Double jeopardy and the veil of ignorance – a reply

John Harris  University of Manchester

Abstract
This paper discusses the attempt in this issue of the journal by Peter Singer, John McKie, Helga Kuhse and Jeff Richardson, to defend QALYs against the argument from double jeopardy which I first outlined in 1987. In showing how the QALY and other similar measures which combine life expectancy and quality of life and use these to justify particular allocations of health care resource, remain vulnerable to the charge of double jeopardy I am able to clarify some of the central issues concerning the value of life. In particular, the idea that the value of a life varies with its life expectancy and with its quality, understood in terms of its richness, variety, success etc, is subjected to special examination. It is shown how defenders of QALYs are committed to the view that so far from all lives being of equal value, all lives are necessarily of subtly different value. The paper then analyses the use to which the notorious ‘veil of ignorance’ has been put both by Singer et al and by others and shows how this device of John Rawls’s cannot do the work so often assigned to it. The paper then considers the issue of hypothetical consent and the role that it can play in justifying disposing of the lives of people who have not in fact consented to their lives being disposed of in particular ways. Finally, the paper makes some points about the comprehensive nature of the data collection and storage which would be required by QALY advocates and points out the independent problems attaching to licensing such comprehensive collection and use of personal data.

In an interesting and engaging paper (1) Peter Singer, John McKie, Helga Kuhse and Jeff Richardson (hereafter Singer et al) attempted to revive the ageing and ailing QALY, and give it an extension of life by attempting to improve its immune response to the argument from double jeopardy. They note that the double jeopardy argument, which I first outlined in 1987, has itself recently been given new life by its belated, and not thoroughly convincing, adoption by the United States Secretary for Health and Human Services. In rehearsing their objections to the double jeopardy argument Singer et al produce some interesting new points that deserve further consideration.

On what does the value of life depend?
Singer et al wrongly attribute to me the view that the value of life depends upon the strength of the individual’s preference for living (2). I don’t believe this is true, nor even that if it were true, the strength of a wish to live could possibly be measured in any way that would make interpersonal comparisons meaningful or consistent.

Singer et al seem to believe that what an individual might choose for herself, when comparing different future life possibilities, will also necessarily appeal to that individual when making interpersonal comparisons.

But, as I argued in my 1987 paper: ‘[W]hereas it follows from the fact that the given choice a person would prefer a shorter healthier life, to a longer one of severe discomfort, that the best treatment for that person is the one yielding the most QALYs, it does not follow that treatments yielding more QALYs are preferable to treatments yielding fewer where different people are to receive the treatments … [I]t does not follow that where the choice is between three years of discomfort for me or immediate death on the one hand, and one year of health for you, or immediate death on the other, that I am somehow committed to the judgment that you ought to be saved rather than me’ (3).

What matters is that the person is not prepared to agree that his interest in continued life is of less value than that of anyone else, nor that that interest necessarily varies with the quality of his life nor with his life expectancy. In short, if a person wants continued existence, then, in my view, his interest in continued existence is entitled to be treated as on a par with that of anyone else. All people who want to go on living have an interest in continued existence, the value of which can only be determined by themselves.

Since very few people know precisely what their life expectancy is, and have even less idea of precisely how long they will actually live; and since the precise...
lifespan measured to the last millisecond of almost everyone in the world is unique, treating people as equals, valuing each person as one and none as more than one, necessarily involves disregarding life expectancy or actual lifetime. If this were not the case, the value of each person’s life would vary in proportion to its length or quality.

All are more equal than others
This would have consequences. In the first place all individuals (as Singer et al seem to believe) would have lives of different value – no one would be the equal of anyone else. As I have suggested elsewhere (4), this involves taking as the basic unit of value, units of lifetime, or units of lifetime discounted for quality, rather than individual persons. Secondly there would always be a discrepancy between the estimated value of a person’s life and its actual value, between estimates of life expectancy, discounted for quality, and the actual length and quality of an individual’s life (supposing there to be a sensible interpersonal measure of quality – which there isn’t). This would mean that the justice of discriminations between individuals while they are alive, resource allocation decisions for example, would depend upon the predicted life expectancy being accurate. Moreover, where resource allocation decisions involved life or death consequences, as they often would, they would be self-fulfilling and so the degree of ‘error’ would be concealed. If Singer’s life were to be saved rather than Harris’s because his quality of life and life expectancy were allegedly greater, no one would ever know whether or not my life was in ‘fact’ the more valuable, because I did in the event (and per impossible) live longer with a bigger smile on my face.

