We were interested to read Corfield et al’s recent article on Foundation doctors’ confidence in dealing with ethical issues in the workplace(1), which felt particularly relevant to us – a fourth-year medical student and a Foundation doctor. The importance of medical law and ethics (MEL) has been emphasised by the current COVID-19 pandemic. Difficult decisions with complex ethical implications have had to be made at both clinical and managerial levels across the health service.
Suddenly, junior doctors’ preparedness to deal with ethical dilemmas is framed in a new light. We took particular note of Corfield et al’s concluding remark which highlights the need for a supportive environment which fosters liberal discussion of ethical queries(1). It is well documented that the presence of rigid hierarchies within the clinical environment can deter junior doctors from raising uncertainties(2-4), a phenomenon likely to extend to those of an ethical nature.
The COVID-19 pandemic represents an unprecedented challenge for medics regardless of their level of seniority, which has engendered a feeling of common endeavour with far-reaching consequences for practice. Interestingly, discussions with colleagues have echoed our perception that these changes have precipitated a less pronounced sense of hierarchy. This in turn has the potential to facilitate more open discussion of ethical issues including those generated by the crisis. In relation to the authors’ findings(1),...
We were interested to read Corfield et al’s recent article on Foundation doctors’ confidence in dealing with ethical issues in the workplace(1), which felt particularly relevant to us – a fourth-year medical student and a Foundation doctor. The importance of medical law and ethics (MEL) has been emphasised by the current COVID-19 pandemic. Difficult decisions with complex ethical implications have had to be made at both clinical and managerial levels across the health service.
Suddenly, junior doctors’ preparedness to deal with ethical dilemmas is framed in a new light. We took particular note of Corfield et al’s concluding remark which highlights the need for a supportive environment which fosters liberal discussion of ethical queries(1). It is well documented that the presence of rigid hierarchies within the clinical environment can deter junior doctors from raising uncertainties(2-4), a phenomenon likely to extend to those of an ethical nature.
The COVID-19 pandemic represents an unprecedented challenge for medics regardless of their level of seniority, which has engendered a feeling of common endeavour with far-reaching consequences for practice. Interestingly, discussions with colleagues have echoed our perception that these changes have precipitated a less pronounced sense of hierarchy. This in turn has the potential to facilitate more open discussion of ethical issues including those generated by the crisis. In relation to the authors’ findings(1), junior doctors who are either underprepared or overconfident when it comes to ethical reasoning, will each be more likely to be exposed to such discussion, leading to better ethical decision-making overall.
This could represent an important learning opportunity to be taken forward over the coming months, one that could promote more confidence and competence amongst Foundation doctors when tackling MEL issues.
References
1. Corfield L, Williams RA, Lavelle C, Latcham N, Talash K, Machin L. Prepared for practice? UK Foundation doctors’ confidence in dealing with ethical issues in the workplace. Journal of Medical Ethics. 2020 Apr 10.
2. Brennan PA, Davidson M. Improving patient safety: we need to reduce hierarchy and empower junior doctors to speak up. Bmj. 2019 Jul 2;366:l4461.
3. Care Quality Commission. Opening the door to change: NHS safety culture and the need for transformation. 19 Dec 2018. www.cqc.org.uk/openingthedoor.
4. Srivastava R. Speaking up—when doctors navigate medical hierarchy. New England Journal of Medicine. 2013 Jan 24;368(4):302-5.
While the authors are right to conclude that any compulsory medical intervention/vaccination could only be justified if the intervention is safe, effective, proportional and necessary, the moral dilemma really only starts here.
Who should have the right to determine what is proportional and necessary? Furthermore, the safety and efficacy in themselves will be disputed. We know this from existing vaccine controversies that lead parents to decline vaccines for their children. They do not trust the data produced by the manufacturers and they do not trust anyone who has industry funding or other potential conflicts of interest. Clearly the only reason why a parent would decline a medical intervention is because they fear that it could harm their child.
Although a Covid19 vaccine would not mainly be aimed at children, as in routine childhood immunisations, but at everyone, the question of safety and efficacy remains and invariably determines the question of proportionality as well. In fact it will be even more difficult, due to the shorter development times, shorter trial lengths and shorter follow-ups we can expect, as well as the limited time the virus is expected to be around in sufficient parts of the population that would allow for meaningful field trials.
Safety and efficacy have always been at the heart of the debate. We know from our work with parents at Consent (https://consent-charity.org.uk) that any...
While the authors are right to conclude that any compulsory medical intervention/vaccination could only be justified if the intervention is safe, effective, proportional and necessary, the moral dilemma really only starts here.
Who should have the right to determine what is proportional and necessary? Furthermore, the safety and efficacy in themselves will be disputed. We know this from existing vaccine controversies that lead parents to decline vaccines for their children. They do not trust the data produced by the manufacturers and they do not trust anyone who has industry funding or other potential conflicts of interest. Clearly the only reason why a parent would decline a medical intervention is because they fear that it could harm their child.
Although a Covid19 vaccine would not mainly be aimed at children, as in routine childhood immunisations, but at everyone, the question of safety and efficacy remains and invariably determines the question of proportionality as well. In fact it will be even more difficult, due to the shorter development times, shorter trial lengths and shorter follow-ups we can expect, as well as the limited time the virus is expected to be around in sufficient parts of the population that would allow for meaningful field trials.
