The Roman Catholic Church and embryonic stem cells

Skene and Parker raise a number of concerns about religious doctrine unduly influencing law and public policy through amicus curiae contributions to civil litigations or direct lobbying of politicians. Oakley picks this up in the context of an emphasis on the Roman Catholic Church’s interest in preventing the destruction of embryos for embryonic stem cell research. Skene, Parker, and Oakley seem to be concerned mostly with religious views having undue influence on public policy. My concern is the negative effect that such Church influenced public policy may have on the progress of the biomedical research that is itself foundational to the debate. Oakley seems to be particularly incensed that, as he puts it: “Those who support a total ban on embryonic stem cell research sometimes talk as if theirs are the only views based on moral principle.” What seems to be at issue here though are not the moral principles of the sanctity and dignity of human life, but the application of those moral principles to biomedical research.

The Roman Catholic Church has historically defended the sanctity and dignity of human life to varying degrees at different times. Human life for much of the past 2000 years was defined by the Church as the presence of the soul, which was thought at different times to appear at various different stages during development. Only recently, with the advent of modern biology, has the Roman Catholic Church shifted its position to claim that the fertilised egg also qualifies as the right sort of human life. It should be noted that this doctrinal change was fundamentally driven by developments in our understanding of embryology and not the process of ensoulment. The current position on the embryo is thus based not solely on Church doctrine but also on a specific interpretation of our empirical observations of human development. It is the Church’s interpretation of the biology of early human development that is foundational to their current stand against experimentation on early embryos. However one of the reasons we may wish to experiment on early embryos is that we know surprisingly little about them. In fact any position that claims to be based on a solid, empirical understanding of the embryo is essentially misleading, as we simply do not have the data available. The reply to this will inevitably be that we know enough about embryos to make certain claims. For example the Roman Catholic Church likes to point out that the early embryo is obviously the earliest stage of a human life, and thus attributes to it moral rights associated with actual people. Many would disagree with this on the grounds that the Church has confused being merely human with being a person. I am concerned by the claim that the early embryo is obviously the early stages of a human life.

My concern is not that the claim isn’t obvious to some people but that obviousness is a dangerous thing when it comes to science. It is, for example, quite obvious to me that I am currently sitting at my desk. Empirically my senses seem to confirm that I am more or less stationary. I may well believe that I am stationary. For much of human history we believed the earth to be stationary at the centre of the universe. This assumption was confirmed in the Western world by the Church itself. Church doctrine confirmed that the earth was not the centre of the universe with the heavens above and hell below. When Galileo challenged this view by promoting the sun centred Copernican system of cosmology the Roman Catholic Church attempted to silence him. The Church’s attack on Galileo and Copernicism was tripartite. Firstly, the Copernican system appeared to contradict some scriptures. Secondly, the Copernican system contradicted the Church sanctioned science of the day represented by Aristotelian physics. Thirdly, was the appeal to obviousness or the immediate evidence of the senses. Of the three, only the scriptural objections were undamaged by nature. The Church appeals to science and obviousness were able to be settled by empirical evidence. We now know that we are not stationary at the centre of the universe although this is still far from obvious to many people.

Any position that claims to be based on a solid, empirical understanding of the embryo is misleading: we simply do not have the data.

The situation 400 years ago regarding Copernicism thus seems to be very similar to that today regarding the status of the early embryo. The Roman Catholic Church tried to prevent Galileo from collecting empirical evidence using his telescope and disseminating his empirical evidence by banning his books. Similarly the Church today has attempted to prevent the gathering of empirical data on the early embryo by promoting a ban on all experimentation on early embryos.

The Copernican revolution itself has become a paradigm for the process of theory change in science. Science is not simply a collection of results from experiments (or facts) but perhaps more importantly science is fundamentally about the process of theory or position within biology the Church has set back progress in the field worldwide by many years.