The value of life would also, on the QALY view, vary with the quality of an individual’s life, so that those with greater quality would have greater value and the wrong done by murder, for example, would vary with the quality of the victim’s life, the greater the quality the greater the wrong done in ending it. I find these consequences unattractive and I am therefore drawn to the view that the value of life varies neither with its quality nor with its quantity, but is the value that the individual whose life it is places upon it. If she thinks that she would like her own life to stand equal competition with all other lives, then it should. I am also attracted to this view for more positive reasons – because it is supported by the arguments I produce in my book The Value of Life (5).

Measuring the value of continued life
We can now come to my problems with the Singer et al account of double jeopardy and the veil of ignorance. They start by assuming that there exists a suitable measure of the value that continued life holds for the person whose life is at stake. ‘This value might be identical to what is now measured by QALYs, or it may be a measure of strength of preference, or it may be something else altogether. For simplicity, we shall refer to it as a person’s “interest in continued life”’. They then summarise the point of the veil of ignorance as used by Rawls and to be clear I will repeat their summary.

‘The idea of the veil of ignorance is that it forces an impartial choice by preventing people knowing whether they will be advantaged or disadvantaged by the proposed arrangement. So, in this case, we imagine people choosing a basis for allocating health care without knowing whether, at some point in their lives, they would be in need of health care to prolong their lives; and they also do not know whether, if this happens, they will be among those whose interest in continued life is low, or among those whose interest is high.

How would rational egoists choose if they were faced with the situation in which they each need life-saving treatment, and each has an interest in continued life, but there is enough life-saving treatment for only one?’ (1).

Singer et al note that rational egoists would not choose to give the treatment to nobody, and that in ‘comparison with that prospect, tossing a coin would at least give them a 50 per cent chance of survival, and so would be preferable. But a random method would in turn seem less attractive than a method of selection that gives preference to the person with a stronger interest in continuing to live’ (1). Now, the Singer et al explanation of why the random method would be less attractive than prioritising stronger interests in life, is unclear. They explain it in the following way:

‘For those choosing the basis for allocating health care will know that if they choose a random method of selection in order to avoid discrimination in situations when a treatment cannot be given to everyone, then someone with a higher interest in continued life will not receive such treatment. To maximise the satisfaction of their own interests, rational egoists would have to choose a system that gives preference to saving life when it is most in the interests of the person whose life is saved. This means that if QALYs were an accurate way of measuring when life is most in one’s interests, then rational egoists would choose to allocate in accordance with QALYs. But they cannot do this without building double jeopardy into their principles of distribution. Thus by one widely accepted, and undoubtedly impartial, way of deciding on the justice of principles of distribution, double jeopardy is not a sign of injustice or unfairness’ (1).

But there seem to me to be two simple but genuine fallacies in the reasoning here (6). First, it is clearly false to claim that if random methods of choosing between rival claimants are used ‘someone
with a higher interest in continued life will not receive such treatment' (1). It can only be the case that such a person may not receive such treatment. Indeed there seems to be an obvious slip in the formulation of the argument here. Singer et al claim that 'rational egoists would have to choose a system that gives preference to saving life when it is most in the interests of the person whose life is saved' (1) but, apart from suicides and others who don’t want to live, it will surely always be most in the interests of a person who might be saved to be the one who does in fact have his or her own life saved? This slip, if it is a slip, reveals a basic problem at the heart of the Singer et al analysis.

A rational egoist would surely only give preference to saving the life of the person with the highest interests in continued existence, when he is also most likely to be that person. If he has no better than a 50/50 chance of being that person, it cannot be in his interest to prioritise the life of such a person because he cannot know that he won’t in fact be worsening his own chances; the same goes of course for nonsaving gains. When Singer et al discuss such gains, they say, in the same vein, that [a] rational egoist choosing from behind a veil of ignorance would choose to give the treatment to the patient who will gain more from it’ (1); but again, this would not necessarily be the case, unless the rational egoist had reason to believe that he or she would be more likely to be the person who would gain more from it, and this by hypothesis they cannot know.

