Over the past 15 years, since the publication of Walter Bodmer's report for the Royal Society, the public understanding of science (PUS) has become a positive industry in the UK. Initially intended by the natural scientists to foster public acceptance of science, it has gradually drawn on a longer and deeper academic tradition in Britain of the social studies of science. Some of that social science research predicted the recent "moral panic" over genetically modified (GM) crops and food, but both natural scientists and governments have held social science in low esteem for many years, so it went unremarked at the time.

The hypothesis of those who launched PUS was that the public was merely deficient in factual knowledge and that public acceptance of science could be improved simply by setting out "the facts". Social studies of science had demonstrated the vacuity of this "decent model", both theoretically and empirically, long before the GM furore provided an experimental falsification of the hypothesis that classification III. With the publication of a seminal House of Lords report on science and society in 2000, a more socially informed way of thinking is now entering the British mainstream.

The book offers a view from a rather different perspective: it is neither British nor a work of social scientists, but comes from the head of corporate communications for Novartis (who also acts as professor of health policy at a Swiss graduate school) and from the communications manager of a major German chemical company. As one might expect from a continental European perspective, there is a lively awareness of social factors in the acceptance of new technology, but sadly the conceptual framework within which these authors work appears dated and unrealistic.

It is an abuse of language (and of the conceptual clarity that should underlie the use of language) to divide, as these authors do, public reaction to GM technology into "rational" and "emotional" categories. Although the authors try to limit the damage by noting that the emotive factors are not "any less valid, less legitimate, or less important", it follows immediately that the "emotional" factors are irrational. Nor does it help that their subheadings under "rational factors" include: medical benefits; economic benefits; environmental benefits; and social benefits [my emphasis]; whereas the "emotional factors" include: concern about safety and aversion to risk. This is not classification but rhetoric.

In premodern (peasant) societies, almost all risks are natural disasters, Acts of God, such as crop failure; famine; flooding; pestilence, and devastating weather. In contrast, in a modern society risks almost all result from social choices of technology — whether to build a nuclear power plant or to burn coal; to slaughter a nation's cattle herds or hope that BSE will not transmit to humans, to plant GM crops. Although we accept socially imposed technological risks — indeed it would be impossible to function in society if we did not—that acceptance is provisional and will turn to rejection if anything goes wrong.

The character of risk changes from premodern to modern society: one does not sue God for a natural disaster, but we believe it justifiable to sue if a train crashes, or an aeroplane falls from the sky.

Socially imposed technological risks are a central, defining element of life in modern society, not a secondary "emotional" factor. Strange, although the fundamental text that sets out this thesis on risk—The Risk Society—was originally published in German by a German sociologist, Ulrich Beck, it appears to be only a decade behind. It has been widely elaborated in the UK by Anthony Giddens, now director of the London School of Economics, but he appears not to be cited either.) Despite its flaws, there is a great deal in this book. It attempts a "big picture" overview, and much of its factual and historical content is interesting and valuable. The authors provide a clear exposition of the technical aspects of biotechnology itself and do appreciate many of the social and ethical issues that it raises. It seems to represent a genuine attempt to reach out from the laager of technological supremacists to the wider community to seek consultation and consensus. As such it is to be welcomed, for no purpose is to be served by repeating, with genetic modification, the mistakes of nuclear power. But for all that, this book also shows just how far there is for the scientific-industrial community still to go before it fully appreciates the rational foundations for the public to assert its voice, its values, and its expertise, as well as, and against, the well-articulated voice, values, and expertise of the biotechnology companies.

T Willie

Medical Ethics: Sources of Catholic Teaching

Edited by K O'Rourke, P Boyle. Georgetown University Press, 1999, $26.95, pp 442. ISBN 0878407227

This third edition of O'Rourke and Boyle's Medical Ethics: Sources of Catholic Teaching is a useful and comprehensive collection of statements published for the most part, by the central authorities of the Roman Catholic Church, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in the United States and the bishops' conferences of individual US states on a wide range of issues in the area of medical ethics. The statements are arranged alphabetically according to subject matter. It is useful to have such a wide range of documents available in one volume, many of which would otherwise be accessible only with difficulty. The documents included range from major encyclical letters issued by more recent popes on matters such as human sexuality (Humanae Vitae by Paul VI) and human life (Evangelium Vitae by John Paul II) to ad hoc responses by individual bishops to very particular questions with which they have been faced, and upon which they have felt the need to offer some guidance. Unfortunately no guidance is provided as to the weight and authority that is to be given to the various documents. For example, a major philosophical and theological treatise such as the encyclical letter, Evangelium Vitae, by John Paul II is presented alongside an ad hoc response from the bishops' conference of an individual state to a particular question that has arisen, as though they were of equal significance and importance. This detracts seriously from the usefulness of the collection and gives a misleading weight and authority to a great many of the statements gathered together here.

The impression could also be that documents such as these provide the only, or indeed the major, source for Catholic biologists and bioethicists. This is not the case. There are other (and far greater) sources of weight and authority — the contributions to this field of medical ethics of authors such as the late Richard McCormick, John Paris, and Albert Jonsen, to name but a few of the more prominent.