Safety and efficacy have always been at the heart of the debate. We know from our work with parents at Consent (https://consent-charity.org.uk) that any medical intervention to which they do not give their voluntary and informed consent comprises a huge emotional conflict; one which can become almost an existential threat, psychologically, if they feel forced into allowing or accepting a medical intervention which they have, rightly or wrongly, come to believe to be dangerous. One can imagine the resistance this will induce. People will consider deregistering children from schools and giving up their careers in order to avoid the perceived threat.
How do we address this questions of safety? How can people be made to trust the data? Do we have a moral right to mandate, if we have made no effort to convince? Are we willing to do what it takes? In the long term the answer may well have to be a completely independent body to conduct trials, independent both of industry and politics.
The vulnerabilities of pharmacists would appear to be invisible in the euthanasia/assisted suicide debates.
As healthcare systems and societies are changing, the social positions of doctors, pharmacists, nurses and patients within them were changing too. In the past, clinical experts’ authority and patients’ autonomy have been in conflict. The current patient-centered / person-centered model of medical care, aims to establish egalitarian relationships between patients and healthcare clinicians and providers .
Vulnerability can be defined as a lack of autonomy and independence, bodily and psychological insecurity, marginalized or deviant status, lack of acknowledgement within the society (1).Vulnerable groups are exposed to discrimination, intolerant attitude, subordination. Vulnerability is usually seen as an inherent quality of certain social groups (but not others). However it has many dimensions and might be attributed to relatively “powerful” groups (2). Doctors, pharmacists and nurses i.e. so called powerful groups, are rarely characterized as vulnerable groups, but within certain circumstances, they can be recognized as “vulnerable”.
Doctors, pharmacists and nurses are in a situation where they are becoming more controlled by the patients. There is an emphasis on the myth that citizens (patients) should be autonomous and the inevitability and normality of dependency is not recognised (3). Dependency is an unavoidable feature of...
The vulnerabilities of pharmacists would appear to be invisible in the euthanasia/assisted suicide debates.
As healthcare systems and societies are changing, the social positions of doctors, pharmacists, nurses and patients within them were changing too. In the past, clinical experts’ authority and patients’ autonomy have been in conflict. The current patient-centered / person-centered model of medical care, aims to establish egalitarian relationships between patients and healthcare clinicians and providers .
Vulnerability can be defined as a lack of autonomy and independence, bodily and psychological insecurity, marginalized or deviant status, lack of acknowledgement within the society (1).Vulnerable groups are exposed to discrimination, intolerant attitude, subordination. Vulnerability is usually seen as an inherent quality of certain social groups (but not others). However it has many dimensions and might be attributed to relatively “powerful” groups (2). Doctors, pharmacists and nurses i.e. so called powerful groups, are rarely characterized as vulnerable groups, but within certain circumstances, they can be recognized as “vulnerable”.
Doctors, pharmacists and nurses are in a situation where they are becoming more controlled by the patients. There is an emphasis on the myth that citizens (patients) should be autonomous and the inevitability and normality of dependency is not recognised (3). Dependency is an unavoidable feature of any society and it is not a feature that is taken into account from the liberal perspective. The recognition of universal vulnerability suggests that the autonomy model will have to re thought (4).
Ethics has not paid attention to vulnerability for three possible reasons (5):
• Vulnerability is the antithesis of the individualistic ethics predominating in Western societies.
• Vulnerability is not addressed in ethics because philosophy ignores the body.
• Ethics has been prominently rationalist and therefore feelings have been displaced or have not been taken into account.
It is methodologically important not to define certain groups as (not) vulnerable by default (2). There are many potential sources of vulnerability, and each of these constitutes a different, overlapping layer. This metaphor of layers presents a contextual and variable concept of vulnerability, moving away from the fixed and static view (6). The vulnerability of professionals e.g. pharmacists remains invisible as it does not correspond with their social position. The sufferings (existential and moral) of pharmacists in particular are invisible, denied and ignored in the euthanasia/assisted suicide debates.
All forms of euthanasia and physician assisted suicide require lethal medications. The role of pharmacists in the pharmaceutical care/medication use process at the end of life is often ignored, written out or overlooked. In the main doctors and nurses are included in “conscientious objection” legislative protections. Pharmacists are often excluded from protection of their human right to freedom of conscience and the derived right of “conscientious objection”. Pharmacists in all working environments (pharmaceutical industry , community pharmacy, hospital pharmacy, palliative care pharmacy, long term care, care of people with disabilities including intellectual disabilities, general practice pharmacists, etc. ) will be part of the process (7).
We can understand our humanity in a broader sense only by recognizing our universal vulnerability and interdependence (8). Pharmacists and their patients and colleagues are vulnerable and autonomous. The end of life medication use process (natural death or intentional death ) is dependent on the involvement and expertise of pharmacists. Failure to recognise this makes individual pharmacists and the pharmacy profession vulnerable.
References
1. Liamputtong, P. Researching the Vulnerable: A Guide to Sensitive Research Methods; SAGE: London, UK; Thousand Oaks, CA, USA, 2007; 246p.
