traditions. Of course, a “Word” in a language you do not speak is of no use. The word is part of a language, which is the embodiment of a culture, and ethics is inevitably culture bound. Even words shared between cultures do not necessarily share exact meanings. A consideration of Justice within the bioethical community culture would be incomplete without reference to Rawls. A consideration of Justice within a Māori community would be centred around Te Tiriti o Waitangi/ The Treaty of Waitangi(1). A simple translation is not enough. The definition of Whakawhanaungatanga is a good starting place, but more depth is needed. It is embedded in a Māori concept of health(2), and the richness of the concepts cannot be appreciated without appreciating the context in which it is used. Whilst it is a Māori word it is now also a New Zealand word. A whole generation of medical students have been taught Māori concepts of health, including Whakawhanaungatanga, significantly spearheaded by the work of Pitama and Lacey(3). Parry as a 5th year student wrote a heart-warming case study that illustrated the value of using these concepts(4). The New Zealand ethical landscape is an example of the extent to which ethics is culture bound. Whilst traditional ethical principles remain they are increasingly augmented by Māori concepts. The related word Whanaungatanga is one of the principles in “Te Ture Whakaruruhau Code Of Ethical Principles For Public Health in Aotearoa New Zealand”(5). I look forward to further contributions.
* Māori language translation of words.
1. Mutu M. ‘To honour the treaty, we must first settle colonisation’ (Moana Jackson 2015): the long road from colonial devastation to balance, peace and harmony. Journal of the Royal Society of New Zealand. 2019;49(sup1):4-18.
2. Durie M. Whaiora Maori Health Development. Second Edition ed. Melbourne Australia: Oxford University Press; 1998.
3. Lacey C, Huria T, Beckert L, Gilles M, Pitama S. The Hui Process: a framework to enhance the doctor–patient relationship with Māori. Journal of the New Zealand Medical Association. 2011;124(1347).
4. Parry R, Jones B, Gray B, Ingham T. Applying a Māori-centred consultation approach for engaging with Māori patients: an undergraduate medical student case study. Journal of Primary Health Care. 2014;6(3):254-60.
5. Public Health Association of New Zealand Incorporated. Te Ture Whakaruruhau Code Of Ethical Principles For Public Health in Aotearoa New Zealand. Wellington New Zealand2012 [Available from: https://www.pha.org.nz/page-18201.
We should be careful of the way we talk. Human society can be described as a long conversation about what matters. In this conversation, the language we use to describe our healthcare and social care practices not only reveals our attitudes and virtues, it shapes them. In order to promote self-worth and respect for individuals who use professional services there must be an understanding of how the language used in a profession influences professionals and the individuals with whom professionals work. The term ‘ service user’ or ‘client’ may be one reluctantly used by many healthcare professionals. The language of ‘service user’ or ‘client’ is acceptable at the political level. However it may be potentially detrimental to those it labels in healthcare and may also be damaging to the underlying ethical practices of many healthcare professions.
Language is a means of communication in healthcare, it can indicate attitudes and it is an integral part of social and professional life and behaviour. The particular meaning we attach to words reveal the underlying values and attitudes we hold about the people or things to which we are referring. Language exerts hidden power as our words may be simple descriptions or they may change lives. This power may not be detected by the vulnerable/underserved in society and by those with less power . Power and status in healthcare and social care interactions determine how each party behaves e.g. The term ‘service user’ or ‘cl...
We should be careful of the way we talk. Human society can be described as a long conversation about what matters. In this conversation, the language we use to describe our healthcare and social care practices not only reveals our attitudes and virtues, it shapes them. In order to promote self-worth and respect for individuals who use professional services there must be an understanding of how the language used in a profession influences professionals and the individuals with whom professionals work. The term ‘ service user’ or ‘client’ may be one reluctantly used by many healthcare professionals. The language of ‘service user’ or ‘client’ is acceptable at the political level. However it may be potentially detrimental to those it labels in healthcare and may also be damaging to the underlying ethical practices of many healthcare professions.
Language is a means of communication in healthcare, it can indicate attitudes and it is an integral part of social and professional life and behaviour. The particular meaning we attach to words reveal the underlying values and attitudes we hold about the people or things to which we are referring. Language exerts hidden power as our words may be simple descriptions or they may change lives. This power may not be detected by the vulnerable/underserved in society and by those with less power . Power and status in healthcare and social care interactions determine how each party behaves e.g. The term ‘service user’ or ‘client’ may be described as ‘depersonalising’.