O'Dowd

The Ethics of Clinical Research in Developing Countries


The discussion paper produced and published by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics about the ethics of clinical research in developing countries is a timely, useful and (for such a concise publication) comprehensive document. It will prove useful for those planning research in developing countries, as well as for those already working in the developing world and planning research. The sponsors of research should also read the paper, whether they are pharmaceutical companies or a host country's statutory bodies, reviewing research proposals.

The topic has most recently been discussed in the context of the controversy surrounding trials of zidovudine (AZT), but the authors rightly point to a much wider agenda. They also convincingly highlight the differences and difficulties that are particular to research by developed countries in developing countries (rather than those inherent in all research). They also touch, however, on the issue of self-generated research in the developing world.

Perhaps the general issue can most easily be summarised in terms of the competing arguments for universality in the ethics covering research (which can be described as paternalism from the developed world), and for acknowledging the need for local self determination (which can be seen as condoning unethical behaviour). Taken to the extreme the "Universal School" may result in no potentially useful research being done in the developed world because of the fear of any harm. The local self determination group can, however, fall into the dangers inherent in having varying standards and therefore lead
to the developing world being exploited by the richer and more powerful North.

More broadly, it is possible to see this branch of ethics as a subset of the overall ethics associated with development, under-development and poverty. Many of the special dilemmas involved are those appropriate standards of care arise directly from poverty and inequality. For example, those who argue for developed world standards of care for all trial participants, will need to ask if this medical care should continue to be provided, even when the underlying cause of the condition is malnutrition. Should one then provide developed world standards of food, the means to transport food and the infrastructure and housing.

The paper covers the existing guidance and the dilemmas, contradictions, and problems they pose in their application. It also covers the issues of non-therapeutic research, consent and concern for those who remain after a trial is over.

Not surprisingly in such a paper, there are more questions than answers. The authors do, however, point to one very good example of policy-making that the guidance can provide. This is where pro-active guidance (unfortunately provisional and therefore unreferenced) is being provided in the form of a document on ethical considerations in international trials of HIV preventive vaccines by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). Perhaps the future lies in the production of appropriate intermediate guidance and training, in a minimum set of ethical issues and practical considerations that should be addressed before research is started. This may enable a compromise to be reached between some of the impracticalities and constraints in applying developed world standards and developing universal standards. This paper is a very useful start in identifying the issues and indicating a way forward.

A P Bacon

The Ethics of Health Care
Rationing: Principles and Practices


This book is about scarcity and rationing in health care and the ethical questions they raise. It is based on the premise that if the aim of a responsible government is to balance the nation’s varied claims upon the collective purse, then no government can be morally blamed for failing to remove the need of rationing from the National Health Service (NHS), and thus rationing as such cannot give rise to legitimate moral concerns. The question that needs to be addressed therefore is not whether rationing itself is unethical, or even whether any particular distribution mechanisms are unethical, but whether they are structured and work in morally acceptable ways, and lead to morally acceptable results.

In the first chapter Butler describes the gap between needs and resources. He describes what has been done (mainly) in the UK as a way of providing the background to the rationing debate. The second chapter addresses the moral basis of rationing by focusing on those which personal qualities we are prepared to accept as a fair basis for discriminating between individual patients. The author could not have chosen a simpler and yet more effective example to drive us through the debate.

Chapters 3 to 5 tackle the debate on rationing from a different point of view. Here Butler explores the moral issues of fairness and justice through the structures, processes, and outcomes of health care. Given that health services will always be in short supply in relation to potential demand, he asks whether they are structured and organised in ways that will promote people’s fair and equitable access to health care. This question is addressed by taking the reader through three competing theories of justice: those of Rawls (social justice), Daniels (fair equality and opportunity), and Doyal (human need). All three share a common feature in highlighting that the structure of provision of health care cannot be left to chance or interest but must be planned and implemented in ways that make explicit the principle of justice they are seeking to achieve.

Butler then takes the reader through the various processes of health care. Starting with a description of Waele’s theory of responsible or responsive government, he presents numerous arguments and examples of implicit and explicit rationing, public involvement in, and political and professional accountability for, rationing decisions, pointing out the potential conflicts between different moral concerns at different levels. Clinicians have a primary obligation to treat the individual patients before them, managers to see that public resources are not wasted, and politicians to use the resources fairly and to balance interests and expectations of different sections of society. Within a given budget constraint, are government and health authority decisions made on the basis of defensible ethical criteria? Even if doctors and nurses are unable to do all they would like to do for their patients, are they making choices based on established ethical criteria?

Chapter 5 addresses the ethical issues of health care rationing and health outcomes. As Butler states, outcomes are elusive things. Even at the patient level measuring improvements in health may be tricky, but at population level, where ethical questions are more likely to be posed, the difficulties multiply. Moreover, improvements in health are likely to reflect a variety of social, economic, environmental, educational and occupational changes among which delivery of care is only one. In situations where all objectives cannot be achieved and comparisons between different outcome have to be made, how can we fairly establish that some objectives are morally to be preferred to others? Should outcomes be perceived in terms of meeting individual need, the maximisation of total health gain (utilitarianism for example, using quality adjusted life years) or as the narrowing of the health gap between rich and poor?

Chapter 6 singles out this book from others on the topic. This chapter contains a series of stories the author has gathered from professionals who deliver health care. In order to present an unbiased selection of stories, Butler’s includes anecdotes from doctors, clinicians, nurses, and managers. Despite their different technological background they contain a common thread in that although none say so openly, each clearly describes a decision which implies rationing. These stories clearly bring out the conflict between moral concerns at the different levels.