2. Societies 2020, 10(1), 5; https://doi.org/10.3390/soc10010005
3. Fineman, Martha A., The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency, New York, The New Press, 2004.
4. Rodriguez, Janet Delgalo. The Relevance of the Ethics of Vulnerability in Bioethics. The Ethics Forum. Volume 12, Issue 2–3, Automne 2017, p. 154–179 https://doi.org/10.7202/1051280
5. Hoffmaster, Barry, “What Does Vulnerability Mean?”, Hastings Center Report, vol. 36, no. 2, 2006, pp. 38-45.
6. Luna, Florencia, “Vulnerabilidad: la metáfora de las capas”, Jurisprudencia Argentina, IV, 1, 2008, pp. 60-67.
7. Flood, Bernadette. Pharmacists and assisted dying. BMJ 2020 https://www.bmj.com/content/368/bmj.m1139.full
Withdrawal and Withholding treatment in terminal illness:
Islamic Perspective
Withholding or withdrawing life support is still an area of controversy. Its applicability is weighed with benefits and risks, and how futile the treatment is for the terminally ill patient.
Unfortunately, many elder patients with chronic illness spend their last few weeks or months in hospitals. Life support is not required if it prolongs the agony and suffering associated with final stages of a terminal illness. When considering end-of-life decision making, both withholding and withdrawing life support are considered to be ethically equivalent. (1)
Issues arising from the withdrawal and withholding treatment have not reached total consensus amongst the Muslim jurists. However, article 63 of the Islamic code of medical ethics
(Code of Conduct1981) stated that, “the treatment of a patient can be terminated if a team of medical experts or a medical committee involved in the management of such patient are satisfied that the continuation of treatment would be futile or useless.” It further stated that “treatment of
patients whose condition has been confirmed to be futile by the medical committee should not be commenced.” (2,3)
The Permanent Committee for Research and Fatwa, Fatwa (Decree) No. 12086 (1989) is a landmark in regulating resuscitative measures, stopping of machines in cases thought to be not suitable for resuscitative measures. The decision shou...
Withdrawal and Withholding treatment in terminal illness:
Islamic Perspective
Withholding or withdrawing life support is still an area of controversy. Its applicability is weighed with benefits and risks, and how futile the treatment is for the terminally ill patient.
Unfortunately, many elder patients with chronic illness spend their last few weeks or months in hospitals. Life support is not required if it prolongs the agony and suffering associated with final stages of a terminal illness. When considering end-of-life decision making, both withholding and withdrawing life support are considered to be ethically equivalent. (1)
Issues arising from the withdrawal and withholding treatment have not reached total consensus amongst the Muslim jurists. However, article 63 of the Islamic code of medical ethics
(Code of Conduct1981) stated that, “the treatment of a patient can be terminated if a team of medical experts or a medical committee involved in the management of such patient are satisfied that the continuation of treatment would be futile or useless.” It further stated that “treatment of
patients whose condition has been confirmed to be futile by the medical committee should not be commenced.” (2,3)
The Permanent Committee for Research and Fatwa, Fatwa (Decree) No. 12086 (1989) is a landmark in regulating resuscitative measures, stopping of machines in cases thought to be not suitable for resuscitative measures. The decision should be based on medical criteria and decided by at least three competent physicians. The family should be approached and the facts discussed fully with them. (4,5)
Mohiuddin et al stated that while the notions of futility greatly impact the bioethical discourse regarding withholding and/or withdrawal of treatment, the conceptualization of futility lacks nuance. The justifying conditions appear to rely on physician assessment of the clinical
prognosis. (6)
• Hassan Chamsi-Pasha, Consultant Cardiologist, King Fahd Armed Forces Hospital, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
• Other Contributors:
o Majed Chamsi-Pasha, Senior Registrar, Internal Medicine.
o Mohammed.A. Albar, Director of Medical Ethics Center, International Medical Center.
References:
1. Al-Bar MA, Chamsi-Pasha H. Contemporary bioethics: Islamic perspective. New York
(NY): Springer; 2015.http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-18428-9
2. Kassim, P. N., & Adeniyi, O. B. (2010). Withdrawing and withholding medical treatment: A comparative study between the Malaysian, English and Islamic law. Medicine and Law, 29(3), 443–461.
3. Code of Conduct drawn at the International Conference on Islamic Medicine held in Kuwait, 1981, known as “The Islamic Code of Medical Ethics,” p 67
4. Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta. (1989). Ruling on resuscitating the patient if he is dead, his health condition is not fit for resuscitation or his disease is incurable. Fatwa number 12086. http://www.alifta.net/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?View=Page&PageID=299&Pa....