Care of people who are unable to care for themselves and compassion towards people who are vulnerable has been a basic tenet of medicine since ancient times . We need to be aware of our own language, values and attitudes to enable us to create a collaborative relationship with people that is person centred, respectful, non-judgmental, encourages personal responsibility and takes into account ethical and professional considerations.
We need to be particularly careful of language in the care of the dying. Euphemisms are place-holders for important concepts. They may disguise a practice which one might abhor if it were given another name.
Those who use the phrase ‘dying with dignity’, by avoiding the negative connotations of suicide and euthanasia /intentional killing , expect that it will be perceived as less alarming than euthanasia and assisted suicide, and that there is a problem with people being treated with ‘dignity. The use of the term ‘dying with dignity’ creates a halo of benignity and generates greater support for and muted opposition to any proposed law. Similarly, the euphemisms ‘physician assisted suicide’ , ‘medical assistance in dying’ or ‘assistance with dying’ are meant to be reassuring.
The use of ‘detoxifying language’ can lead to a situation where physicians, pharmacists, nurses and others can turn from healers/those who maintain or improve health, to those who intentionally take human life. In Nazi Germany during World War II, euphemisms were used to desensitize physicians, pharmacists, nurses and society to the horrors of a program of intentional killing /euthanasia .
The consistent application of euphemisms for medicalized killing significantly weakens arguments against assisted intentional killing of a human being.
Reference:
Mitchell CB. Of Euphemisms and Euthanasia: The Language Games of the Nazi Doctors and Some Implications for the Modern Euthanasia Movement. OMEGA - Journal of Death and Dying. 2000;40(1):255-265. doi:10.2190/K68E-
In their recent article, Jocelyn Downie and Udo Schuklenk conclude, first, that the Canadian experience denies the existence of a 'slippery slope' expanding medical termination from a limited to a broader medical constituency. Second, they argue a faiure to provide social constituents of health and support is a significant factor in the increased requests for 'medical aide in dying.' (1) It is hard to credit their conclusions on either point.
As they note, 2016 legislation legalized 'medical assistance in dying" in cases of serious and incurable illness, disease or disability in an advanced state of decline with death an inevitable and foreseeable conclusion. But as they note (pg. 3-4) new legislation has broadened those criteria to include those with 'disabilities' whose death is not reasonably foreseeable as well as others with chronic, non-progressive disorders including mental illness. Indeed, enui seems to now be an acceptable rational for termination among even those without serious chronic illnesses or disorders. (2)
That is precisely the definition of the slippery slope, a narrow framework of action is broadened to include ever larger classes of peoples.
Similarly, they give short-shirt to the issues of the social constituents of health, ignoring the complex of predicate failures that may lead one to seek a rapid death. These include the limited availability of expert palliative care, the shortage...
In their recent article, Jocelyn Downie and Udo Schuklenk conclude, first, that the Canadian experience denies the existence of a 'slippery slope' expanding medical termination from a limited to a broader medical constituency. Second, they argue a faiure to provide social constituents of health and support is a significant factor in the increased requests for 'medical aide in dying.' (1) It is hard to credit their conclusions on either point.
As they note, 2016 legislation legalized 'medical assistance in dying" in cases of serious and incurable illness, disease or disability in an advanced state of decline with death an inevitable and foreseeable conclusion. But as they note (pg. 3-4) new legislation has broadened those criteria to include those with 'disabilities' whose death is not reasonably foreseeable as well as others with chronic, non-progressive disorders including mental illness. Indeed, enui seems to now be an acceptable rational for termination among even those without serious chronic illnesses or disorders. (2)
That is precisely the definition of the slippery slope, a narrow framework of action is broadened to include ever larger classes of peoples.
Similarly, they give short-shirt to the issues of the social constituents of health, ignoring the complex of predicate failures that may lead one to seek a rapid death. These include the limited availability of expert palliative care, the shortage of hospices across Canada's provinces, and in each provincial health system the limited availability of those resources and the rehabilitative, psychological and social facilities that may make a life lived with chronic conditions meaningful and sustainable.