We should be clear that the veil of ignorance conceals identity but it does not precede identity. Only in the latter case would the Singer et al point hold good. In that case we would be choosing to create a world with healthier longer-lived persons in it rather than some other world. It would be like choosing in advance of conception whether to have healthy or disabled children. However, policy choices, allegedly ‘illuminated’ by the veil of ignorance, involve choosing which of existing persons in an existing world will live and which will die.

Of course, all this concedes the point that I dispute, namely, that it makes sense to talk about some people’s interest in continued life being low while that of others is high. It is of course sensible for an individual contemplating different paths that her own life might take, to prefer one path, one future scenario, to another; to say that she has a greater interest in life under one set of conditions than under another. But this, as I have argued, is a vastly different proposition.

Approaching 50, I have around 20 years less life expectancy than I had when 30, and since I am ‘slowing up’ physically, my measurable quality of life in health terms broadly conceived, is less; but it does not seem to me that I have less of an interest in continuing alive, nor that life is less valuable to me measured in any other way than it was twenty years ago. Of course people behind the veil of ignorance might not wish systematically to favour the old, or those with short life expectancy, or those with poor quality of life, because this would distort population. However, if my suggestion is adopted, namely that each person is given an equal chance quite irrespective of, and oblivious to, quality and quantity of life, then the same distribution of these things is likely to be maintained (7).

To summarise, the arguments of Singer et al about the veil of ignorance turn upon two ideas, the first that rational egoists would choose to prefer those with a stronger interest in continuing to live or who will gain more from life. But their analysis of what each of these two ideas amounts to is question-begging. It assumes that a person has a stronger interest in life when he has more and better life in prospect; this is not necessarily true. Secondly, it assumes that you gain more in proportion to quality and time, again not necessarily true unless of course, as with Singer et al, it is simply stipulated as true. Finally it assumes that psychologically, a rational egoist choosing from behind a veil of ignorance, would choose to give the treatment to the patient who would gain more from it or who had a greater interest in life, but again this is not true. The rational egoist will only do that if he has reason to suppose that he or she will be that person or is more likely to be that person. While I don’t doubt that there is some intuitive force to their suggestion, Singer et al cannot provide conclusive reasons. I think this is really a case where you pays your money and you takes your choice.

**Hypothetical consent**

Singer et al note that I have already considered and rejected arguments from hypothetical consent. They go on to criticise my rejection of them. But, there is no necessity for rejecting hypothetical consent if there is no evidence that the relevant hypothetical consent could be constructed in a way which would compel rational egoists to choose to value lives at less or more than par. I do not believe that Singer et al have demonstrated any rationally compelling considerations as to why rational egoists, choosing from behind a veil of ignorance, would choose to allocate treatment, whether life-saving or life-enhancing, on any method that valued any individual at more or less than par.

Singer et al then produce a rather extraordinary argument in two parts. In the first part they accept my suggestion, based on an argument provided by Ronald Dworkin (8), that ‘hypothetical agreement does not provide an independent argument for the fairness of an arrangement that would be agreed to behind the veil of ignorance’. They then suggest, having just conceded the opposite, that it is choice behind a veil of ignorance that provides an independent argument for the fairness of arrangements thus decided.
The argument turns on a, perhaps strained, use of the idea that rational egoists might choose a slave-owning society from behind the veil of ignorance, if the chances of being a slave were small and the benefits to be gained for everyone else from slavery sufficiently great. Singer et al say, and I quote: ‘If we change the nature of human beings enough to make it plausible that rational egoists would choose to allow slavery without knowing if they were to be slaves or masters, then yes, slavery might be just’ (1), and presumably might be just because it would be thus chosen and not because any independent arguments or considerations could be adduced to demonstrate the justice of slavery.

I assume that if there were any independent arguments of this sort, Singer et al would have produced them.