5. Chamsi-Pasha H, Albar MA. Ethical Dilemmas at the End of Life: Islamic Perspective. J Relig Health. 2017;56(2):400‐410. doi:10.1007/s10943-016-0181-3
6. Mohiuddin A, Suleman M, Rasheed S, Padela AI. When can Muslims withdraw or withhold life support? A narrative review of Islamic juridical rulings. Glob Bioeth. 2020;31(1):29‐46. Published 2020 Mar 22. doi:10.1080/11287462.2020.1736243
Words/Nga Kupu*
The suggestion of a “Words” column focussing particularly on words from a non-western ethical tradition is great. We are journeying through perilous waters and will need to adapt our ethical framework to the new reality. A value of diversity is that we can draw on concepts from other traditions. Of course, a “Word” in a language you do not speak is of no use. The word is part of a language, which is the embodiment of a culture, and ethics is inevitably culture bound. Even words shared between cultures do not necessarily share exact meanings. A consideration of Justice within the bioethical community culture would be incomplete without reference to Rawls. A consideration of Justice within a Māori community would be centred around Te Tiriti o Waitangi/ The Treaty of Waitangi(1). A simple translation is not enough. The definition of Whakawhanaungatanga is a good starting place, but more depth is needed. It is embedded in a Māori concept of health(2), and the richness of the concepts cannot be appreciated without appreciating the context in which it is used. Whilst it is a Māori word it is now also a New Zealand word. A whole generation of medical students have been taught Māori concepts of health, including Whakawhanaungatanga, significantly spearheaded by the work of Pitama and Lacey(3). Parry as a 5th year student wrote a heart-warming case study that illustrated the value of using these concepts(4). The New Zealand ethical landscape is an example of t...
Words/Nga Kupu*
The suggestion of a “Words” column focussing particularly on words from a non-western ethical tradition is great. We are journeying through perilous waters and will need to adapt our ethical framework to the new reality. A value of diversity is that we can draw on concepts from other traditions. Of course, a “Word” in a language you do not speak is of no use. The word is part of a language, which is the embodiment of a culture, and ethics is inevitably culture bound. Even words shared between cultures do not necessarily share exact meanings. A consideration of Justice within the bioethical community culture would be incomplete without reference to Rawls. A consideration of Justice within a Māori community would be centred around Te Tiriti o Waitangi/ The Treaty of Waitangi(1). A simple translation is not enough. The definition of Whakawhanaungatanga is a good starting place, but more depth is needed. It is embedded in a Māori concept of health(2), and the richness of the concepts cannot be appreciated without appreciating the context in which it is used. Whilst it is a Māori word it is now also a New Zealand word. A whole generation of medical students have been taught Māori concepts of health, including Whakawhanaungatanga, significantly spearheaded by the work of Pitama and Lacey(3). Parry as a 5th year student wrote a heart-warming case study that illustrated the value of using these concepts(4). The New Zealand ethical landscape is an example of the extent to which ethics is culture bound. Whilst traditional ethical principles remain they are increasingly augmented by Māori concepts. The related word Whanaungatanga is one of the principles in “Te Ture Whakaruruhau Code Of Ethical Principles For Public Health in Aotearoa New Zealand”(5). I look forward to further contributions.
* Māori language translation of words.
1. Mutu M. ‘To honour the treaty, we must first settle colonisation’ (Moana Jackson 2015): the long road from colonial devastation to balance, peace and harmony. Journal of the Royal Society of New Zealand. 2019;49(sup1):4-18.
2. Durie M. Whaiora Maori Health Development. Second Edition ed. Melbourne Australia: Oxford University Press; 1998.
3. Lacey C, Huria T, Beckert L, Gilles M, Pitama S. The Hui Process: a framework to enhance the doctor–patient relationship with Māori. Journal of the New Zealand Medical Association. 2011;124(1347).
4. Parry R, Jones B, Gray B, Ingham T. Applying a Māori-centred consultation approach for engaging with Māori patients: an undergraduate medical student case study. Journal of Primary Health Care. 2014;6(3):254-60.
5. Public Health Association of New Zealand Incorporated. Te Ture Whakaruruhau Code Of Ethical Principles For Public Health in Aotearoa New Zealand. Wellington New Zealand2012 [Available from: https://www.pha.org.nz/page-18201.
In their recent article, Jocelyn Downie and Udo Schuklenk conclude, first, that the Canadian experience denies the existence of a 'slippery slope' expanding medical termination from a limited to a broader medical constituency. Second, they argue a faiure to provide social constituents of health and support is a significant factor in the increased requests for 'medical aide in dying.' (1) It is hard to credit their conclusions on either point.
As they note, 2016 legislation legalized 'medical assistance in dying" in cases of serious and incurable illness, disease or disability in an advanced state of decline with death an inevitable and foreseeable conclusion. But as they note (pg. 3-4) new legislation has broadened those criteria to include those with 'disabilities' whose death is not reasonably foreseeable as well as others with chronic, non-progressive disorders including mental illness. Indeed, enui seems to now be an acceptable rational for termination among even those without serious chronic illnesses or disorders. (2)
That is precisely the definition of the slippery slope, a narrow framework of action is broadened to include ever larger classes of peoples.
Similarly, they give short-shirt to the issues of the social constituents of health, ignoring the complex of predicate failures that may lead one to seek a rapid death. These include the limited availability of expert palliative care, the shortage...
In their recent article, Jocelyn Downie and Udo Schuklenk conclude, first, that the Canadian experience denies the existence of a 'slippery slope' expanding medical termination from a limited to a broader medical constituency. Second, they argue a faiure to provide social constituents of health and support is a significant factor in the increased requests for 'medical aide in dying.' (1) It is hard to credit their conclusions on either point.