As a Canadian long engaged in this debate--legal and social--as well as in the care of those with chronic conditions I thus find their arguments incomplete and their conclusions inaccurate. I would, of course, be more than willing to debate their argument in person or in this, or another journal.
Tom Koch
The University of British Columbia, VAncouver, BC, Canada.
Alton Medical Centre, Toronto, ON, Canada.
1. Downie J. and Schudklienk U. Social determinants of health and slippery slopes in
assisted dying debates: lessons from Canada. J Med Ethics 2021. doi:10.1136/medethics-2021-107493.
2. Koch T. Old age alone shouldn’t be considered a justification for physician-assisted death. Globe and Mail 2018 (April 18). https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-old-age-alone-shouldnt-b....
The authors argue that when we prioritize healthcare workers for ventilators because of their instrumental value as healthcare workers, we fail to value human lives equally. While they suggest that “it may be ethically justifiable for healthcare workers to receive priority for some scarce healthcare resources” and argue that healthcare workers should have sufficient personal protective equipment (PPE), they do little to explain why granting priority for these resources isn’t also, as they argue with ventilators, a case of failing to attribute equal value to human lives. Indeed, it is not clear that they think prioritizing healthcare workers for vaccines was the right thing to do: “. . . our social fabric has shown signs of unravelling as vaccine roll-outs have pulled on loose threads” and prioritizing vaccines has resulted “in unanticipated frustration, mistrust and strife.” The authors are right in their conclusion about ventilators, but we should reject the concerns their article raises about vaccines and PPE. If saving the most lives is the goal, it is consistent with valuing each person’s life equally to prioritize healthcare workers for preventive measures, particularly at the outset of a pandemic.
The authors mention three reasons ventilators are different from preventive measures like PPE and vaccines: 1) Efficacy: Those who require a ventilator will not return to work quickly. 2) Lifesaving: While ventilators rescue endangered lives, preventive measures only...
The authors argue that when we prioritize healthcare workers for ventilators because of their instrumental value as healthcare workers, we fail to value human lives equally. While they suggest that “it may be ethically justifiable for healthcare workers to receive priority for some scarce healthcare resources” and argue that healthcare workers should have sufficient personal protective equipment (PPE), they do little to explain why granting priority for these resources isn’t also, as they argue with ventilators, a case of failing to attribute equal value to human lives. Indeed, it is not clear that they think prioritizing healthcare workers for vaccines was the right thing to do: “. . . our social fabric has shown signs of unravelling as vaccine roll-outs have pulled on loose threads” and prioritizing vaccines has resulted “in unanticipated frustration, mistrust and strife.” The authors are right in their conclusion about ventilators, but we should reject the concerns their article raises about vaccines and PPE. If saving the most lives is the goal, it is consistent with valuing each person’s life equally to prioritize healthcare workers for preventive measures, particularly at the outset of a pandemic.
The authors mention three reasons ventilators are different from preventive measures like PPE and vaccines: 1) Efficacy: Those who require a ventilator will not return to work quickly. 2) Lifesaving: While ventilators rescue endangered lives, preventive measures only reduce risk. 3) Urgency: Not being prioritized for preventive measures likely means waiting until they become available, while not being prioritized for a ventilator means not receiving one at all. The point about efficacy should be acknowledged as an important difference between ventilators and preventive measures. If healthcare workers qualify for priority for scarce life-saving resources due to their instrumental value in their roles as care providers, and the need for a ventilator indicates an inability to fulfill this role, then healthcare workers requiring ventilators shouldn’t receive priority for those resources over others.
The authors’ commitment to community solidarity leads them to concern about the results of assigning (or worse, reassigning) the last ventilator to a healthcare worker as opposed to someone in equal medical need. However, if prioritizing ventilators for healthcare workers weakens our social fabric, we must ask whether this also applies to preventive measures. Contra the authors’ last two points about differences between ventilators and preventive care: a) preventive care is lifesaving: The life of a nurse forced to face Covid patients without adequate PPE is endangered. b) preventive measures are urgent: If hospitals are overwhelmed and death rates are spiking, those aware of the virus’s danger and the vaccine’s efficacy in January will find only limited comfort in knowing that they might be able to receive the vaccine if they are healthy by May.