The Roman Catholic Church’s input into the embryonic stem cell debate has not been simply moral or ethical as one might assume but has openly defended a particular claim about the biology of the early embryo. Given the basic lack of empirical evidence regarding the embryo and such developments as the unexpected properties of stem cells the Church’s influence may be decisive in the formation of public policy. Indeed President Bush’s decision to effectively ban public funding of embryonic stem cell research in America is widely believed to have set back progress in the field worldwide by many years.

I believe the Church’s religious fervour for its preferred doctrinal and scientific position of the day is fundamentally at odds with the process and progress of science. Science is an exploration of the physical world that is characterised by changing paradigms and, historically at least, major shifts in understanding. Over the last 400 years the Roman Catholic Church has been slow to accept that science progresses at all and has preferred to maintain its doctrinal position as a matter of faith even when it has been shown to be empirically unsound. My concern here is I think similar to that of Skene.
and Parker. The Roman Catholic Church’s contributions to public policy are based not only on their moral or ethical principles, but on an effectively arbitrary and dogmatic application of those principles that is backed by the full force of what is effectively a very powerful lobby group in many countries. Like Skene and Parker, I have no answer to the problem I have raised. Historically one thing is certain, in the future the Roman Catholic Church’s current position on the embryo will be judged to have been right or wrong with the wisdom of hindsight. Just as we judge the Church’s persecution of Galileo almost 400 years ago now.

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Non-compliance: a side effect of drug information leaflets

The problem of non-compliance with treatment and its repercussions on the clinical evolution of different conditions has been widely investigated. Non-compliance has also been shown to have significant economic implications, not only as a result of product loss but also indirectly through the complication of disease management and its subsequent healthcare and social costs.

Non-compliance as a health problem

The term “non-compliance” might be taken to refer both to the failure to follow a drug regimen and to the failure to adopt other measures that contribute to improvement in health—for example, changes in lifestyle or diet. This letter focuses on the former. Non-compliance with a drug regimen can be the result of a number of different factors and a variety of techniques have been developed in an attempt to control it. Of these, the few techniques that have been shown to be effective have only managed to solve the problem in specific situations over short periods of time. The use of such techniques to control non-compliance, particularly where these are effective, raises interesting ethical questions about the extent to which their application constitutes an infringement of the patient’s right to decide on how to manage their own health. Here we suggest that in some cases one factor that leads to non-compliance is the tendency to provide extensive and exhaustive information on side effects in patient information leaflets. Consider the following case.

A true story

One morning Dr Smith woke up with a slight cold—muscular aches, headache, chills, and nasal congestion. He decided to take some medicine to counteract its effects. His initial thought was to find something to combat his runny nose, so he chose a product specially indicated for nasal congestion: “StopSniff!” After reading the product information leaflet, however, Dr Smith felt another kind of chill run down his spine. He was struck cold by the contra-indications, warnings, interactions, precautionary instructions, and contraindications listed in the leaflet. If he used this drug, it said, he would run the risk of suffering nausea, anxiety, agitation, insomnia, hallucinations, convulsions, amazement, weariness, arrhythmia, dizziness, … . Rather than risk all of this, he thought, why not suffer a few bothersome sniffles? For his muscular aches, Dr Smith chose another drug, “Abatache”, but the risks described in the accompanying information leaflet seemed even worse. These included baldness, skin blistering, aspert meningitis, pneumonitis, fatal hepatitis, gastrointestinal perforation, blood in the urine, jaundice, kidney disease, peptic ulceration, mouth ulceration, visual abnormality, … . So in the end, armed with his clinical and pharmacological knowledge, Dr Smith simply opted to continue blowing his nose and suffer a few muscular aches. He had no desire to play Russian roulette with his health.

The principle of autonomy and the right to information

The principle of autonomy in medical ethics places the patient at the centre of medical decision making about his or her care. It places particular emphasis on the importance of informed consent, and suggests that, except in rare situations, no patient should undergo medical treatment or surgical intervention without his or her fully informed authorisation. This is the basis of patient-centred medicine.