As they note, 2016 legislation legalized 'medical assistance in dying" in cases of serious and incurable illness, disease or disability in an advanced state of decline with death an inevitable and foreseeable conclusion. But as they note (pg. 3-4) new legislation has broadened those criteria to include those with 'disabilities' whose death is not reasonably foreseeable as well as others with chronic, non-progressive disorders including mental illness. Indeed, enui seems to now be an acceptable rational for termination among even those without serious chronic illnesses or disorders. (2)
That is precisely the definition of the slippery slope, a narrow framework of action is broadened to include ever larger classes of peoples.
Similarly, they give short-shirt to the issues of the social constituents of health, ignoring the complex of predicate failures that may lead one to seek a rapid death. These include the limited availability of expert palliative care, the shortage of hospices across Canada's provinces, and in each provincial health system the limited availability of those resources and the rehabilitative, psychological and social facilities that may make a life lived with chronic conditions meaningful and sustainable.
As a Canadian long engaged in this debate--legal and social--as well as in the care of those with chronic conditions I thus find their arguments incomplete and their conclusions inaccurate. I would, of course, be more than willing to debate their argument in person or in this, or another journal.
Tom Koch
The University of British Columbia, VAncouver, BC, Canada.
Alton Medical Centre, Toronto, ON, Canada.
1. Downie J. and Schudklienk U. Social determinants of health and slippery slopes in
assisted dying debates: lessons from Canada. J Med Ethics 2021. doi:10.1136/medethics-2021-107493.
2. Koch T. Old age alone shouldn’t be considered a justification for physician-assisted death. Globe and Mail 2018 (April 18). https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-old-age-alone-shouldnt-b....
The authors argue that when we prioritize healthcare workers for ventilators because of their instrumental value as healthcare workers, we fail to value human lives equally. While they suggest that “it may be ethically justifiable for healthcare workers to receive priority for some scarce healthcare resources” and argue that healthcare workers should have sufficient personal protective equipment (PPE), they do little to explain why granting priority for these resources isn’t also, as they argue with ventilators, a case of failing to attribute equal value to human lives. Indeed, it is not clear that they think prioritizing healthcare workers for vaccines was the right thing to do: “. . . our social fabric has shown signs of unravelling as vaccine roll-outs have pulled on loose threads” and prioritizing vaccines has resulted “in unanticipated frustration, mistrust and strife.” The authors are right in their conclusion about ventilators, but we should reject the concerns their article raises about vaccines and PPE. If saving the most lives is the goal, it is consistent with valuing each person’s life equally to prioritize healthcare workers for preventive measures, particularly at the outset of a pandemic.
The authors mention three reasons ventilators are different from preventive measures like PPE and vaccines: 1) Efficacy: Those who require a ventilator will not return to work quickly. 2) Lifesaving: While ventilators rescue endangered lives, preventive measures only...
The authors argue that when we prioritize healthcare workers for ventilators because of their instrumental value as healthcare workers, we fail to value human lives equally. While they suggest that “it may be ethically justifiable for healthcare workers to receive priority for some scarce healthcare resources” and argue that healthcare workers should have sufficient personal protective equipment (PPE), they do little to explain why granting priority for these resources isn’t also, as they argue with ventilators, a case of failing to attribute equal value to human lives. Indeed, it is not clear that they think prioritizing healthcare workers for vaccines was the right thing to do: “. . . our social fabric has shown signs of unravelling as vaccine roll-outs have pulled on loose threads” and prioritizing vaccines has resulted “in unanticipated frustration, mistrust and strife.” The authors are right in their conclusion about ventilators, but we should reject the concerns their article raises about vaccines and PPE. If saving the most lives is the goal, it is consistent with valuing each person’s life equally to prioritize healthcare workers for preventive measures, particularly at the outset of a pandemic.
The authors mention three reasons ventilators are different from preventive measures like PPE and vaccines: 1) Efficacy: Those who require a ventilator will not return to work quickly. 2) Lifesaving: While ventilators rescue endangered lives, preventive measures only reduce risk. 3) Urgency: Not being prioritized for preventive measures likely means waiting until they become available, while not being prioritized for a ventilator means not receiving one at all. The point about efficacy should be acknowledged as an important difference between ventilators and preventive measures. If healthcare workers qualify for priority for scarce life-saving resources due to their instrumental value in their roles as care providers, and the need for a ventilator indicates an inability to fulfill this role, then healthcare workers requiring ventilators shouldn’t receive priority for those resources over others.
The authors’ commitment to community solidarity leads them to concern about the results of assigning (or worse, reassigning) the last ventilator to a healthcare worker as opposed to someone in equal medical need. However, if prioritizing ventilators for healthcare workers weakens our social fabric, we must ask whether this also applies to preventive measures. Contra the authors’ last two points about differences between ventilators and preventive care: a) preventive care is lifesaving: The life of a nurse forced to face Covid patients without adequate PPE is endangered. b) preventive measures are urgent: If hospitals are overwhelmed and death rates are spiking, those aware of the virus’s danger and the vaccine’s efficacy in January will find only limited comfort in knowing that they might be able to receive the vaccine if they are healthy by May.
