The implications of starvation induced psychological changes for the ethical treatment of hunger strikers

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Objective: To evaluate existing ethical guidelines for the treatment of hunger strikers in light of findings on psychological changes that accompany the cessation of food intake.

Design: Electronic databases were searched for (a) editorials and ethical proclamations on hunger strikers and their treatment; (b) studies of voluntary and involuntary starvation, and (c) legal cases pertaining to hunger striking. Additional studies were gathered in a snowball fashion from the published material cited in these databases. Material was included if it (a) provided ethical or legal guidelines; (b) shed light on psychological changes accompanying starvation, or (c) illustrated the practice of hunger striking. Authors’ observations, opinions, and conclusions were noted.

Conclusions: Although the heterogeneous nature of the sources precluded statistical analysis, starvation appears to be accompanied by marked psychological changes. Some changes clearly impair competence, in which case physicians are advised to follow advance directives obtained early in the hunger strike. More problematic are increases in impulsivity and aggressivity, changes which, while not impairing competence, enhance the likelihood that patients will starve themselves to death.

Hunger striking, the voluntary refusal of food in an attempt to achieve a political goal or other social manipulation, has become increasingly frequent. Prominent past cases include British suffragettes in the early 1900s, followed later by Gandhi, dissidents in the Soviet Union, and, over many decades, numerous imprisoned Irish Nationalists. In the last decade, hunger striking has been conspicuously employed by, among others, South African, Chinese, Turkish, Spanish, Moroccan, and Palestinian detainees, alleged Al Qaeda and Talibin prisoners, Canadian, Australian, and US prisoners seeking an improvement of prison conditions, a wide range of immigrants, refugees, and political asylum seekers, and Azerbaijani newspaper editors protesting censorship. At least 67 people have died in hunger strikes in recent times, a figure that does not include those who have committed suicide or severely injured themselves in the course of such strikes. The relevance of such behaviour will become clearer later in this article. Moreover, while it is admittedly difficult to calculate the risks entailed in hunger striking given the unique circumstances of each case, it is likely that news accounts underestimate starving patients’ willingness to harm themselves since hunger striking is often a fairly successful form of protest—authorities frequently capitulate or negotiate before irreversible harm has occurred. In short, there is reason to believe that, while most physicians will never be called on to care for hunger strikers, those who are face a serious task indeed. Hunger striking presents medical personnel with a fundamental dilemma, for there is a conflict between the duty to preserve life and the obligation to respect the autonomy of the patient. Formal ethical pronouncements to date have weighted the latter over the former. These positions overlook the fact, however, that news accounts underestimate starving patients’ willingness to harm themselves since hunger striking is often a fairly successful form of protest—authorities frequently capitulate or negotiate before irreversible harm has occurred.

CURRENT ETHICAL AND LEGAL PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE TREATMENT OF HUNGER STRIKERS

Drawing upon the principle of informed consent, the World Medical Association’s Tokyo declaration states that “Where a prisoner refuses nourishment and is considered by the doctor as capable of forming an unimpaired and rational
judgment concerning the consequences of such a voluntary refusal of nourishment, he or she shall not be fed artificially''. Broadening and refining this pronouncement, the WMA’s Declaration on Hunger Strikers defines a hunger striker as “a mentally competent person who has indicated that he or she has decided to embark on a hunger strike and has refused to take food and/or fluids for a significant interval''. Attending physicians are instructed that “The hunger striker must be professionally informed by the doctor of the clinical consequences of a hunger strike, and of any specific danger to his own particular case”. The British Medical Association has adopted a similar position, stating that no patient who is capable of forming a rational judgment and is aware of the consequences of refusing food should be force fed.44

While British courts have supported the right to refuse food, US courts have largely failed to do so. In two cases US courts ruled in favour of the force feeding of prisoners and, more recently, US courts supplied a court order for the force feeding of prisoners captured during US military operations in Afghanistan.