Whether or not slavery would be chosen from behind a veil of ignorance arises in this discussion because I offered the suggestion that the veil of ignorance does not guarantee the justice of arrangements that would be decided upon by rational egoists behind it. I suggested that it would not be irrational for rational egoists to gamble on good odds, for an unjust society that benefited them. And thus the veil of ignorance could not guarantee the justice of outcomes decided behind it, because the appeal of the outcome was the prospect of benefiting from injustice if the chances and the benefits of so doing would be good enough to make it a good bet. The point could have been made, as it just has, less dramatically. Singer et al object: ‘But it is difficult to know what to make of this example, because it is not clear if Harris is talking about a world rather like our own, or one in which human nature is quite different from what it is now’ (1). They suggest that my counter-example is flawed because it is too fanciful. It is notorious that the ignorance demanded by the veil is so comprehensive that it is difficult to know how rational egoists would know enough about themselves behind the veil to make rational choices about their lives. Are Singer et al, to borrow their own rhetorical device, talking about a world like our own or one in which human nature is quite different? If fanciful examples which make radical assumptions about the human predicament are to be ruled out, then it seems to me that this would apply to the veil of ignorance device as well. However, this is not the important point.

Singer et al suggest that my example is also fanciful because: ‘in the real world a ratio of one slave to every ten free people would certainly not be enough to make the lives of the slave owners wonderfully luxurious. Of course, some will impatiently waive aside such petty calculations. Slavery is unjust, and we know that much better than we know how many slaves it takes to create luxurious lives for their masters. Indeed, we do, but that is because in the real world, those who support slavery know very well that they are the masters and not the slaves; if there were any uncertainty at all about this, they would not support it’ (1).

This is an extraordinary argument, it suggests that the injustice of slavery is contingent upon whether or not those who support slavery know that they will be the masters or the slaves. Singer et al nowhere give any indication of what arguments might support such a conclusion, they rest content with this summation: ‘In other words: if we change the nature of human beings enough to make it plausible that rational egoists would choose to allow slavery without knowing if they were to be slaves or masters, then yes, slavery might be just. But as long as human beings stay roughly as they are, rational egoists behind a veil of ignorance would not choose to allow slavery’ (1).

I wonder if Singer et al believe that human nature has changed so radically since the Hellenistic period? Aristotle is notorious for having supported slavery, and in particular for defending the right of the victors in battle to enslave the defeated, although he could not for sure and certain have known that he, or the Greeks, would never be defeated in battle by non-Greeks, indeed he knew that the contrary was the case. So it is false to say that ‘in the real world, those who support slavery know very well that they are the masters and not the slaves’ (1), Aristotle, in the real world and with direct experience both of slavery and of the possibility of defeat in battle, did support it (9). But, does it follow that we cannot judge the justice of slavery in such circumstances? Bertrand Russell commented, with his characteristic wit and economy on this very point: ‘This would seem enough to justify any conqueror who ever lived; for no nation will admit that it is intended by nature to be governed, and the only evidence as to nature’s intentions must be derived from the outcome of war. In every war, therefore, the victors are in the right and the vanquished in the wrong. Very satisfactory!’ (10). Greek rational egoists with human nature not a million miles from our own might well have supported slavery from behind a veil of ignorance, believing in the superiority of their own nature, or believing that those whose nature was not superior would deserve to be slaves (9).

The veil and the two principles

‘Finally, Harris points out that Rawls himself holds that rational egoists behind a veil of ignorance would choose two specific principles of justice, and these second of these principles is that inequalities in wealth and resources are justifiable only in so far as they operate to the advantage of the worst off members of society. This second principle is, of course, incompatible with the idea of distribution in a way that maximises QALY’s. Harris therefore says that if it could be shown that the device of choice
behind a veil of ignorance leads to the reverse of Rawls's second principle of justice, this would discredit the plausibility of the device itself' (1).

I couldn't have put it better myself! However, Singer et al go on to disagree pointing out that Rawls is widely believed to have "cooked the books" in order to derive from his hypothetical device the principles that he believed squared with our considered moral judgments about justice' (1).

Again I accept this, and my argument does not depend on denying it. It does, however, depend on denying the use Singer et al make of this suggestion. They conclude: 'If we are right in concluding that rational egoists behind the veil of ignorance would opt for a QALY-based method of allocating health care resources, and if this is incompatible with the principles of justice Rawls claims to have derived from the hypothetical choices of rational egoists, then this discredits Rawls's derivation of the two principles of justice, rather than the device of hypothetical choice itself' (1).