Preventive measures are like ventilators in that they are scarce lifesaving medical resources and their use is urgent. Can prioritizing them be justified? The authors follow James Childress in supposing that any justification for their use on the basis of instrumental value carries a “heavy burden of proof.” Childress made his comments in 1970, while grappling with how to approach extremely limited dialysis or organ transplant opportunities. He argued that the burden for straying from randomness or chance as a basis for allocation demands showing not that someone has positive contributions to make, but that they are literally irreplaceable, that disaster would likely result from that person’s loss. However, in the context of a pandemic, this burden of proof is too heavy. It is possible to be instrumental in saving many lives yet still fall short of Childress’ standard.
The most straightforward justification for prioritizing those who save more lives is the multiplier effect, an instance of instrumental value. If we save the life of a life-saver, more total lives are saved. This is evidence not that we value lives unequally—the life-saver’s life isn’t valued more highly—but that we value saving more lives above saving fewer lives. The authors make the point that many workers, not just healthcare workers, have instrumental value. It is true that healthcare workers aren’t alone in having instrumental value (many are instrumental in keeping the economy running or society functioning, for example) and in fact, aren’t the only ones in roles that might save lives. My argument is that if saving the most lives is our primary objective, then prioritizing those we believe will make that possible is consistent with valuing each life equally.
These judgments are context dependent. Decisions must be judged by the information available at the time. At the outset of a pandemic, we are information poor. No one knows whether the infectious agent in question is as contagious as measles or Ebola, how it spreads, or which groups are most at risk. This is difficult because PPE must be stockpiled in advance, and successful planning for mass vaccine allocation/distribution, although it happens later, isn’t last minute either. We must act on our best predictions. For pandemic disease, it is reasonable to assume that healthcare workers will be particularly vulnerable to death and that more lives will be saved if healthcare worker lives are saved. If we later come to have solid evidence that prioritizing housekeepers for vaccines instead of healthcare workers would actually save more lives (not the same as concluding that housekeepers are dying at higher rates, as mentioned in the article), we should adjust our priorities accordingly.
The authors’ account of unravelling social fabric is overblown. Scarcity brings sorrow; there aren’t enough lifesaving resources to go around. However, this is more a reflection of the pandemic’s toll than our decision to save the most lives by prioritizing healthcare workers. The goal is to save the most lives, not a perfect distribution process. Inevitably an imperfect distribution system will lead to the frustration the authors reference. Many will disagree with which goals are primary or how to achieve them. But frustration isn’t failure. When we come to know more, we can do better. Meanwhile, we save the most lives we can.
Tell me now, what would the Doctors and staff do in this situation if there wasn’t a supposed Covid diagnosis?
What is SOP ?
Why couldn’t they just follow that procedure with any and all PPE precautions?
I wouldn’t think they would just throw someone in that condition into a room full of equally suffering patients ?
Do they?
Somebody please explain this to me in Layman’s terms.
If these questions were already answered in the article then let me know, and I’ll do a closer read, but until then.....
The author asserts that coercion to vaccinate is ethically analogous to mandatory seatbelts or the use of physical force to remove a dangerous substance from a child. This is a false analogy. Wearing seatbelts while driving or removing a dangerous toy from a child does not alter anyone’s individual constitution, but vaccines do, permanently, and with largely unknown long-term consequences. Vaccination is an intimate, deeply invasive and permanent medical procedure, not just a behavioural preference. The same flawed comparison could be used to support mandatory abortion or coercive organ harvesting if these procedures were deemed in the interest of public health: a repugnant conclusion.
Regarding seriousness of Covid-19 as a public health issue, the author ignores the fact that Covid-19 deaths are recorded in a non-standard way which precludes meaningful assessment of the true public health impact of this disease in comparison to other respiratory infections. Acording to the WHO https://www.who.int/classifications/icd/Guidelines_Cause_of_Death_COVID-... guidelines, “A death due to COVID-19 is defined for surveillance purposes as a death resulting from a clinically compatible illness [...] COVID-19 should be recorded on the medical certificate of cause of death for ALL decedents where the disease caused, or is assumed to have caused, or contributed to death.” The Office of Nat...
The author asserts that coercion to vaccinate is ethically analogous to mandatory seatbelts or the use of physical force to remove a dangerous substance from a child. This is a false analogy. Wearing seatbelts while driving or removing a dangerous toy from a child does not alter anyone’s individual constitution, but vaccines do, permanently, and with largely unknown long-term consequences. Vaccination is an intimate, deeply invasive and permanent medical procedure, not just a behavioural preference. The same flawed comparison could be used to support mandatory abortion or coercive organ harvesting if these procedures were deemed in the interest of public health: a repugnant conclusion.
Regarding seriousness of Covid-19 as a public health issue, the author ignores the fact that Covid-19 deaths are recorded in a non-standard way which precludes meaningful assessment of the true public health impact of this disease in comparison to other respiratory infections. Acording to the WHO https://www.who.int/classifications/icd/Guidelines_Cause_of_Death_COVID-... guidelines, “A death due to COVID-19 is defined for surveillance purposes as a death resulting from a clinically compatible illness [...] COVID-19 should be recorded on the medical certificate of cause of death for ALL decedents where the disease caused, or is assumed to have caused, or contributed to death.” The Office of National Statistics UK, for example, counts all mentions of Covid-19 on death certificates as Covid-19 deaths, irrespective of whether Covid-19 is the underlying cause of death (see Note 5 in the ONS Spreadsheet). https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarri... Due to this definition ambiguity, it is unclear how many people died from infection with SARS-CoV-19 as the underlying cause. On the other hand, judging by the excess deaths in UK due to respiratory illness, it is doubtful whether anyone would notice that there is a pandemic if not for the associated media campaign and the unprecedented, draconian counter-measures. The fact that Covid-19 is characterised as a serious global threat based on potentially misleading mortality statistics automatically disqualifies any ethical justification of coercive measures to vaccinate against Covid-19, due to potential disagreement about the alleged normative facts. On the other hand, I do agree with the author that mandatory seatbelts to prevent Covid-19 would be ethically permissible, although probably ineffective.