In 1990 the US Supreme Court ruled on a request to withdraw care from a vegetative accident victim. Although the court noted that “For purposes of this case, it is assumed that a competent person would have a constitutionally protected right to refuse treatment on the basis of his or her previously expressed wishes”, the majority also held that “As a general matter, the States—indeed, all civilised nations—demonstrate their commitment to life... Moreover, the majority of States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit suicide. We do not think a State is required to remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to death (emphasis added).”

Although legal rulings exhibit considerable international variation in the West, current ethical pronouncements uniformly assimilate the treatment of hunger strikers to existing schemas of medical practice. The first question addressed is that of competence. Irrational or otherwise impaired individuals are not considered autonomous agents, and hence the physician is to resort to the protective imperative regardless of such individuals’ wishes, as was recently done in a British case.52 The autonomy of competent individuals is, however, to be respected, for to do otherwise is, from both ethical and legal perspectives, to commit assault.53-55 Competence hinges on the ability to make an informed decision, having weighed the costs and benefits in light of one’s own beliefs.56-58 Accordingly, physicians must (a) ensure that the hunger striker understands the potential health consequences of his or her actions, and (b) evaluate the hunger striker’s specific competence59 to decide to refuse food in light of that understanding. If both assessments are positive, the resulting decision must be respected regardless of the extent to which the physician concurs, or even considers it a sensible or defensible position.56

Because hunger striking will, if carried to its ultimate conclusion, result in overt mental deterioration and hence a loss of competence, physicians are instructed to arm themselves against this possibility by obtaining clear information in advance. For example, the Malta declaration states “The doctor should...ascertain on a daily basis what the patient’s wishes are with regard to treatment should he become unable to make an informed decision”.53 Physicians are thus advised to obtain a living will advance directive that will guide them in conforming to the patient’s wishes should starvation progress to the point that the patient becomes confused, incoherent, or lapses into a coma.60 As Annas has noted, however, such a step does not wholly solve ethical dilemmas for, given the nature of hunger striking as a political strategy, such documents may themselves constitute publicly broadcast manipulative devices rather than true directives.61 More troubling still, the issue of competence is far more complex than might at first appear.

EVIDENCE OF STARVATION INDUCED PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGES

To date, the issue of starvation induced loss of competence in hunger strikers has been raised primarily with regard to late stages of the condition.62 There is reason to believe, however, that such a change can occur much earlier in the process, long before death is an imminent possibility. No systematic accounts have been published regarding psychological changes accompanying hunger striking. Nevertheless, potentially germane findings can be gleaned from reports of the consequences of drastic dietary constriction in contexts other than hunger striking. Studies of the effects of “crash” diets and “therapeutic” starvation on clinically obese patients indicate that dramatic caloric restriction can result in an impairment of competence independent of the level of bodily energetic reserves. Investigators have noted that patients, often with no previous history of psychiatric disorder, may manifest megalomania and persecutory delusions, auditory hallucinations, somatisation, dissociation, suicidality, and confusion.63-66 These direct effects of fasting may explain cases such as the apparent dissociation experienced by one of the Irish hunger strikers,67 and the dramatic psychotic break suffered by a Cambodian hunger striker in Australia.68

While the above observations should alert the physician to the need to consider the question of competence throughout a hunger strike, they do not necessitate any fundamental changes in current orientations toward hunger strikers; indeed, the Malta declaration’s instruction to interview hunger strikers on a daily basis provides ample guarantee that such a commitment and marked alterations in competence will be detected. Far more problematic, however, is the possibility that fasting may induce subtle changes in psychological functioning.