From a professional point of view this book has much to offer both to those familiar with the subject and to those new to it. Moreover, although the book is mainly concerned with the UK what it has to say can apply equally to other countries, particularly other countries in Europe. Overall this book is comprehensive, thought-provoking, readable, and highly recommended.

M Longo

Speaking for the Dead:
Cadavers in Biology and Medicine


This book is well-timed. Jones has produced a broad-ranging work focused on a novel subject: the cadaver. In this year alone, high-profile media issues have included the non-consensual storage of postmortem examination tissues at Alder Hey; the trial of Dr Heinrich Gross, for killing and storing the brains of children in Austria in the second world war; debate about the medical uses of brains of children in Austria in the second world war; debate about the medical uses of human fetal tissues, and the repatriation and reburial of indigenous remains from museums.

Speaking for the Dead is underpinned by a profound respect for cadavers. Jones makes the claim that respect accorded to persons (and their wishes) extends to their tissues after death. He bases this on both utilitarian and Kantian grounds. Hypothetical arguments—such as that of the “neomort”—flesh out the argument.

Historical examination of attitudes to cadavers provides a context for this work. It is brave and noteworthy to describe explicitly our fearful subjective response to dead bodies. I would unrecommendedly recommend this chapter to medical students seeking an insight into the historical background. It is a humanising explanation of the heritage and necessity of undertaking postmortem examination and of learning anatomy by dissection.

Jones then advances another strong contention: that the use of unethical research data and results constitutes moral complicity. He discusses contentious research derived from autopsies and wartime experiments, as well as touching on legal issues such as whether the body and its parts can be regarded as property.

The response to indigenous concerns about archaeological findings is an area that this book should manage to balance, on the one hand, strong arguments for advancing knowledge in science and anthropology, and on the other, the interests of indigenous peoples in respecting ancestors.

The discussion of organ transplantation policies and the incipient ethical dilemmas of new technologies is generally solid, but occasionally fails to accommodate the full range of opinions. Given the broad remit of the field, Jones does well to cover the many hypothetical situations which may be expected.

In discussing brain death, Speaking for the Dead reintroduces the perspective of the cadaver, the person he or she was previously, and other stakeholders. These viewpoints, in defining brain death, frequently become subordinated to technical criteria and philosophical argument about personhood, selfhood and consciousness. Jones makes more action guiding points, and thus his discussion is more clinically relevant than most other debates about brain death.

Finally, Jones expounds on his particular expertise, embryology, and specifically addresses brain birth. His arguments are based upon careful study and are highly pertinent. I hope they will be heeded.
Speaking for the Dead ranges far more widely than its title would suggest. Gareth Jones has covered a neglected area thoroughly. Moreover, he has integrated myriad tangential ethical problems into his discussion. Ramifications for the fields of research ethics, medical education, anthropology and policy are significant. Questions raised for the future are numerous, and Jones provides a compelling, well argued and consistent framework from which to address these problems. I would recommend this book to a broad audience—laypersons, doctors and philosophers—for its simplicity, eloquence and viewpoint. It is a thought provoking work, and engrossing to read.

D Sullivan

The American Medical Ethics Revolution

Codified moral medicine is an antidote to medical apathy and the misgivings about medical practice which plague modern society. Medical ethics, which often appears to be a minor discipline of medicine, in reality has a long history and importance. The history of medical ethics is intertwined with the history of medicine and society. The American Medical Ethics Revolution, through the medium of a tetrad of editors and a stellar collection of luminaries, displays the pedigree of codified American medical ethical thought back to its earliest progenitor: the primordial 1847 American Medical Association (AMA) code of ethics. The volume deftly handled academic sabres vitiates the medical ethical dimension of the practice of medicine in America, and reveals the stark contentiousness underlying American medical ethics, as well as the acute timelines of the volume.

The rich blend of varied viewpoints culled by the editors was delivered, originally, as papers at a conference in Philadelphia, PA, in March 1997, intended to commemorate the founding of the AMA, and to celebrate the sesquicentennial of its pristine code of ethics. The ensuing volume rambles into branches of good writing and philosophic musings appertaining to American medical ethics, reaching from the far past to the uncertain future. The volume is comprised of 20 chapters and includes notable appendices, showing the evolution of AMA principles and codes of ethics, from 1847 to 1997. The thoughtul ruminations on the evolution of American medical ethics reflect the crisis thinking of noted scholars drawn from diverse fields, including: ethics, law, public policy, philosophy, historical history, and sociology.

The AMA code of ethics has a history of dissonance, albeit of continued vitality. The lineaments of the code have shown the ability to evolve, in response to professional and legal developements. Although today, in America, medical ethical issues are possibly more beguiling than ever, some may opine that the code is really an anarchonism which offers a mere patina of relevancy, and really not much of a point of enforceability. Rigorous debate about its continuing vitality and relevance is certainly a very healthy exercise. And, it is in the realm of stirring, informed debate and discussion that the volume particularly excels.

Three chapters, for example, proffer a thought-provoking, trichotomy of views concerning the singular question: who should control the scope and nature of medical ethics? Several chapters examine the relevance and adequacy of the traditional paradigm of codified, collaborative medical ethics in the context of particular, contemporary challenges to American medical ethics, relating, for instance, to “alternative medicine”, managed care, and the challenge of providing universal access to health care, given limited resources.