We were interested to read Corfield et al’s recent article on Foundation doctors’ confidence in dealing with ethical issues in the workplace(1), which felt particularly relevant to us – a fourth-year medical student and a Foundation doctor. The importance of medical law and ethics (MEL) has been emphasised by the current COVID-19 pandemic. Difficult decisions with complex ethical implications have had to be made at both clinical and managerial levels across the health service.
Suddenly, junior doctors’ preparedness to deal with ethical dilemmas is framed in a new light. We took particular note of Corfield et al’s concluding remark which highlights the need for a supportive environment which fosters liberal discussion of ethical queries(1). It is well documented that the presence of rigid hierarchies within the clinical environment can deter junior doctors from raising uncertainties(2-4), a phenomenon likely to extend to those of an ethical nature.
The COVID-19 pandemic represents an unprecedented challenge for medics regardless of their level of seniority, which has engendered a feeling of common endeavour with far-reaching consequences for practice. Interestingly, discussions with colleagues have echoed our perception that these changes have precipitated a less pronounced sense of hierarchy. This in turn has the potential to facilitate more open discussion of ethical issues including those generated by the crisis. In relation to the authors’ findings(1),...
Show MoreWhile the authors are right to conclude that any compulsory medical intervention/vaccination could only be justified if the intervention is safe, effective, proportional and necessary, the moral dilemma really only starts here.
Who should have the right to determine what is proportional and necessary? Furthermore, the safety and efficacy in themselves will be disputed. We know this from existing vaccine controversies that lead parents to decline vaccines for their children. They do not trust the data produced by the manufacturers and they do not trust anyone who has industry funding or other potential conflicts of interest. Clearly the only reason why a parent would decline a medical intervention is because they fear that it could harm their child.
Although a Covid19 vaccine would not mainly be aimed at children, as in routine childhood immunisations, but at everyone, the question of safety and efficacy remains and invariably determines the question of proportionality as well. In fact it will be even more difficult, due to the shorter development times, shorter trial lengths and shorter follow-ups we can expect, as well as the limited time the virus is expected to be around in sufficient parts of the population that would allow for meaningful field trials.
Safety and efficacy have always been at the heart of the debate. We know from our work with parents at Consent (https://consent-charity.org.uk) that any...
Show MoreThe vulnerabilities of pharmacists would appear to be invisible in the euthanasia/assisted suicide debates.
As healthcare systems and societies are changing, the social positions of doctors, pharmacists, nurses and patients within them were changing too. In the past, clinical experts’ authority and patients’ autonomy have been in conflict. The current patient-centered / person-centered model of medical care, aims to establish egalitarian relationships between patients and healthcare clinicians and providers .
Vulnerability can be defined as a lack of autonomy and independence, bodily and psychological insecurity, marginalized or deviant status, lack of acknowledgement within the society (1).Vulnerable groups are exposed to discrimination, intolerant attitude, subordination. Vulnerability is usually seen as an inherent quality of certain social groups (but not others). However it has many dimensions and might be attributed to relatively “powerful” groups (2). Doctors, pharmacists and nurses i.e. so called powerful groups, are rarely characterized as vulnerable groups, but within certain circumstances, they can be recognized as “vulnerable”.
Doctors, pharmacists and nurses are in a situation where they are becoming more controlled by the patients. There is an emphasis on the myth that citizens (patients) should be autonomous and the inevitability and normality of dependency is not recognised (3). Dependency is an unavoidable feature of...
Show MoreWithdrawal and Withholding treatment in terminal illness:
Islamic Perspective
Withholding or withdrawing life support is still an area of controversy. Its applicability is weighed with benefits and risks, and how futile the treatment is for the terminally ill patient.
Show MoreUnfortunately, many elder patients with chronic illness spend their last few weeks or months in hospitals. Life support is not required if it prolongs the agony and suffering associated with final stages of a terminal illness. When considering end-of-life decision making, both withholding and withdrawing life support are considered to be ethically equivalent. (1)
Issues arising from the withdrawal and withholding treatment have not reached total consensus amongst the Muslim jurists. However, article 63 of the Islamic code of medical ethics
(Code of Conduct1981) stated that, “the treatment of a patient can be terminated if a team of medical experts or a medical committee involved in the management of such patient are satisfied that the continuation of treatment would be futile or useless.” It further stated that “treatment of
patients whose condition has been confirmed to be futile by the medical committee should not be commenced.” (2,3)
The Permanent Committee for Research and Fatwa, Fatwa (Decree) No. 12086 (1989) is a landmark in regulating resuscitative measures, stopping of machines in cases thought to be not suitable for resuscitative measures. The decision shou...