To obtain valid informed consent, it is argued that the patient must receive sufficient understandable information to make a fully informed choice. In practice this means that someone undergoing a specific treatment receives information from at least two sources. First, they are given direct information from their doctor or another health professional about the drug to be taken, recommended lifestyle changes, and perhaps a warning of the hazards related to non-compliance. The patient will also be provided with information on some of the side effects attributed to the drug being prescribed. Individual patients will tend to understand this information in a range of different ways, and it is well recognised that they will respond with a variety of known behavioural patterns.

Secondly, the patient will also receive additional information on side effects from the information given with the drug itself. These leaflets tend to cite each and every one of the undesirable effects related—note “related”—to the principle active ingredient contained in the drug. The information can in some cases be so complete or detailed that even any extremely unusual syndrome described in relation to the use of the drug will inevitably be listed in the leaflet as a possible side effect. In practice, patients are not able to read the leaflet again and again. They may then consult another source of medical information such as a website and perhaps decide to take only half the dose for half the amount of time prescribed, or simply decide not to take the medicine at all.

In addition to the problem of non-compliance, the so called nocebo effect needs to be taken into account, whereby the patient’s mindset is often a key element in the appearance of either physical or imaginary side effects, as has been shown in various studies. Such an effect may be caused by information leaflets.

Complete information versus sufficient information

Practically any city dweller would refuse to use transport services, work tools, or recreational facilities if they were supplied with complete, absolute, and extensive information on the hazards using these might entail. Precautions and warnings are usually good things, but they should be kept within reasonable limits to avoid creating outright alarm. Too much information can sometimes undermine autonomy and also lead to significant harms through non-compliance.

It was shown some years ago that information supplied by doctors can generate side effects that cannot subsequently be corroborated by physical examination. As it happens all too often, the information was not as exhaustive or complete as it might be.

In view of this, we believe that the kind of information given in drug descriptions should be reassessed. The information should be true, accurate, and easy to understand in as complete a way as possible, but it should not generate alarm that can lead to deleterious consequences in the healthcare sector or in the economic sphere.

So what did the patient decide?

The patient, shocked and dismayed at the drug’s side effects, finally decides not to follow the doctor’s recommendation. He (or she) will try to relax, perhaps by smoking a cigarette laced with nicotine, tar, and a number of other substances. True enough, doctors recommend giving up smoking. But who will listen to what a doctor says about smoking when they appear to be prescribing drugs truly hazardous to health? After all, a pack of cigarettes only says that cigarette smoking seriously damages your health. There is certainly no leaflet listing each and every one of its possible side effects. Tobacco kills, but it sometimes looks as if medication is worse.

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Response to “Patient organisations should also establish databanks on medical complications”

Gebhardt in his brief report1 pleads for patient organisations to establish databanks on medical complications. Given the references (for example, an article by Paans, a journalist, entitled “Medical errors to be kept secret”) an implication that medical errors is substantial danger of misinterpretation of the current situation, which in turn may frustrate the process of increased transparency. We would therefore like to respond to this by giving background information and reasons for some of the choices that were made with respect to the registry of complications mentioned by Gebhardt.

First, a distinction needs to be made between an error and an adverse outcome, which are often confused. From Gebhardt’s reference to the journalist’s article which discusses the same registry of adverse outcomes, but with the title referring to errors, both Gebhardt and the journalist think errors and adverse outcomes are the same thing. However, an error refers to the process in which something has gone wrong, a substandard performance, regardless of the outcome. It has been explained by others that such a judgement may have a degree of subjectivity.2 An adverse outcome refers to the outcome which is unwanted but does not necessarily imply that an error has been made. This is why the term “adverse outcomes” is used rather than the term “complications”, since the latter term is often confused with an error being made. The registration of medical complications that Gebhardt refers to is a register of adverse outcomes guided by an unambiguous definition of the term “adverse outcome”, of which only a small percentage is related to errors. Furthermore, some errors will be missed in this registration—that is, errors which have not led to adverse outcomes.