The lengthy time continuum of the volume encompasses forward-looking comments on future challenges to traditional medical ethics, involving, for example, molecular medicine. Given the uncertain role of ethics in the unfolding genetics revolution, it cannot be gainsaid that it is timely and potentially salutary, to ponder, in an informed intellectual sense, whether codified ethics can favourably help guide the future of biomedicine.

The recondite nature of this volume is well tailored to suit the curiosity of academically inclined readers interested in medical ethics, and medicine in America. Its abstruseness, however, is ill tailored to fit the lay reader, and may even fall outside the ken of comfort of some clinicians. In this respect, the volume is ineffectual as an educational conduit for the possible linkage of professional ethics with broader societal ethics.

Withal, the volume indubitably is a beacon of superb scholarship, illumining the path to moral rectitude, and barriers along the way, for academicians.

L Usych

Gene Therapy and Ethics

Gene therapy research and its clinical application raise a large number of ethical, legal, and social questions. Many of these are discussed in Nordgren’s anthology. The contributions come from a number of different disciplines, including bioethics, genetics, social science, and theology, and are divided into five main sections (following a short introduction): scientific aspects of gene therapy; the history of, and prospects for, gene therapy; conceptual issues; gene therapy in a German and Japanese context, and a section on the uses of gene therapy in relation to, for example, testing and screening. The contributions are quite diverse and mostly well worth reading. From the perspective of medical ethics the contributions by LeRoy Walters, Eric Juengst, Karen Lebacqz, Nikolaus Knopffler, and Christian Munthe are of particular interest.

Walters’s contribution focuses in part on the issue of eugenics. He defends a voluntary germ-line gene therapy programme as a means of reducing the transmission of genetic diseases to future generations. In the context thereof he problematizes the different points of view in terms of targeted diseases or deviations, between past eugenics and the sort of germ-line gene therapy programmes that would probably be run today. Walters also discusses the difference between gene therapy and genetic enhancement. He thinks the distinction is vague. Eric Juengst undertakes the task of clarifying the distinction, discussing three accounts of it. These appeal to the goals of medicine, the notion of species-typical functioning and particular concepts of disease, respectively. Juengst argues persuasively that none of these distinctions bear moral weight. For instance, he points out that there are cases of medical treatment leading to above-species-typical functioning that seem obviously morally desirable (for example the use of gene therapy to empower the immune system to eliminate cancer cells).

Juengst, however, is not critical of genetic enhancement and there are some affinities between his concern that genetic enhancement should not involve complicity with unjust social biases and Lebacqz’s views.

Lebacqz argues that the concept of therapy presupposes a distinction between normal and abnormal. How that distinction is drawn often depends on power structures in society and, hence, is not necessarily based on whether being unusual in some particular respect makes one worse off. An added type of genetic therapy which targets perceived abnormalities, such as dwarfmism, may not benefit anyone. It may simply make people more alike. Lebacqz suggests that if disability is a human attribute, being able to remove it is simply removing a socially constructed disability. Suppose we could make everyone read using moderate resources, and that a society in which disability to read was not a disability would be in many respects much worse than ours. Why should we prefer, morally speaking, the latter option? The more general point is that it is unclear why, from the point of view of justice, a society in which people are different is necessarily more equal.

In his contribution, Nikolaus Knopffler embraces the Kantian idea of human dignity, and treats it as the fundamental principle of bioethics. Roughly, in his view this idea implies that, whereas somatic gene therapy is morally unproblematic, germ-line gene therapy and germ-line enhancement are morally unacceptable. Knopffler does not explain why, exactly, this follows. At one point he seems to suggest that the fact that we have no common grounds for determining which enhancements are desirable implies that enhancement violates the Kantian principle, but such irresolvable disagreements simply seem beside the point.

In an interesting article, Christian Munthe convincingly argues that there is no morally relevant difference between genetic interventions involving the treatment of a particular individual and genetic interventions involving the exchange of the genetic makeup of one person for another. Examples of the latter sort of intervention include the preselection of embryos based on preimplantation genetic diagnosis.

K Lippert-Rasmussen

Creating Accepting Communities

S Dunn. MIND [National Association for Mental Health], 1999, £9.99 (£1 p+p), pp 181. ISBN 1874690871

The government’s social exclusion unit (SEU) was established to help individuals, groups, and regions overcome deprivation and discrimination resulting from a combination of problems, including unemployment, poor
quality housing, low income, lack of educational training opportunities, bad health, and family breakdown. Such difficulties are commonly experienced by people with mental health problems who also have to cope in a society which alienates and rejects them, barring them from every aspect of community life. Remarkably, even the SEU’s remit excludes consideration of the obstacles to social inclusion faced by those with a psychiatric diagnosis.

Creating Accepting Communities is the final report of an inquiry commissioned by MIND, which looked at the nature and extent of social exclusion experienced by people who use mental health services in Britain. The inquiry panel received written and oral evidence from a wide range of individuals and organisations, including mental health practitioners, high street retailers, groups working within the voluntary sector, and, importantly, service users.

The book is clearly written and the material well organised into four main chapters, each of which contains a useful summary of the key issues raised. Quotations from witnesses are used extensively throughout the narrative, giving real meaning to the findings, and to participants a sense of “ownership” in the report.