It is, however, not as simple as this. As I have already argued, it is not, I believe, plausible to suppose that QALYs would be chosen from behind the veil of ignorance. However, the device of the veil and the two principles, again as Dworkin has shown, are in a sort of symbiotic relationship, each deriving plausibility from the other. If the device of the veil of ignorance is plausible as a machine for manufacturing just and impartial principles, it is so because it is seen to result in Rawls's two principles, and the principles are given added weight by apparently being generated by the machine. I am not as convinced as Singer et al that the device of the original position is a reliable machine for the manufacture of just and impartial principles rather than for manufacturing conservatively self-interested principles (8). However, its appeal, as Dworkin suggests, is largely dependent on the idea that: 'there is a group of men and women who find, on reading Rawls, that the original position does strike them as a proper "intuitive notion" from which to think about problems of justice, and who would find it persuasive, if it could be demonstrated that the parties to the original position would in fact contract for the two principles he describes' (11).

My suggestion is that if QALYs would be chosen by people in the original position then this would discredit it as a proper intuitive notion from which to think about problems of justice. The fact, as Singer et al record, that Rawls has himself moved away from attempts to defend principles of justice by use of the original position rather than the other way about, if anything confirms this view.

**Inconsequential differences**

Quoting one of my previous forays on the subject of QALYs, Singer et al suggest that I have made things too easy on myself. They remind us that I had pointed out that 'if you and I are of different ages but we both want to live, then it is unfair to prefer your life to mine simply because you are three months younger' (1). Singer et al concede that this passage 'invokes an example that makes it difficult to disagree with Harris's claim' (1), they then suggest that I am making it too easy. In a crucial passage they set out their general argument against treating people as equals independent of QALY considerations.

'If he wants to stand by the claim that the value of life is nothing else but the value that those alive place on their lives, he would have to also object to giving the treatment to Otto rather than Richard if they both wanted very much to live, even if the heart transplant could offer Otto only a year or two, while it still offered Richard 38 years .... Indeed, it isn't clear what basis Harris would have for giving treatment to Richard rather than Otto, even if the latter would have only a month, or a week to live. No doubt Harris would want to say that there is a threshold below which his argument is not valid – but if both Richard and Otto want to live, it is difficult to see how such a threshold could be defended, consistently with the general position Harris takes' (1).

First, while I am not averse to making things easy for myself if I can, I am not averse to facing difficulties if I must. I do object, as Singer et al so presciently predict that I would, to giving the treatment to Otto rather than Richard in the circumstances they outline, and nothing I have ever written would lead them to expect that I would duck this conclusion. The truth is surely that there are difficulties over small differences for me and for QALY defenders alike. Singer et al are committed to valuing lives more, the more un-elapsed lifetime they are likely to contain. This they would (or should) maintain however small this temporal advantage is, so long as it is sufficient for the particular individual to derive some benefit from it, so long as it gives him or her some interest in continued life derived from that temporal advantage. Likewise for small advantages in quality of life.

When Singer et al ask 'is it really unfair to give a lower priority to saving the lives of those with incurable conditions that significantly reduce their quality of life?' (1) they are also succumbing to the temptation to make things easy for themselves. For what is the word 'significantly' doing here? They would, to be consistent, have to say that any measurable difference in quality made for a difference in priority. The same goes of course for quantity. The QALY is a quality adjusted life year, but what matters about it is that it is a measurable unit of lifetime which it can be in someone's interests to live. Nothing in the theory of QALYs or the moral arguments which underpin them, can show why the appropriate unit is the year rather than the month or the week or the minute (12).
People versus units of quality discounted time
As I have indicated, all sides look most plausible when dramatic differences are compared; both seem vulnerable when small differences are highlighted. The crucial difference, small or large, is whether we value persons or units of quality discounted lifetime. Respecting persons, I have suggested, involves valuing each as one and none as more than one, whatever their life expectancy or present or predicted quality of life.

To fail to do this, I would still maintain, involves us in problems of unjust discrimination and double jeopardy. If, as I believe I have here shown, the claim of Singer et al that the ‘argument from the hypothetical consent of rational egoists is ... an adequate response to the double jeopardy objection’ is flawed, then double jeopardy constitutes one (13) continuing and powerful objection to the justice of QALYs (14).