Secondly, with respect to confidentiality, this is relevant in particular for the initial years of such a registry during which it is thoroughly tested and accuracy of the registration may vary widely between participants. Nothing is gained by false positive signals with respect to the high incidence of adverse outcomes in some hospitals, except perhaps by flashing headlines in the media. In this respect one may compare the development of such a national registry to the development of a new drug, in which case no one argues about confidentiality and thorough testing until proved safe. Moreover, a pharmaceutical company will probably be sued if it markets a new drug without proper research. It is intended that after this initial period, national adverse outcome data will become available to the public with respect to probability of an adverse outcome given certain types of surgery.

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Box 1: Patients need information to make a well informed choice

Who is a good doctor and what is a good hospital? This simple question is not easy to answer for many patients who need a good diagnosis and the best treatment. The NPCF (Dutch Federation of Patients and Consumer Organisations) and its member organisations have published several consumer guides for specific diseases to help patients find their way in the labyrinth of the healthcare system. Patients experience many difficulties in getting access to relevant information from doctors’ organisations and insurance companies. Therefore the NPCF wants to cooperate with these organisations to create consumer information based on the important and relevant data that are available. A joint project for a database on best practices started in September 2003.

Patients are not interested in black lists of doctors and malpractices, they prefer to know about good and best practices to make a well informed choice for a doctor or hospital. They need consumer information on objective measures such as the risk of infection in a hospital, the specific skills of a doctor, how many patients with this specific disease a doctor treats a year, etc. Patients would also like to receive subjective information on a specific hospital or doctor: How is the communication between a doctor and his or her patients? Does the team give enough information and support when needed?, etc. This experience based information is often available from patient organisations.

The NPCF has chosen to work together with organisations of healthcare providers and insurance companies to use parts of their databanks as a basis for consumer information. One task of the NPCF is to translate the data into more information that meets the needs of the patients, based on research and experiences of patients. Joint efforts are needed to make this important information accessible for doctors and patients.

Dr I van Bennekum, Director, NPCF

Finally, what does the patient want? (see box 1). International research has shown that patients do not use public information on performance of hospitals or doctors for making a choice of treatment or hospital because, among other reasons, they do not understand and do not trust these data. This also applies to adverse outcomes data. For interpreting the incidence of hospital specific adverse outcomes it is important to know the context—for example, since older, sicker, and more complex patients have higher probabilities of adverse outcomes. It is therefore vital to establish a reliable registry which can be trusted and understood both by medical professionals and the public. For this reason, the Association of Surgeons of the Netherlands and the Dutch Federation of Patients and Consumer Organisations (NPCF) are collaborating with respect to the national surgical adverse outcome registry, in particular, to produce information that is relevant for patients about treatment and hospital choices. Supported by the international literature, the NPCF holds the view that patients are not primarily interested in data on adverse outcomes, since they are aware that these data need to be interpreted in the right context. Patients are more interested in the experience of doctors or hospitals to treat certain diseases or to perform certain operations, since the question they want answered is “What is the best place to go to for this type of problem?”. That this doctors or hospitals probably has a high adverse outcome record is not relevant, since this may well be explained by the complex patients who are referred to more experienced doctors. As argued in a previous paper, it is essential that there is an increased mutual trust between the medical profession and patients’ organisations that supports a combined effort to improve the quality and availability of patient information. Such initiatives are needed by doctors and are too important to be too be frustrated by references to “powers that must be kept under control”.