Words/Nga Kupu*
Show MoreThe suggestion of a “Words” column focussing particularly on words from a non-western ethical tradition is great. We are journeying through perilous waters and will need to adapt our ethical framework to the new reality. A value of diversity is that we can draw on concepts from other traditions. Of course, a “Word” in a language you do not speak is of no use. The word is part of a language, which is the embodiment of a culture, and ethics is inevitably culture bound. Even words shared between cultures do not necessarily share exact meanings. A consideration of Justice within the bioethical community culture would be incomplete without reference to Rawls. A consideration of Justice within a Māori community would be centred around Te Tiriti o Waitangi/ The Treaty of Waitangi(1). A simple translation is not enough. The definition of Whakawhanaungatanga is a good starting place, but more depth is needed. It is embedded in a Māori concept of health(2), and the richness of the concepts cannot be appreciated without appreciating the context in which it is used. Whilst it is a Māori word it is now also a New Zealand word. A whole generation of medical students have been taught Māori concepts of health, including Whakawhanaungatanga, significantly spearheaded by the work of Pitama and Lacey(3). Parry as a 5th year student wrote a heart-warming case study that illustrated the value of using these concepts(4). The New Zealand ethical landscape is an example of t...
In their recent article, Jocelyn Downie and Udo Schuklenk conclude, first, that the Canadian experience denies the existence of a 'slippery slope' expanding medical termination from a limited to a broader medical constituency. Second, they argue a faiure to provide social constituents of health and support is a significant factor in the increased requests for 'medical aide in dying.' (1) It is hard to credit their conclusions on either point.
Show MoreAs they note, 2016 legislation legalized 'medical assistance in dying" in cases of serious and incurable illness, disease or disability in an advanced state of decline with death an inevitable and foreseeable conclusion. But as they note (pg. 3-4) new legislation has broadened those criteria to include those with 'disabilities' whose death is not reasonably foreseeable as well as others with chronic, non-progressive disorders including mental illness. Indeed, enui seems to now be an acceptable rational for termination among even those without serious chronic illnesses or disorders. (2)
That is precisely the definition of the slippery slope, a narrow framework of action is broadened to include ever larger classes of peoples.
Similarly, they give short-shirt to the issues of the social constituents of health, ignoring the complex of predicate failures that may lead one to seek a rapid death. These include the limited availability of expert palliative care, the shortage...
The authors argue that when we prioritize healthcare workers for ventilators because of their instrumental value as healthcare workers, we fail to value human lives equally. While they suggest that “it may be ethically justifiable for healthcare workers to receive priority for some scarce healthcare resources” and argue that healthcare workers should have sufficient personal protective equipment (PPE), they do little to explain why granting priority for these resources isn’t also, as they argue with ventilators, a case of failing to attribute equal value to human lives. Indeed, it is not clear that they think prioritizing healthcare workers for vaccines was the right thing to do: “. . . our social fabric has shown signs of unravelling as vaccine roll-outs have pulled on loose threads” and prioritizing vaccines has resulted “in unanticipated frustration, mistrust and strife.” The authors are right in their conclusion about ventilators, but we should reject the concerns their article raises about vaccines and PPE. If saving the most lives is the goal, it is consistent with valuing each person’s life equally to prioritize healthcare workers for preventive measures, particularly at the outset of a pandemic.
Show MoreThe authors mention three reasons ventilators are different from preventive measures like PPE and vaccines: 1) Efficacy: Those who require a ventilator will not return to work quickly. 2) Lifesaving: While ventilators rescue endangered lives, preventive measures only...
This study, https://doi.org/10.1126/scitranslmed.3006175, showed that the placebo effect still worked when patients were informed that they were receiving the placebo.
If this is generally true, there is no need to move from honesty.
Tell me now, what would the Doctors and staff do in this situation if there wasn’t a supposed Covid diagnosis?
What is SOP ?
Why couldn’t they just follow that procedure with any and all PPE precautions?
I wouldn’t think they would just throw someone in that condition into a room full of equally suffering patients ?
Do they?
Somebody please explain this to me in Layman’s terms.
If these questions were already answered in the article then let me know, and I’ll do a closer read, but until then.....
Thank You
The author asserts that coercion to vaccinate is ethically analogous to mandatory seatbelts or the use of physical force to remove a dangerous substance from a child. This is a false analogy. Wearing seatbelts while driving or removing a dangerous toy from a child does not alter anyone’s individual constitution, but vaccines do, permanently, and with largely unknown long-term consequences. Vaccination is an intimate, deeply invasive and permanent medical procedure, not just a behavioural preference. The same flawed comparison could be used to support mandatory abortion or coercive organ harvesting if these procedures were deemed in the interest of public health: a repugnant conclusion.
Regarding seriousness of Covid-19 as a public health issue, the author ignores the fact that Covid-19 deaths are recorded in a non-standard way which precludes meaningful assessment of the true public health impact of this disease in comparison to other respiratory infections. Acording to the WHO https://www.who.int/classifications/icd/Guidelines_Cause_of_Death_COVID-... guidelines, “A death due to COVID-19 is defined for surveillance purposes as a death resulting from a clinically compatible illness [...] COVID-19 should be recorded on the medical certificate of cause of death for ALL decedents where the disease caused, or is assumed to have caused, or contributed to death.” The Office of Nat...
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