The first chapter summarises evidence presented to the inquiry on how a psychiatric diagnosis can exclude people from a range of significant areas such as employment, education and training, aspects of daily life (that is, access to goods and services, social networks, etc), and empowerment within mental health services. The panel found widespread evidence of social exclusion and dismissed claims that this was simply the result of poverty. Instead, they argue that while policy initiatives should focus on addressing poverty, for material circumstances of service users, they should also work towards creating greater social cohesion or social inclusion.

A range of ethical aspects associated with social inclusion is briefly but coherently discussed in chapter 2. In particular, inquiry evidence is used to evaluate the relationship between individuals and their wider community, and to address the following questions: how should societies judge the value of a person’s life? How does society differentiate individual “badness” from “mental illness”? How should risk be defined? What is meant by the participation and empowerment of service users? Essentially, the findings support the basic need to recognise the absolute value of individuals and to acknowledge that any ethical approach to social inclusion needs to balance this against existing social forces: differences can only be resolved through the participation of everyone involved.

Chapter 3 discusses a range of initiatives that have been set up to promote social inclusion in key areas of work, education, the arts and the media, daily living, and the mental health services. The panel highlighted three areas where more work should be done to improve social inclusion: the development of the initiatives and integration of inter-agency cooperation, legal and policy-based reforms at national level and the promotion of more intensive public education programmes on mental health. Based on this inquiry evidence, chapter 4 presents a series of recommendations aimed at directing social progress “from exclusion to cohesion”.

In general, the report raises the profile of a wide range of issues concerning social exclusion and provides an informative overview of current policy and practice initiatives. Unfortunately, because the book’s remit is so wide, its depth of analysis is compromised, leaving unchallenged some very difficult ethical barriers to social inclusion.

For example, little is currently known about the nature of the interactions between “them and us” and the consequences of these interactions for the promotion of a society based on “inclusive diversity”, particularly in the face of: 1) growing public demands for more zero-tolerance initiatives; 2) the threat of new legislation designed to exclude those with a serious personality disorder, those who fail to comply with medication while living in the community, and those who are destructive in schools; 3) media campaigns provoking street demonstrations against groups the media feels society should no longer tolerate, and 4) employment practices which measure individual value in terms of productivity to the point whereby even mental health services lack confidence in service users’ abilities. Ultimately, the problem of analytical depth is a methodological one that requires the development and integration of research initiatives at both the micro and macro levels of social inquiry. Moreover, these observations should not detract from what is an excellent report and an important reference point for those interested in the social inclusion of people who experience mental ill health.

A Colombo

Priority Setting and the Public


As its title suggests this book’s main area of inquiry is the rationale for, and methodology of, public involvement in priority setting. Mullen and Spurgeon set out to evaluate a number of assumptions and hard issues in priority setting. In doing so they have produced a volume that is both a useful introduction to this area and a worthy piece of research on an important theme.

They begin by contextualising the debate about priority setting within the recent history of health service reform in the UK and other nations. This move enables them to give an analysis of considerable scope. They are not just interested in rationing and public involvement but also in questions about the level to which the UK National Health Service (NHS) ought to be publicly funded. Given the frequently stated assumption that rationing is inevitable it is very refreshing to read a book that grapples with the difficult, more primary question of whether rationing itself is in fact necessary.

They note that reform processes and initiatives in the health system have served to focus attention on the need for priority setting but that there is a need to evaluate carefully the basis of this need. The present level of funding that the NHS receives is a matter of choice and not simple necessity, as is frequently implied. They suggest that we should think carefully about the inevitability of rationing and our inability to pay and instead work out how to provide treatments that are of undisputed efficacy.

In chapter three they examine the basis for public involvement in priority setting. Given that many would think the NHS ought to read this book. It’s likely to be of special interest to those making prioritisation decisions at all levels.

J McMillon

Catholic Ethicists on HIV/AIDS Prevention


This impressive and informative book deserves a wider readership than it is likely to get. Unfortunately there are still too many people who consider they have no need to read anything about the virus as it will, to their way of thinking, never touch them. In addition there will be those who think that a view by Catholic ethicists will be too narrow in outlook to be worthwhile. Both sets of people are mistaken. HIV/AIDS is an example of the depth of feeling that can be evoked when the rule of rescue conflicts with the maximisation of health care benefit. Their sixth chapter considers in some depth empirical methods that can be used to elicit the values of the public about priority setting. They present a broad range of possible methods in a way that makes them useful, not only for ascertaining views about prioritisation but also for gaining information about other empirical questions within medical ethics. Given the amount of lobbying for and against any decision it is inevitable that some issues are dealt with in a fairly summary fashion, but when they do this the authors make reference to the wider literature.

All those interested in prioritisation and the NHS ought to read this book. It’s likely to be of special interest to those making prioritisation decisions at all levels.

J McMillon

www.jmedethics.com
the positive person to inform the partner? Where does confidentiality begin and end? One of the saddest cases, and not as rare as it may seem, is of a married couple in Italy, both infected, who want to have a child. Will the child also be seropositive? Will one or both partners live long enough to look after the child? Who else should know of the situation?