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What do patients value in their hospital care? A response to Joffe et al

In the Journal of Medical Ethics, Joffe et al recently published an article titled “What do patients value in their hospital care? An empirical perspective on autonomy controled bioethics”. This empirical study evaluates whether patients’ willingness to recommend their hospital to others is more strongly associated with their belief that they were treated with respect and dignity than with their belief that they had an adequate say in their treatment.” Joffe et al go on to suggest that confirmation of these empirical hypotheses would constitute a prescription for elevating the principle of respect for persons to the level that the principle of respect for autonomy currently enjoys in our model of the ideal patient–physician relationship (p 104). In other words, they suggest that by... Joffe et al also evaluate whether patients’ reports that they had confidence and trust in their health care providers significantly predicted whether they would recommend the hospital to their relatives or friends. Joffe et al address only Joffe et al’s treatment of the respect for persons and the respect for autonomy principles in this response.

some means empirical findings could influence our ranking of the normative principles. Earlier in the article, they make an even stronger claim about our reliance on empirical data on our acceptance of normative principles. They suggest that, if it were demonstrated empirically that some patients prefer to delegate medical decisions to health care professionals, patients’ autonomy rights should be balanced against the normative assumptions underlying the principle of respect for autonomy, at least under the mandatory autonomy view, which holds that patients not only have a right but also an obligation to act autonomously (p 103).

In the light of many recent empirical studies challenging the centrality of patient autonomy and shared decision making in bioethical theory, I think it is instructive to evaluate the means by which empirical findings, like those offered in Joffe et al, strengthen or weaken our arguments for ethical principles. In particular, I would be interested in how these authors propose that their data led them to the normative conclusions they reached.

In the last paragraph of their article, Joffe et al write: “we do not recommend that patients’ perspectives should unilaterally determine ethical frameworks. We do, however, believe that data such as those presented here can contribute to the search for reflective equilibrium in bioethics” (p 107). The term “reflective equilibrium”, as the authors note, was introduced by Rawls. At least in its first instance, it refers to a way of constructing a moral theory by balancing one’s considered moral judgements against one’s moral principles, until one’s judgements and principles form a consistent set—that is, a moral theory (p 288). Joffe et al’s idea seems to be that by surveying patients’ perspectives they will be able to capture one side of this equilibrium, considered moral judgements, or moral principles (they do not specify which), and in so doing contribute to the desired end: a consistent ethical framework to govern medical encounters, built (at least in part) from the principles and moral judgements by the patient community. Whatever the merits of this goal, however, Joffe et al fail to capture either the considered moral judgements or the moral principles of those they survey and so fail to contribute to the moral theory they seek to construct.

Rawls defines considered moral judgements as those judgements in which our moral capacities, which he considers analogous to our linguistic capacities, are most likely to be displayed without distortion—for example, those offered without hesitation, given without strong emotions like fear, and made in the absence of conflicting interests (p 47). The discourse of considered judgements and judgements generally is important. When constructing a moral theory for a particular community—for instance, the patient community—we want to use only those judgements that reflect the respondents’ real moral sensibilities, and not those stemming from superficial prejudices or their mood on the day they happen to respond. This raises two important questions, however, for researchers, who, like Joffe et al, are using the concept of reflective equilibrium: (1) precisely how considered did considered judgements have to be if they are to count; and, more practically, (2) how can a researcher know whether he or she is collecting them—that is, what survey method, if any, is appropriate for the task.
Although it is difficult to give a positive answer to these questions (and I will not attempt to do so here), some survey methods, such as mailed questionnaires, that Joefe et al used, seem particularly inadequate. Rawls suggests that certain external conditions favour the formation of considered judgements: “the person making [the considered judgement] is presumed to have the ability, the opportunity and the desire to reach a correct decision (or at least, not the desire not to)” (p 48). Very likely, however, many of Joefe et al’s respondents lacked the necessary ability, opportunity, or desire to reflect on their moral judgements when responding to the questionnaire they received in the mail. Furthermore, even if a number of patients did offer legitimate considered judgements, there is no way to distinguish these from those made by respondents who lacked the requisite ability or desire. Although the size of Joefe et al’s study is of value for its ability more accurately to reflect a population’s response to its survey questions, because of the practical limitations that come with its size, the study falls short of capturing patients’ considered moral judgements.