In addition to overtly psychotic symptoms, some obese patients undergoing “crash” dieting and “therapeutic” starvation manifest sudden personality changes involving hyperirritability and alarming levels of aggressivity.69-71 Importantly, the same changes have been observed in experimental starvation of normal subjects, and are also repeatedly reported in accounts of starvation due to disaster or war.72-74 Likewise, both aggressivity and anger attacks have recently been documented in association with anorexia nervosa.75 In addition to barely containable hostile urges, some experimental starvation subjects also exhibited dramatic increases in a wide variety of other impulse related phenomena, including impulsive buying, kleptomania, binge eating, self mutilation, and suicidality (note that, with the exception of those who engaged in binge eating, force of will sufficed to keep experimental starvation subjects from eating despite increases in impulsivity).75

 Similar patterns of impulsive behaviour occur among underweight anorexics,76-78 a finding which, on the face of it, is surprising given that this population is typically described as extremely self controlled.79

DISCUSSION

A large corpus of research documents a link between hyperirritability, impulsive aggression, and reduced serotonergic activity; similar findings apply to all of the impulsive behaviours described above.80-82 Significantly, animal models reveal a marked reduction in frontal cortex binding sites for serotonin transporters following food deprivation,83 and underweight anorexics exhibit deficits in plasma tryptophan, urinary 5-HIAA, platelet serotonin binding, and basal cerebrospinal fluid 5-HIAA, deficiencies that are eliminated by weight restoration.84-85 It thus appears that, via a reduction in serotonergic activity, fasting inherently increases levels of impulsivity in general, and impulsive aggression in particular.

This pattern can be seen as usually adaptive, since, under conditions of naturally occurring food shortage, the individual is well served by (1) an increase in the preference for immediate
II. The WMA’s Declaration on Hunger Strikers instructs phy-
fast progresses due not to an increase in oppression but rather to endog-
way of striking out against oppressive institutions may increase as the
plaints at the outset of his or her fast, if, as the evidence
concur with the legitimacy of any given hunger striker’s com-
extent to which a proverbial “reasonable person” would
decisions about the future.

I. Hunger strikers typically begin their fasts in part out of
anger at what they feel to be unjust treatment, political
oppression, or similar outrages committed against them
and/or their communities or constituencies. Regardless of the
extent to which a proverbial “reasonable person” would
concur with the legitimacy of any given hunger striker’s com-
plaints at the outset of his or her fast, if, as the evidence
adduced above suggests, the act of fasting itself intensifies
feelings of anger, then the hunger striker’s motivation to fast as a
way impair an individual’s ability to comprehend the con-
tent and relevance of medical information can conceivably be
viewed as acceptable recalibrations of the differential weight-
ing of choices upon which competence itself rests.

The longer the hunger strike lasts, the starker the contrast
becomes between, on the one hand, increasing levels of
aggressivity, impulsivity, and anger, and, on the other hand,
relatively constant levels of competence. With each successive
day of fasting, the dangers of continuing the hunger strike
rise. Although it is reasonable to narrow the boundaries of
competency as the gravity of the decision facing a patient
increases, provided that neither psychotic breaks nor cloud-
ing of the sensorium occur, according to contemporary criteria
for competence we must continue to judge hunger strikers as
competent even as they become increasingly outraged at their
oppressors, increasingly focused on their own successes, and
increasingly indifferent to the possibility of their own deaths.
Difficult as it may be for attending physicians who witness
these changes, the competence of hunger strikers must be
acknowledged, and hence their refusal of food must be
honoured and supported.

The psychological changes induced by starvation dovetail
with the social dynamics of hunger striking in such a fashion
as to increase the likelihood that hunger strikers will carry
their actions to the point of irreparable harm or death. It is
unclear to what extent starving humans can rise above the
subjective changes dictated by phylogenetically ancient
mechanisms. However, given that conscious will can overcome
one of the most elementary drives, namely the desire to eat,
there is reason to hope that those patients capable of some
degree of introspection will be able to take their own
starvation induced psychological changes into consideration
when deciding whether to maintain a hunger strike.