Persons are equal
In a paper entitled ‘More and Better Justice’ (15) to which Singer et al refer, I argued that equality seen as a moral principle must be construed as protecting the entitlements of individual people, not the maximization of units of lifetime discounted for quality.

‘The equality principle covers young and old, present and future people and may be taken as stating that people’s lives and fundamental interests should be given equal weight regardless of race, creed, colour, gender and age, economic status and regardless of their generation’ (16).

This was not intended to be an exhaustive list and I might have added many more of the quality of life considerations so beloved of QALY defenders.

The point is of course not only the protection of the lives and fundamental interests of individuals but the assertion of their claim to equality, construed not least in terms of their entitlement to equality of concern and respect, to equal dignity standing and protection of the community in which they live. This is not only an issue of justice and respect for persons, it is also an issue of community and civility.

Where people live in a community that values individuals differentially according to the success of their lives and its quality and predicted length of un-elapsed time, this is highly likely to have a disastrous effect on their sense of personal worth and their sense of security. Where people are frightened not only of suffering injury or illness, or of possessing genes which will likely shorten their life expectancy, or are already coping with the deleterious effects of these; but are also frightened of the effect that others’ knowledge of these disadvantages will have on their standing in the community, their access to other dimensions of its care, including health care, and to rescue and other services, then this is surely likely to have a divisive and corrosive effect on the sense of community. This is also part of what is wrong with what I have called double jeopardy.

Where there is known to be a policy in place which systematically favours the advantaged, it is likely to promote a sense among a significant proportion of the population, of being part of an impacted and disadvantaged minority, a minority moreover which has no hope of escape from its existing disadvantages and every expectation of having these added to by future discrimination in the matter of health care and rescue.

The problems of information and privacy
Finally, even if it were to be accepted that QALYs are the right measure for the allocation of health care resources there remains the problem of information. If we are to distribute access to health care in the light of quality of life and life expectancy, then health professionals and administrators need to have immediate access to the relevant information at the point of need or claim. To take just one example, in order to prioritise care, the casualty officer in the accident and emergency department must know precisely the life expectancy before and after treatment and the quality of life (personal and professional success or failure, happiness and expected happiness, friends, relations, lovers, haters, complexity of life, coherence of life plan, likely success or failure of life plan, economic status, etc, etc) of every casualty she sees, and she must know it immediately. If this were not possible, huge injustices would occur and reasonable questions would arise as to the legitimacy of making those on whom information happened to be available, bear the whole brunt of our attempts to redistribute health care according to this particular conception of a meritocracy of interests.

Even if, per impossibile, such complete information could be made available there remains the question of whether it would be desirable for other reasons (which would include privacy and the dangers of abuse), to support such comprehensive information gathering and monitoring.

In view of all this it is surely far from clear that even rational egoists would pursue the policy that QALY advocates propose and the very real problem of double jeopardy remains among many issues of justice which the QALY fails signally to resolve.

Acknowledgement
As so often I am indebted to my colleague Charles Erin for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I am also grateful to Eric Nord for helping me to clarify my ideas about these complex issues.
John Harris is Professor of Bioethics and Applied Philosophy and Research Director of The Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, University of Manchester.

References and notes


(2) Although in fairness to them I did carelessly encourage this mis-interpretation in the past. In setting out an anti-ageist argument in my book The value of life London, Routledge, 1985 I incautiously added the word ‘fervent’ to the argument. ‘So long as we each fervently wish to live out the rest of our lives, however long that turns out to be, then if we do not deserve to die, we each suffer the same injustice if our wishes are deliberately frustrated and we are cut off prematurely’ (page 89). I would now omit ‘fervently’ for reasons that will appear.


News and notes

Ethics and Community

The role of ‘community’ in relation to the practice of health care professionals, welfare and community workers will be the subject of a national two-day conference on the 19th and 20th October 1995, at The Centre for Professional Ethics, University of Central Lancashire.

The title of the conference is Ethics and Community. The conference will also raise issues in the theoretical debate about communitarianism and individualism.

For further details, contact Jane Johnson, University of Central Lancashire: telephone (01772) 892253.