Any empirical approach using reflective equilibrium, as Joefe et al’s, faces a second challenge: why do we want people’s considered moral judgements to influence our theories of ethics in the first place? In his influential critique of reflective equilibrium, D W Haslett writes:

... given the wide differences between people’s considered moral judgments, and given that these differences are, as we know, largely just a reflection of differences in upbringing, culture, religion, and so on, it would appear that, far from having a reason for giving people’s considered moral judgments initial credibility, we have instead a reason for initial skepticism (p 309).

If moral judgements are liable to reflect superficial prejudices, one could argue, considered moral judgements are liable to reflect deep seated ones. Surely this prejudice is something a system should like to overcome, not codify. While I do not think this challenge is insurmountable, it does demand that researchers justify the inclusion of considered judgements in ethical theory before using the method of reflective equilibrium. Joefe et al have failed to do this.

Joefe et al’s study is susceptible to a second line of critique. Even if the study’s use of mailed surveys is appropriate, it fails to capture either patients’ considered judgements or principles, because, put simply, it does not ask for considered judgements or principles. Instead, it asks patients whether providers respected their person or respected their autonomy, and then tests patients’ responses by asking questions against whether they report being satisfied with their care. If a provider’s acting with respect for persons is a better predictor of patient satisfaction than him or her acting with respect for autonomy, Joefe et al conclude that the principle of respect for persons should be assigned as much importance, ethically speaking, as the principle of respect for autonomy. As should be clear, this conclusion does not follow from Rawls’s conception of how one constructs a moral theory. In a Rawlsian view, a moral theory requires knowing which principles patients hold, not whether those principles are associated with patient satisfaction. Joefe et al seem to be operating with an underlying utilitarian assumption to the effect that when we ought to do something is whatever will lead to the greatest patient satisfaction. Although there may be reasons for accepting this utilitarian assumption (which Joefe et al do not provide), certainly there are others for rejecting it. For instance, although patient satisfaction may give a hospital a very good reason to change a policy, we probably do not want to say this reason is a good ethical reason. It is just good business sense. This is an especially important point given the principles that Joefe et al evaluate. Respect for autonomy and respect for persons are traditionally viewed deontologically—that is, it terms of duties or rights, which are valued for their own sake rather than the consequences (such as patient satisfaction) that they produce. In any case, these utility considerations take us far from patients’ actual moral views, the very things Joefe et al, by invoking Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, propose to capture.

Lastly, there is a question of their instrument’s validity. As I have been arguing, Joefe et al claim to assess whether patients are treated according to the principles of respect for autonomy and respect for persons. Yet, their single item assessing respect for autonomy—the question, “do you feel you had your say?”—does not do the principle justice. The principle of autonomy not only requires that the health care provider asks the patient for his or her opinion, but also that the provider acts on the patient’s opinion. Their instruments are similarly inadequate for the principle of respect for persons, which, they suggest, includes “autonomy, fidelity, veracity, avoiding killing, and justice”, as well as “respect for the body, respect for family, respect for community, respect for culture, respect for the moral value (dignity of the individual), and respect for the personal narrative” (p 104). How are we to know whether patients had all or any of these in mind when they answered the question: “Did you feel like you were treated with respect and dignity while you were in the hospital?” Joefe et al acknowledge that these ethical concepts are a bit unwieldy for a survey of manageable length. However, these practical considerations should be used not only to excuse the study but also to question its ability to clarify the ethical concepts it claims to assess. They should prod us to ask, regardless of the survey’s scale and the

†See, for instance, Delden and Theil, “in which the authors argue convincingly that a reflective equilibrium-like method may be valuable for capturing the norms of health care providers and that knowledge of these norms may guide individual providers.

