involved.

The third section, Successive selves and individualism, deals with philosophical, clinical and cultural issues arising from the notion of successive selves. Topics include: the metaphysics of successive selves; the normativity of individualism; therapeutic goals for a liberal culture, and the continuity of self-sufficiency for individualism.

The fourth section, Divided minds, addresses the issue of whether the clinical and scientific evidence supports the notion of divided minds and multiple selves, and ends by exploring philosophical ideas on self-ownership.

Two rather more general issues emerge early on and re-appear throughout the text. The first concerns the problem of how we should act towards persons/patients/clients whose behaviour challenges the traditional concept of a person (as being a unified, motivationally transparent organism subject to a single will and capable of introspective deliberation). The second concerns the more general problem of the ethics of the relationship between practitioner and client, or simply between one person and another, in an age when the political, legal and moral views of the individual (grounded on the traditional concept of a person) stand in stark contrast to a cultural outlook (styled "modernism" by Radden but more typically termed "post-modernism" in philosophy, literature, and the arts) which poses radical challenges to precisely this view of the individual.

Modernism/post-modernism has created a climate of acceptance for radical ideas about the self, ideas which, only a century ago, were viewed as eccentric and bizarre. What is highly encouraging is that concerns in the clinical and research literature in modern psychiatry, abnormal psychology, and neuroscience are increasingly engaging with the relevant concerns in contemporary philosophy of mind, and vice-versa, to produce a growing area of inter-disciplinary discussion and debate which can only benefit all involved. Radden's book is very much in the spirit of this new climate of cooperative inquiry, whilst maintaining an admirably sharp focus on her subject matter. More than this, though, the text will be of interest to those engaged not only in the areas mentioned above, but also to those working in the relevant areas of law and social policy.

Radden sustains an approach which is accessible but does not duck the important issues. She fully acknowledges the highly problematic ethical issues raised for practitioners, whilst addressing possible responses with great clarity. Similarly, the philosophical problems of personal identity and the unity of the self are carefully set out, and the philosophical resources on hand are subject to critical scrutiny. As Radden herself acknowledges, she has achieved more by way of analysis than in terms of synthesis or resolution. But this is, none the less, a tour de force of intellectual inquiry.

Only one reservation comes to mind when reflecting upon the book as a whole. Radden adopts a moderately Lockean view of the person, and gives the impression that "person" and "self" can be viewed as being synonymous. This is to ignore recent (post-modernist) cultural developments which have found expression in Continental and, increasingly, in analytical, philosophy. The philosophical expression of these developments includes: a) acknowledging fundamental conceptual and methodological problems with views such as Radden's; whilst, ii) situating the traditional concept of a person in the context of the ethical, legal, and political concerns which originally motivated it; and, iii) subjecting the concept of reflexivity to critical scrutiny as a philosophical problem in its own right. These recent developments reflect what is essentially a cultural change in the way individuals conceive of themselves, which cuts across all the conventional disciplinary boundaries of academia (for a useful introduction, and response, to some of the philosophical issues, see Luntley. 1)

It would have been helpful to both philosophers and practitioners if Radden had acknowledged these matters and their relevance to the clinical and philosophical issues she deals with, if only for the sake of completeness. However, this is but a small gripe - overall Radden has succeeded in producing a text that will interest both practitioners and philosophers at all levels of expertise, and which will, without doubt, inform debate on these issues for a considerable time.

**References**


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**World in Crisis. The Politics of Survival at the End of the Twentieth Century**


The very name, Doctors without Borders/Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), implies a critique of national and international organisations. The concept of genocide was formulated in 1944 as a response to the persecution of ethnic, religious and political minorities by autocratic states. The Holocaust exposed the failure of the international community to act collectively to save the lives of the deprived and persecuted, and the lack of independence of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Although the United Nations and its technical agencies, such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), were established to remedy this situation, there remained a horrific potential for vulnerability to genocidal persecution as well as to natural disasters. Given that intergovernmental organisations are prone to bouts of bureaucratic paralysis, non-governmental organisations have advantages of flexibility and an ability to deliver effective assistance. States and international organisations have often failed to act in the interests of humanity, arguably revoking the right to intervene which they practised during the nineteenth century. Although the record of intergovernmental organisations such as UNICEF is highly creditable, these bodies still face structural limitations.

World in Crisis is the fourth in a series of volumes reporting on this charity's activities. Although MSF was founded in 1971, thereby giving the book something of the air of a 25-year celebration, only the foreword is at all (albeit sketchily) historical. At the same time the tone is by no means celebratory, merely totting up the amounts of aid dispensed, but there is a call for self-reflection in the face of often ghastly situations. The authors call for reflection on past experiences, so that highly principled policies can be invoked whenever genocide and other disasters arise.