The Catholic Church has always had high ideals even if many of its adherents, including some of its positions of power and authority, have not lived up to them. Those ideals cover not just areas of charity and fidelity but also those of charity and truth where each one of us has to strive constantly to live up to a more responsible and better living. The church is particularly strong teaching on fidelity in marriage and against premarital and extramarital sex. It is important to recognise the connection between this strong teaching and the basic values of family life and the worth of the individual, on the one hand and, on the other, the abuses that arise from pressures on innocent girls and women, particularly in some cultures. A universal approval of condom use would go far in eradicating these and others: how can we work towards the time when married couples have sufficient education and knowledge to work out for themselves the right use of conscience with regard to their sexual relations? Inevitably there are occasions when a solution is far from obvious: we have to remind ourselves frequently that we are fallible human beings with free will. This book goes a long way towards enabling the reader to consider and ponder at some considerable depth, a variety of dilemmas and questions.

In so many countries, including our own, a conspiracy of silence, of denial, has grown up in relation to HIV and AIDS. It is one when HIV is looked at objectively and dispassionately, regardless of the moral stigma that so often haunts those affected by the virus, that the real work of prevention will occur. Educa-
tion alone is insufficient. Only when we understand what the virus is, how it is passed on, what it does to individuals and to families—not least the children—will the global epidemic begin to be contained. Just to know that on average 5,500 funerals take place each day in Africa as a result of HIV should go a long way towards impressing upon us what the consequences in terms of personal tragedy and economic structures are in that continent alone. The rapid spread of the virus in India, passed off as “a bad illness”, resulting from infidelity and prostitution, as well as from untreated blood products, gives cause for alarm. “It won’t happen to me” remains an all too common remark, betraying a total lack of awareness of just how many people are now suffering from this virus, either in themselves or in those they love. This book should be widely read and used for discussion and reflection on just how far each of us has a responsibility for others in this desperately needy world. In our multicultural medical practices all doctors need to be more aware of HIV and its consequences.

From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice

With over 10 000 bases of DNA being sequenced around the world per minute, it is vital that ethical discussion continues to keep pace with genetic research. This contribution by four top theorists in bioethics carefully considers the implications of the many ways genetic information will influence human health and reproduction, by considering “the most basic moral principles that would guide public policy and individual choice concerning the use of genetic tests in a just and humane society” (pages 4–5).

Proceeding with the themes of rights, justice, and harm, problems addressed by the authors include: the significance of the moral difference between treating genetic disease and altering personality characteristics; whether the utilisation of prenatal interven-
tions to avoid disability discriminates against the disabled and who should have control over the utilisation of this technology.

The main focus of the work is upon the future of genetics, however this is framed within an “ethical autonomy” of eugenics, in which the inappropriateness of past practices is considered. It is argued that the wrongs of eugenics (broadly, a denial of freedom) must be recognised when considering what an ethical basis will constitute, but that wanting to provide future generations with genes that could contribute to their lives going better is not necessarily unpalatable. It is vital, however, that any such procedures are pursued justly.

After moving through several topical themes in genetics (which are highlighted in the introduction by the presentation of several futuristic genetics scenarios), the final chapter of the book draws out the major principles that should be used in policy-making about genetic technology.

Among the arguments advanced throughout are claims that genetic interventions as a perspective for the distribution of genetic technology is acceptable, and that this may also theoretically be applied to non-
thouplastic fields. Yet preferable to this is for social institutions to be designed which do not exclude people who are worse-
off, and for plurality in views of personal assets and the good life to be protected (chap-
ters three and seven). In chapters four and five it is argued that the boundary between treatment and enhancement does not always coincide with what is acceptable and unac-
ceptable, however, it is a good starting point for what the obligations of the state should be in delivering health care. The authors found no “reason to object in general to using genetic influences any more than environmental ones” (page 202), however concerns about both fairness in the distribution of this technology and medical risk should still be recognised. Chapter six explores in more detail the idea of reproductive freedom in pre-
venting or allowing harm to children, and dis-
cuss ways around the “non-identity” prob-
lem to illustrate a basis for obligations to prevent harm. Another effect of this obliga-
tion, however, is that parents should strive to benefit their children up to the limits of a requirement for these benefits are addressed in chapter seven, through an analysis of several disability-rights critiques of genetics.

This is an excellent book that immediately engages the reader. Its strengths as a book are the analysis is the use of real-world examples, a recognition that there may be more than one ethical solution to each problem in genetics, and an articulation of the limits of ethical theory. Although each author has contributed to different chapters, the book does not suffer from an inconsistency of style. It is worthwhile to read it from beginning to end, as subtle connections between many apparently unrelated issues begin to emerge. It will, how-
ever, also be useful as a tool for anyone interested in obtaining clear analysis of topical issues in genetics. An extremely comprehen-
sive table of contents also makes the book easy to navigate.

Overall, this book provides much insight on many important questions in genetics, but it also elegantly illustrates the inherent com-
plexity in issues that have arisen and will continue to arise when genetics, reproductive technology and parenting practices coincide.