Preventive measures are like ventilators in that they are scarce lifesaving medical resources and their use is urgent. Can prioritizing them be justified? The authors follow James Childress in supposing that any justification for their use on the basis of instrumental value carries a “heavy burden of proof.” Childress made his comments in 1970, while grappling with how to approach extremely limited dialysis or organ transplant opportunities. He argued that the burden for straying from randomness or chance as a basis for allocation demands showing not that someone has positive contributions to make, but that they are literally irreplaceable, that disaster would likely result from that person’s loss. However, in the context of a pandemic, this burden of proof is too heavy. It is possible to be instrumental in saving many lives yet still fall short of Childress’ standard.
The most straightforward justification for prioritizing those who save more lives is the multiplier effect, an instance of instrumental value. If we save the life of a life-saver, more total lives are saved. This is evidence not that we value lives unequally—the life-saver’s life isn’t valued more highly—but that we value saving more lives above saving fewer lives. The authors make the point that many workers, not just healthcare workers, have instrumental value. It is true that healthcare workers aren’t alone in having instrumental value (many are instrumental in keeping the economy running or society functioning, for example) and in fact, aren’t the only ones in roles that might save lives. My argument is that if saving the most lives is our primary objective, then prioritizing those we believe will make that possible is consistent with valuing each life equally.
These judgments are context dependent. Decisions must be judged by the information available at the time. At the outset of a pandemic, we are information poor. No one knows whether the infectious agent in question is as contagious as measles or Ebola, how it spreads, or which groups are most at risk. This is difficult because PPE must be stockpiled in advance, and successful planning for mass vaccine allocation/distribution, although it happens later, isn’t last minute either. We must act on our best predictions. For pandemic disease, it is reasonable to assume that healthcare workers will be particularly vulnerable to death and that more lives will be saved if healthcare worker lives are saved. If we later come to have solid evidence that prioritizing housekeepers for vaccines instead of healthcare workers would actually save more lives (not the same as concluding that housekeepers are dying at higher rates, as mentioned in the article), we should adjust our priorities accordingly.
The authors’ account of unravelling social fabric is overblown. Scarcity brings sorrow; there aren’t enough lifesaving resources to go around. However, this is more a reflection of the pandemic’s toll than our decision to save the most lives by prioritizing healthcare workers. The goal is to save the most lives, not a perfect distribution process. Inevitably an imperfect distribution system will lead to the frustration the authors reference. Many will disagree with which goals are primary or how to achieve them. But frustration isn’t failure. When we come to know more, we can do better. Meanwhile, we save the most lives we can.
One of the most enlightening statements for me from the report of the WISH patient safety forum 2015 is, "The idea that saving patients’
lives demands heroism is a harmful misconception about health and medicine seen in popular culture. In the real-world, the true heroes are not just rescuing patients, they are voicing their concerns and taking proactive measures to reduce the risks, before a patient is potentially put in harm’s way".
We shouldn't need to rely on heroic rescue or expect it to be a normal part of our every day clinical practice. The idolisation of heroism damages attempts to improve systemic approaches to improving patient care because it neglects and belittles the under-appreciated grind of change to reduce the underlying risk of patient harm. Heroism should be less of an aspiration and more of a flag highlighting the need for organisational improvement.
The argument Jecker and Au mount against an elimination strategy for Covid-19 fails to account for the New Zealand experience. They discuss the question of excess mortality and suggest that tactics to reduce Covid-19 related deaths inadvertently increase deaths from other causes. Whilst this is intuitively true actual country wide data undermines their argument: https://blogs.otago.ac.nz/pubhealthexpert/mortality-declines-in-aotearoa... New Zealand experienced negative excess deaths for the years 2020-21 as did Australia and Taiwan. Had New Zealand experienced the same rate of excess deaths as the USA we could have expected 19,900 deaths which would have disproportionately affected ethnic minorities and the vulnerable. The elimination strategy in New Zealand was by far the best strategy to address health disparities, without it many more of those suffering disparities would have died.
Murdoch et al. give an excellent account of the law in Canada relating to consent to research in children when they mature. Laws must be based on moral principles, which always have a beneficial intention and are everywhere similar for both treatment and research, for both adults and children and for the publication of identifying data.
A competent adult can accept,reject or discontinue treatment. But a doctor must only provide treatment, which is beneficial physically or emotionally. In a publicly funded service she may need to balance the benefit to the individual against the needs of the community. The .patient is always free to consult a different doctor. A patient's personal details must not be revealed without express permission.