Accordingly, physicians have an ethical responsibility to include an
account of the possible psychological changes that await when briefing
hunger strikers on the likely consequences of their actions. In discuss-
ing these issues with the patient it should be emphasised that,
while we have all experienced psychological changes during
temporary states of hunger or fatigue, such changes pale beside
the radical personality alterations that often accompany star-
vation. It may be helpful to point out that (a) starving
individuals report the sensation that they are not in control of
their actions, and (b) following refeeding, such individuals are
frequently puzzled by their experiences and behaviours during
food deprivation. 

At each successive interval during the
strike, patients should be reminded of the initial discussion
concerning psychological changes. During these conversa-
tions, physicians may wish to ask hunger strikers to consider
whether they are feeling angry, impulsive, or indifferent to the
prospect of death above and beyond the responses elicited by
their sociopolitical circumstances. Out of both respect for the
patient’s autonomy and concern for preserving the doctor/patien-
t relationship, care should be taken to provide informa-
tion and opportunities for reflection in a manner which
will not be construed as attempting to influence the patient’s
decisions; informing the patient at the outset that the issue of
psychological changes will be raised at future meetings may
help to preclude misunderstandings in this regard.

AFTERWARD: BROADER APPLICATIONS
Viewed in the larger context of medicine, the number of hun-
ger strikers is tiny, and, even with foreseeable growth in the
practice, is likely to remain small. In contrast, rates of anorexia
nervosa among Western teenage women may be as high as 1% per
100,000. Accordingly, the likelihood that general practi-
tioners and psychiatrists will encounter patients undergoing a
form of “voluntary” starvation is non-trivial. By definition,
individuals suffering from anorexia nervosa exhibit disordered decision making abilities, as they pathologically refuse to maintain a normal body weight, thereby potentially impairing their health and welfare. As a result, physicians treating anorexics arguably do not face the same issues as those dealing with hunger strikers, for the competence of an anorexic may be more readily called into question, particularly when grievous harm is imminent. The lessons learned from the above discussion of hunger striking, however, may nevertheless be useful in caring for patients suffering from anorexia nervosa. Specifically, it is likely that, as starvation progresses, both the anorexic’s resolve to avoid eating and her anorexia nervosa. Specifically, it is likely that, as starvation progresses, both the anorexic’s resolve to avoid eating and her resistance toward therapeutic interventions will increase. Knowledge of starvation’s influence on decision making may empower family members, helping them to both understand the patient’s behavior and select from among available treatment options.

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Gender balance and sex equality

Without intervention, a small preponderance of female over male infants will be born, and female children will have a slightly higher chance of living to maturity. Thereafter, the female population will decline comparatively sharply in consequence of death in childbirth. Historical evidence indicates that throughout the recorded history of Britain, there was a relative scarcity of women, and men dominated social structures. This situation was only reversed in the early decades of the 20th century, a time when women undertake roles previously considered male, and events proved their ability to do so. The surplus women continued in working careers, perforse, providing role models for those who came after. All the protests of the suffragettes were less effective than this brutal gender imbalance.

Dickens’s assertion that the present scarcity of girls in India, due to sex selection before and after birth, will lead to a future increased social value for daughters, may be true.1 This will in no way reverse the force of male dominance, however, since to have value as a wife and a mother is not necessarily to have value as a person. On the contrary, a shortage of wives and mothers will reduce opportunities for these future women to be anything else. Their chance of escaping the present lot of their mothers will be significantly less.

In the developed world, the birth rate is falling below replacement levels. A first male child is still preferred and a family of less than two children cannot be balanced. To this day, equality of the sexes has not been fully achieved. Dickens complains that prohibition of sex selection is ineffective, using demographic data from India to prove his point. Most countries prohibit murder, which would also appear to be ineffective. None the less, such law is regarded as a worthwhile statement of the limits of morally acceptable behaviour. He also says that prohibition of sex selection is unjust and oppressive, when used in a society such as Canada, where a survey suggests that sex preference for second born children is chiefly to have one child of each sex. Prohibiting sex selection even in these circumstances is a statement of what a society believes is a morally acceptable attitude towards parenthood, and as such, should not be regarded as unjust or oppressive.

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