D Bell

Living and Working with the New Medical Technologies: Intersections of Inquiry
Edited by M Lock, A Young, A Cambrose. Cambridge University Press, 2000, £15.95/ $US24.95, £42.50/$US59.95, pp 295. ISBN 0521652103

This collection of essays is the outcome of a conference addressing the problems arising from the conjunction of medicine and the humanities with the ever more pressing concerns of bioethics. Since this is a fairly recent development, most of the contributions arise from within an “ethical autonomy” of eugenics, in which the inappropriateness of past practices is considered. It is argued that the wrongs of eugenics (broadly, a denial of freedom) must be recognised when considering what an ethical basis will constitute, but that wanting to provide future generations with genes that could contribute to their lives going better is not necessarily unpalatable. It is vital, however, that any such procedures are pursued justly.

After moving through several topical themes in genetics (which are highlighted in the introduction by the presentation of several futuristic genetics scenarios), the final chapter of the book draws out the major principles that should be used in policy-making about genetic technology.

Among the arguments advanced throughout are claims that genetic interventions as a perspective for the distribution of genetic technology is acceptable, and that this may also theoretically be applied to non-
thouplastic fields. Yet preferable to this is for social institutions to be designed which do not exclude people who are worse-
off, and for plurality in views of personal assets and the good life to be protected (chap-
ters three and seven). In chapters four and five it is argued that the boundary between treatment and enhancement does not always coincide with what is acceptable and unac-
ceptable, however, it is a good starting point for what the obligations of the state should be in delivering health care. The authors found no “reason to object in general to using genetic influences any more than environment-
mental ones” (page 202), however concerns about both fairness in the distribution of this technology and medical risk should still be recognised. Chapter six explores in more detail the idea of reproductive freedom in pre-
venting or allowing harm to children, and dis-
cuss ways around the “non-identity” prob-
lem to illustrate a basis for obligations to prevent harm. Another effect of this obliga-
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syndrome children. Rapp highlights the disjunction between technological advance in genetics and biotechnology and the human response of families who care for such children. A further chapter deals with “bioindental” or “biosocial” conditions, notably MCA (multiple chemical sensitivity) and finds that in the light of conflicting interests and under-funded research any explanation of these sociomedical disorders is likely to be tentative and locally determined. The last two essays deal with organ transplantation and unpack the problem of the dichotomy of the “gift of life” that organ donation from brain dead persons presents, versus any sentiment concerned with keeping dying patients intact—a dilemma that is much felt even within the medical profession. Approaches differ between the US and Japan. The ethical dilemma is compatible but at present there are various solutions. Ethics are generally more implicit than overt but it is agreed that they are diffusely socially determined. The final essay, which considers the ethics involved in transplant procuring whether by gift selling or cadaver donation, finds that if regulations aimed at safeguarding certain rights may themselves infringe customary perceptions of what is moral. Some of the problems would benefit from an anthropological approach to the relationship that takes account of the specificity of small local communities. There are no final answers in this book, but the at times diverse essays bring together highly topical discussions about the rights and wrongs of a world that is just opening up.

Levin and Rapp have found expression in the animal research debate. In this book, Grayson recognises the complexity of this issue, asks for engagement with the practical dilemmas that arise, and the abolitionist demand for a total ban on all animal experiments. At one extreme are those who argue that research on animals is essential both to the conquest of many unsolved medical problems, but recognises that those involved must respect animal life, using animals only when essential, and should adopt alternative methods when available. Grayson also refers to a survey of British doctors in 1993, which indicated 94% agreement that animal research is important to medical advance, while 92% favoured more investment in the development of non-animal methods.

The final two chapters look to the future. Grayson argues that the debate on animal research is likely to intensify, with concern for animal welfare seriously. She refers to the British Association for the Advancement of Science which maintains that continued research involving animals is essential for the conquest of many unsolved medical problems, but recognises that those involved must respect animal life, using animals only when necessary. If we adopt this version of bioethics, there are three priority levels to animal research: replacement, reduction, and refinement. These are ways of reducing the number of animals used in research and refinement is bound up with the minimisation of pain, distress and suffering of the animals used. This is the most significant part of the book, as it indicates the possibility of dialogue and consensus among medical scientists, animal welfare campaigners, government bodies, teachers, and regulatory agencies. Grayson recognises that medical scientists are ethical and shows how the research community have demonstrated that scientists are taking legitimate concerns about animal welfare seriously. She refers to the British Association for the Advancement of Science which maintains that continued research involving animals is essential for the conquest of many unsolved medical problems, but recognises that those involved must respect animal life, using animals only when necessary, and should adopt alternative methods when available. Grayson also refers to a survey of British doctors in 1993, which indicated 94% agreement that animal research is important to medical advance, while 92% favoured more investment in the development of non-animal methods.

The author has produced an excellent introduction to the animal research debate. Each chapter is carefully balanced and is free from the emotive rhetoric which so often clouds the arguments. Moreover, there are summaries, lists of publications, and informative interest groups which are relevant to each viewpoint covered in the book. Animals in Research is an essential source for teachers and researchers in veterinary sciences, and it will be of considerable value to the ethicist who is concerned with the broader moral issues related to medical research and human wellbeing.

The Foundations of Christian Bioethics


Engelhardt's thesis is that "liberal cosmopolitan" ethics, and by extension bioethics, is fundamentally flawed, because the search for universality has sacrificed moral authority and hence moral content. On these grounds he dismisses both secular and "post-traditional" Christian ethics and bioethics. "Traditional Christianity", in contrast to "liberal cosmopolitanism", embraces authority (mediated through noetic experience, ie experiential knowing of God) and exclusivity (terms such as "fundamentalist", "creationist", "conservative", and "political"; intended to malign those who are not of the "liberal cosmopolitan" majority). Consequently, "traditional Christianity" is in conflict with liberal cosmopolitanism and endorses patriarchal and sexist views which are offensive to the liberal majority, and as a result traditional Christians find themselves in a hostile environment.