The book opens by raising the issue of genocide, which has plagued the twentieth century. The foreword by Rony Brauman speaks despairingly of
the impotence of the medical observers of the Rwandan genocide. Other such tragedies are described, for instance, there is an account by a German MSF nurse of the fall of the UN “safe haven” of Srebrenica which became a “killing zone”. Yet poverty and exclusion can occur just as readily in Western Europe, and MSF provides clinics for the homeless and destitute migrants there.

There follow chapters of general significance: on the protection of civilians in conflict; on the role of international medical groups in emergency relief; on international humanitarian action, and on refugees and marginalised populations. Finally there is a useful chapter on international law.

The second half of the book concerns the problem areas of Liberia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Rwanda and the Sudan. The aim of the book is to put problem situations into perspective and to draw out codes of action. One priority is the need to speak out when atrocities occur and not to defer to government manipulation of peace organisations. The case of Ethiopia, when aid organisations were manipulated as bait by an unscrupulous government, is cited. The book puts general principles—such as in maintaining the right to health, or the ethics of emergency medical assistance—into the context of specific circumstances. Overall, this is a forward-looking volume which seeks to draw constructive conclusions from current dilemmas and problems.

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Preventing Prenatal Harm: Should the State Intervene [2nd ed]


The behaviour of a pregnant woman—and even behaviour prior to pregnancy—can have a significant impact on the wellbeing of the child to be born. Not only might the future person be affected by the mode of delivery chosen by the mother, but he or she can also have his or her own health jeopardised by what the pregnant woman eats, or does not eat; the drugs and medications she takes or refuses to take, and the things she does or does not do. Although we may feel sympathy for, or even outrage on behalf of, an infant harmed in utero, it may, as Mathieu observes, be futile to force a pregnant woman to comply with certain behaviours or medical treatments when she can simply terminate the pregnancy instead. Of course, such an option would not be open to her later in pregnancy, but then interventions such as forcing her to have a caesarean section also have serious ramifications for her bodily integrity. Finally, prenatal harm can also occur in circumstances beyond the control of the pregnant woman due perhaps to her workplace conditions or environmental pollution, or caused indirectly by the funding of health and welfare benefits.

Mathieu tackles the issue of prenatal harm methodically, comprehensively and accessibly. Her book divides into seven chapters. The first outlines the problem of state intervention in prenatal harm and covers some of the prominent legal cases from the USA (not surprisingly, Mathieu predominantly uses examples from the USA) which make interesting reading in their own right. In the second chapter she looks at the bearing which the status of the fetus has on the issue. She argues that moral status could be considered irrelevant to the issue of prenatal harm since the harm in question will be experienced in the future by an individual whose status is beyond question. This does not mean that the fetus has rights either to be born or to receive medical treatment in utero. Rather, once the pregnant woman has decided to carry to term “she has not chosen to avoid a situation in which she will affect the wellbeing of another person ... and in so choosing she can be deemed to have assumed moral responsibility for at least some of the wellbeing of that future person” (page 29). Adopting this position enables Mathieu to offer a limited defence of the responsibilities of pregnant women to the unborn without threatening their access to a termination of pregnancy.

In chapters three and four she explores respectively the arguments for and against legally requiring women to act in the interests of the future child. In chapter five she looks at the practical implications of intervening during pregnancy and takes the view that there are both limits to what pregnant women (as parents) can be expected to sacrifice for their future child, but also limits to the damage which women can be excused for causing. Accordingly, there is some role for the state to intervene to prevent serious harm to a fetus which is going to be carried to term. However, when looking at some of the possible candidates for state intervention, she points out that the relationship between the suspected cause of harm and the harm itself must be certain—which it is not in the case of cocaine use, nor can it be conclusively shown that heroin use is certain to cause serious and lasting damage. Here observation is that the state is not actually doing a great deal to help pregnant drug users avoid drug use is echoed in her final chapter, which looks at the prenatal harms caused indirectly by the uneven distribution of health and welfare benefits and goods. In the penultimate chapter she discusses the extent to which the state has been willing and able to protect fetuses from prenatal harm in the workplace. She notes that whilst it is clearly preferable for employers to remove the threats to fetal health, this might not be possible. If it is not, those preventing women from working in such environments will restrict the choices of employment. Accordingly those women who knowingly work in hazardous conditions might find that it is them, rather than their employers, whom their future children might sue for damages. Concluding this chapter, she argues that it is undesirable for children to be permitted to sue their parents because any woman who fears a future suit might have a termination of pregnancy instead. Her solution is a more positive system of support and rewards for those women who do have to make sacrifices for the wellbeing of their future children.

Mathieu is to be commended for her good sense and for writing a well-balanced and readable text which does not sit too much on the fence.

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Limits. The Role of the Law in Bioethical Decision Making


Mr Dworkin discusses in this book “the law’s ability to regulate new