An adult can also accept, reject or stop participation in research intended to benefit others. Again he must not be identified without permission. He cannot require the eradication of data obtained because that would harm others.
A guardian, on behalf of a child, consents to treatment or research with the same rights and restrictions. As far as possible the informed consent of the child should be obtained.. When the child reaches maturity he must be fully informed and assumes responsibility for his own care. He can discontinue beneficial treatment but cannot demand that the doctor reverses it, because that would require her to cause harm. He can change doctors. He can stop participation in research but he cannot hav...
Show MoreFifty years later: the significance of the Nuremberg Code
E Shuster 1 Affiliations expand, PMID: 9358142 DOI: 10.1056/NEJM199711133372006
Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA.
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https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/10557112/
The prosecution of doctors guilty of appalling human rights abuses at Nuremberg was achieved on the mistaken premise that the research community already had a code of conduct which, if applied, would have made such abuses impossible. In fact, not only was there no such code but when the 'Nuremberg Code' was published after the trial it continued to be ignored by many doctors for some thirty years afterwards. Indeed its central principle of informed consent has itself been eroded by subsequent international agreements on the ethics of medical research. This review shows that the mechanisms for approval of medical research which have now been promulgated in England and Wales, in practice, are applied on a very variable basis. Research in vulnerable groups unable to give fully informed consent such as children, prisoners and the incompetent elderly require the application of more rigorous standards of ethical control than those currently in operation. The use of vulnerable populations in the developing world and the application of international standards to them is also considered. A number of suggestions for improvements in current proce...
Show MoreThe vulnerabilities of pharmacists would appear to be invisible in the euthanasia/assisted suicide debates.
As healthcare systems and societies are changing, the social positions of doctors, pharmacists, nurses and patients within them were changing too. In the past, clinical experts’ authority and patients’ autonomy have been in conflict. The current patient-centered / person-centered model of medical care, aims to establish egalitarian relationships between patients and healthcare clinicians and providers .
Vulnerability can be defined as a lack of autonomy and independence, bodily and psychological insecurity, marginalized or deviant status, lack of acknowledgement within the society (1).Vulnerable groups are exposed to discrimination, intolerant attitude, subordination. Vulnerability is usually seen as an inherent quality of certain social groups (but not others). However it has many dimensions and might be attributed to relatively “powerful” groups (2). Doctors, pharmacists and nurses i.e. so called powerful groups, are rarely characterized as vulnerable groups, but within certain circumstances, they can be recognized as “vulnerable”.
Doctors, pharmacists and nurses are in a situation where they are becoming more controlled by the patients. There is an emphasis on the myth that citizens (patients) should be autonomous and the inevitability and normality of dependency is not recognised (3). Dependency is an unavoidable feature of...
Show MoreDahlquist and Kugelberg (2021) correctly notice as the many non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) which have been introduced to stop or slow down the COVID-19 pandemic through coercion are not publicly justified through a scientific consensus on the factual propositions that are used to support the policies, and as such, they would be illegitimate. It has been an unfortunate circumstance of this pandemic, that not only the NPIs but also the therapeutic approaches have been the subject of media misinterpretation, at the expense of a correct debate in between the scientific community, with scientists expressing opinions not welcomed by the media routinely abused for doing their work. Examples of policies lacking every scientific support, but still approved by the media, are everywhere. To find a working solution to the pandemic, definitively we do need free science “on the top”, rather than “on the tap” or even “on a leash”, limiting the interference by governments and corporations directly and through the media serving their interests. Misinformation by media is what has made the response to COVID-19 less effective than what could have been listening to the majority of the scientists. The response to COVID-19 of many countries has been dictated so far by the media, or better by those who control the media, rather than the scientists. To find a solution, scientists should be free of this conditioning.
REFERENCES
Show More1. Dahlquist M, Kugelberg HD. (2021). Public j...