‡Rawls advocates balancing a single person’s considered moral judgements (for example, Rawls’s or his reader’s) with a single person’s moral principles (p 50). Although he later gestures towards reflexive judgements, in an exercise that involves the considered moral judgements of others (p 8), it is probably safer to say “Rawlsian”.

limitations that its size produces: does this survey really address what we mean by the principles of respect for autonomy and respect for persons?

With any empirical study in bioethics, there is a gap between the empirical hypotheses the study confirms and the normative conclusions its authors would like to draw from it. In their article Joefe et al hoped to bridge this gap by invoking Rawls’s notion of the reflective equilibrium. As I have explored, however, the study does not contribute to either side of the reflective equilibrium it implies, and, thus, they fail to demonstrate how their findings challenge the centrality of autonomy and shared decision making in bioethics.

Joefe et al’s failures are instructive, however, insofar as they suggest how we could better bridge the gap between research and theory. The use of the reflective equilibrium in empirical research has promise, provided researchers are clear about: (1) how to define considered moral judgements and/or principles; (2) how their methods capture these judgements and/or principles reliably; (3) how the inclusion of considered moral judgements strengthens rather than weakens bioethical theory; and (4) what judgements or principles are valid for the judgements or principles they mean to assess. In addition, empirical research can contribute to bioethics by questioning the assumptions implicit or explicit in our normative views. Joefe et al try to do just this when they argue in the introduction to their article (p 103)’ that patients’ desire to delegate decision making challenges the mandatory autonomy view. However, if empirical findings are to defeat a particular normative principle, the assumption that those findings challenge must be logically necessary for our holding that principle. For instance, without showing that patients’ desire for autonomy is necessary for our holding the mandatory autonomy view, the studies that Joefe et al cite, even if valid, can be interpreted variously as valuing the mandatory autonomy view or as recommending that we better consider the value of autonomy. This normative question cannot be settled empirically.

Empirical researchers have the potential to contribute substantially to bioethics, but their work needs the kind of empirical rigor that comes from truly interdisciplinary collaboration and must be informed by a careful reflection on the proper relationship between descriptive and normative ethics. Joefe et al take us part of the way down that path. An exciting research itinerary lies ahead.

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How to be a ‘good’ medical student

The public revelation in 2003 that medical students perform intimate examinations without patient consent has engendered much debate in the press and scientific journals. Using this case as a springboard for discussion, I will argue that medical schools should encourage students to raise their ethical concerns and call for a change in policy making it easier for students to do so. I will also address the question of medical students’ moral obligations towards their patients, and conclude that medical students ought to express their discontent when faced with unethical practices or attitudes.

In early January 2003, a study appeared in the British Medical Journal revealing that nearly one-third of rectal and vaginal examinations on anaesthetised patients were performed by medical students without patient consent. Although the study did not generate the firestorm of controversy many expected, it engendered much discussion on ethical issues surrounding informed consent and patient autonomy, as well as stressing the need for greater ethics training for medical students. As an ethical problem, however, the case of intimate examinations is, to my mind, relatively uninteresting. If we agree that it is wrong for doctors to perform a vaginal examination on a conscious person without their consent, then it follows that it will still be wrong if that same person is merely asleep. Society would be somewhat chaotic if a person suddenly lost his rights when unconscious. The argument that the anaesthetised patient is unaware of the examination and so cannot be harmed is, at best, questionable. Suppose a newspaper revealed tomorrow that sociology students had placed hidden cameras in the cubicles of public toilets to study urination habits. Most people would be understandably outraged by this violation of privacy, even though the victims were not harmed by it at the time. This is based on the belief that a person’s rights can be violated without that person’s knowledge.

As for the conflict between the educational need of students and the respect for patient autonomy, it would only arise if an overwhelming number of patients refused to be examined. This is an unlikely scenario, as a commentary on Dr Coldicott’s study, Britt-Ingerd Nesheim, a professor of obstetrics and gynaecology in Norway, affirms that obtaining patient consent to student examinations is not difficult as long as the patient feels comfortable with the arrangements. Yet for me the study raises a more interesting question which extends beyond the recondite sphere of intimate examinations. It concerns the moral obligations of medical students faced with ethically dubious situations. In short, what should a “good” medical student do?