The second half of the book (chapters 5–8) focuses upon the practical implications of adopting this version of bioethics. There are few surprises here, as the practices which are endorsed and forbidden are similar to other conservative Christian traditions. For example, contraception is forbidden, as is abortion and prenatal testing (there is no ensoulment in "traditional Christianity", therefore, disposal of zygotes and embryos is "murder", as abortion is in general). In addition, little assisted reproduction is allowed: artificial insemination by husband is permissible if the wish for a child does interfere with the couple's spiritual quest and if there is no third-party involvement (sperm must be collected during intercourse or stimulation by the wife and the husband must carry out the insemination procedure). Of particular interest for bioethicists in this section are the differences which Engelhardt highlights between "traditional Christianity" and more familiar Christian approaches. For example, he rejects frequently cited Roman Catholic doctrines, such as the "doctrine of double effect" and arguments which appeal to biological "naturalness".

This book contains many interesting insights, although perhaps perhaps they are not original insights in the wider spectrum of viewpoints. One of the strengths of Animals in Research is that Grayson recognises the complexity of this issue, and in the opening chapter, which surveys the anthropological and philosophical debate, she finds that research on animal research, there is an appeal for constructive listening. Avoiding either extreme, Grayson opens with a comprehensive survey of the many different viewpoints that have been expressed in the animal research debate. The second and third chapters focus on public perspectives on animal research and the development of legislation and regulations since the Victorian period. The fourth chapter investigates issues that have drawn the attention of scientists and animal rights and welfare groups since the 1886 act which dealt with research on animals. As in most ethical debates neither side offers support for needless suffering, and the way forward lies in the consideration of ways to minimise any necessary suffering both in general and individually. Chapters five and six therefore address the three Rs (replacement, reduction, and refinement) which have emerged. Much otherwise disparate parties can agree. Replacement and reduction seek to minimise the number of animals used in research and refinement is bound up with the minimisation of pain, distress and suffering of the animals used. This is the most significant part of the book, as it indicates the possibility of dialogue and consensus among medical scientists, animal welfare campaigners, government bodies, teachers, and regulatory agencies. Grayson recognises that medical scientists are ethical and shows how the research community have demonstrated that scientists are taking legitimate concerns about animal welfare seriously. She refers to the British Association for the Advancement of Science which maintains that continued research involving animals is essential for the conquest of many unsolved medical problems, but recognises that those involved must respect animal life, using animals only when necessary, and should adopt alternative methods when available. Grayson also refers to a survey of British doctors in 1993, which indicated 94% agreement that animal research is important to medical advance, while 92% favoured more investment in the development of non-animal methods.

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Kierkegaard, as well as an introduction to the ethics of Orthodox Christianity. On balance, however, this book will perhaps seem somewhat irrelevant to contemporary bioethicists, although it may prove of more interest to theologians, especially those of the more conservative persuasion, such as the emerging school of radical orthodoxy. Ultimately, the difficulty with Engelhardt's position is communication. His rejection of “liberal cosmopolitanism” leads to an unwillingness to compromise, which makes it difficult for those from the “liberal cosmopolitan” world-view to hear his points; this is somewhat problematic given that his intended audience is the academic community.

H Widdows

A Cross-cultural Dialogue on Ethical Challenges in Healthcare

An international conference on health care ethics, A Cross-cultural Dialogue on Ethical Challenges in Healthcare, is to be held in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates, from 10–13 March 2002. It is being organised by the UAE Ministry of Health. Co-sponsors of the conference include the World Health Organization (WHO), the Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences (IOMS), the International Association of Bioethics (IAB), the Emirates Medical Association (EMA), and the Gulf Center for Excellence in Ethics (GCEE).

As the first such conference in the Arab and Muslim world, it aims to bring together scholars and experts from around the world to address a wide range of ethical and social considerations in the planning and delivery of health care.

The objectives of the conference are to: promote a cross-cultural dialogue towards agreement on universal standards of health care ethics; highlight the Islamic world’s contribution to this process; enhance awareness and knowledge of contemporary ethical issues in health care, and to build national and regional capacity to address complex bioethics issues against the backdrop of rapid advancements in the health sciences.

The conference will examine a broad range of contemporary health care ethics topics including: current controversies in research involving human subjects in developing countries; ethical decisions and considerations in clinical practice; social issues in genomics; strategies for allocating scarce resources; access issues in health systems, and building a bioethics capacity and infrastructure in the UAE, Gulf region, and Arab world.

For copies of the conference programme and registration forms please contact: Dr Basil A Badir, Conference Coordinator, Ministry of Health, PO Box 26094, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Telephone: + 971(2) 6330186 and +971(50) 6325110; fax: +971(2) 6321878 and +971(2) 6349225; email: moh_basilb@hotmail.com and ethics_conf@moh.gov.ae Website: http://www.uae.gov.ae/moh/start.htm

CORRECTION

In the December 2001 issue of the journal the Book reviews section was incorrectly headed Letters. We wish to apologise to readers for any inconvenience this error caused.