Words/Nga Kupu*
Show MoreThe suggestion of a “Words” column focussing particularly on words from a non-western ethical tradition is great. We are journeying through perilous waters and will need to adapt our ethical framework to the new reality. A value of diversity is that we can draw on concepts from other traditions. Of course, a “Word” in a language you do not speak is of no use. The word is part of a language, which is the embodiment of a culture, and ethics is inevitably culture bound. Even words shared between cultures do not necessarily share exact meanings. A consideration of Justice within the bioethical community culture would be incomplete without reference to Rawls. A consideration of Justice within a Māori community would be centred around Te Tiriti o Waitangi/ The Treaty of Waitangi(1). A simple translation is not enough. The definition of Whakawhanaungatanga is a good starting place, but more depth is needed. It is embedded in a Māori concept of health(2), and the richness of the concepts cannot be appreciated without appreciating the context in which it is used. Whilst it is a Māori word it is now also a New Zealand word. A whole generation of medical students have been taught Māori concepts of health, including Whakawhanaungatanga, significantly spearheaded by the work of Pitama and Lacey(3). Parry as a 5th year student wrote a heart-warming case study that illustrated the value of using these concepts(4). The New Zealand ethical landscape is an example of t...
We should be careful of the way we talk. Human society can be described as a long conversation about what matters. In this conversation, the language we use to describe our healthcare and social care practices not only reveals our attitudes and virtues, it shapes them. In order to promote self-worth and respect for individuals who use professional services there must be an understanding of how the language used in a profession influences professionals and the individuals with whom professionals work. The term ‘ service user’ or ‘client’ may be one reluctantly used by many healthcare professionals. The language of ‘service user’ or ‘client’ is acceptable at the political level. However it may be potentially detrimental to those it labels in healthcare and may also be damaging to the underlying ethical practices of many healthcare professions.
Language is a means of communication in healthcare, it can indicate attitudes and it is an integral part of social and professional life and behaviour. The particular meaning we attach to words reveal the underlying values and attitudes we hold about the people or things to which we are referring. Language exerts hidden power as our words may be simple descriptions or they may change lives. This power may not be detected by the vulnerable/underserved in society and by those with less power . Power and status in healthcare and social care interactions determine how each party behaves e.g. The term ‘service user’ or ‘cl...
Show MoreIn their recent article, Jocelyn Downie and Udo Schuklenk conclude, first, that the Canadian experience denies the existence of a 'slippery slope' expanding medical termination from a limited to a broader medical constituency. Second, they argue a faiure to provide social constituents of health and support is a significant factor in the increased requests for 'medical aide in dying.' (1) It is hard to credit their conclusions on either point.
Show MoreAs they note, 2016 legislation legalized 'medical assistance in dying" in cases of serious and incurable illness, disease or disability in an advanced state of decline with death an inevitable and foreseeable conclusion. But as they note (pg. 3-4) new legislation has broadened those criteria to include those with 'disabilities' whose death is not reasonably foreseeable as well as others with chronic, non-progressive disorders including mental illness. Indeed, enui seems to now be an acceptable rational for termination among even those without serious chronic illnesses or disorders. (2)
That is precisely the definition of the slippery slope, a narrow framework of action is broadened to include ever larger classes of peoples.
Similarly, they give short-shirt to the issues of the social constituents of health, ignoring the complex of predicate failures that may lead one to seek a rapid death. These include the limited availability of expert palliative care, the shortage...
The authors argue that when we prioritize healthcare workers for ventilators because of their instrumental value as healthcare workers, we fail to value human lives equally. While they suggest that “it may be ethically justifiable for healthcare workers to receive priority for some scarce healthcare resources” and argue that healthcare workers should have sufficient personal protective equipment (PPE), they do little to explain why granting priority for these resources isn’t also, as they argue with ventilators, a case of failing to attribute equal value to human lives. Indeed, it is not clear that they think prioritizing healthcare workers for vaccines was the right thing to do: “. . . our social fabric has shown signs of unravelling as vaccine roll-outs have pulled on loose threads” and prioritizing vaccines has resulted “in unanticipated frustration, mistrust and strife.” The authors are right in their conclusion about ventilators, but we should reject the concerns their article raises about vaccines and PPE. If saving the most lives is the goal, it is consistent with valuing each person’s life equally to prioritize healthcare workers for preventive measures, particularly at the outset of a pandemic.
Show MoreThe authors mention three reasons ventilators are different from preventive measures like PPE and vaccines: 1) Efficacy: Those who require a ventilator will not return to work quickly. 2) Lifesaving: While ventilators rescue endangered lives, preventive measures only...
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