In an article on the scope of medical ethics, Professor Raanan Gillon recounts two experiences from his days as a medical student. The first describes his teacher’s refusal to grant an abortion to a 14 year old girl on the grounds that she was “a slut”; the second his own refusal to examine a scrotal lump on a patient whose testicles had already been examined by five other students. Gillon’s objections were very much the exception. When these events took place in the 1960s, medical students were simply expected to follow their teachers’ orders and to absorb their evident wisdom without question. Since then, medical ethics has developed from an ill defined embryonic subject to an academic discipline in its own right, with specific journals and associations, and a place in the medical curriculum.

Judging from some of the comments from students at Bristol, however, the growing emergence of medical ethics has not dispelled the awkward climate of unquestioned reverence towards teachers. Many of the students felt uneasy about the examinations, but were too intimidated to voice their concerns: “You couldn’t refuse comfortably. It would be very awkward, and you’d be made to feel inadequate and stupid” commented a fourth year student who participated in the study. It seems clear that medical schools should strive to foster a climate more conducive to open discussion on ethical issues between students and teachers. Students should not have to perform heroic acts of courage to raise ethical concerns. In light of medical ethics’ place in the curriculum, the situation is deeply paradoxical. Students may be taught the importance of respecting the patient’s autonomy one day, but witness an obvious violation of this principle by their teachers the next. For the subject to be of any use, students must not only be allowed, but positively encouraged to put into practice their knowledge without the fear of appearing “inadequate and stupid”. If a student’s ethical concerns remain unresolved after discussion with the teacher, there should be formal methods of complaint, perhaps through a committee specifically set up for that purpose, or through the school’s medical ethicist, who would then investigate the matter thoroughly. Medical ethics is, after all, an applied discipline.

It is nonetheless all too easy to blame the medical establishment and individual teachers for the unethical behaviour of students, as if the appellation “medical student” shielded individuals from moral fault. In Nick Hornby’s novel “How to be good”, the narrator, an adulterous GP and mother of two, resolves her moral conundrums by mechanically repeating “I must be good. I’m a doctor.” It is only later that she acknowledges that her justification is too facile: “it’s not enough to just be a doctor, you have to be a good doctor”. Students, however wide eyed or intimidated by their teacher’s examples of independent thought, their personal values should not vanish as they put on the white coat, just as a patient’s rights should not evaporate when under anaesthetic. Although the reluctance of many Bristol students to perform the examinations is comforting, it seems that none acted on their qualms by declining to perform the procedure or asking that proper consent be obtained. Neither the diminished responsibility of the medical student, nor his status as an apprentice, removes the need for ethical reflection in daily proceedings. Indeed, far from absolving him from moral inquiry, these factors should encourage a process of ethical questioning. This exercise is, to my mind, crucial to a student’s flourishing as a morally responsible future doctor. To paraphrase Nick Hornby: “it’s not enough to just be a medical student”.

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JME editorial office has now moved

The JME editorial office has now moved to BMA House. The new contact details are: Journal of Medical Ethics, BMA House, Tavistock Square, London WC1H 9JR. Tel: +44 (0) 207 383 6439. Fax: +44 (0) 207 383 6668. The point of contact is Nayanah Siva, Editorial Assistant.

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The JME wishes to award 10 bursaries of up to £500 each to support Medical Student Electives, or exceptionally Special Study Modules, on issues in medical ethics.

Medical students, jointly with their supervisor, are invited to apply by 28th February 2005. Application is to be done via email, explaining the project’s relevance to medical ethics and the reasons why a bursary is requested. An outline study protocol and project budget should be included or attached. Applications should be sent to Mrs M Bannatyne, JME Bursaries Administrator, email: bannatyne@dial.pipex.com.

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