experiments among groups to assess the prophylactic efficacy of promotional intervention.

Only when practitioners know the answer, or can persuade themselves that they know the answer, can these constraints be dispensed with. It is here where the true paradox lies, not in Skrabanek’s confused distinction. To think one knows the outcome consequent upon applying any intervention is sufficient to absolve professionals from a formal duty to inform, to counsel and to obtain consent. Clearly such a paradox amounts to a double standard which simultaneously provides a disincentive to enquire.

The true state of knowledge concerned with a particular question will be fixed at a given time, but the certainty or doubts of individual practitioners may not be. Thus certain practitioners can proceed without constraint while the uncertain ones cannot.

It may well be true that in clinical therapeutic medicine people prefer certainty (whether entirely scientifically justified or not) more than they might in prophylactic medicine, for obvious reasons to do with urgency, specificity and often, desperation. But there is no reason to suppose that the nature and extent of these uncertainties are any different between the two. (See for instance (2).)

Skrabanek argues that there are many uncertainties in the practice of preventive medicine, which are not deemed to be uncertain by some practitioners. He is right. But it is nonsense to argue that this makes preventive medicine special in some important sense and it is certainly not thus exempted from these, rather peculiar, ethical constraints.

References

**Donors and sellers of organs**

**SIR**

In your issue of September 1990, J Harvey argues for schemes for non-exploitative paid kidney donation. He claims that such schemes might end the shortage of kidneys available for transplant.

I would like (1) to point out a significant element of confusion in the terms of his proposal, (2) to outline the main reason for the present shortage, and (3) to propose a policy which would do far more to end shortages in the supply of all the organs and tissues which can be transplanted.

(1) In the New Collins Concise English Dictionary, ‘donor’ is defined as ‘any person who gives blood, organs, etc, for use in the treatment of another person’. ‘Give’ is defined as ‘to present or deliver voluntarily to another’, and ‘sell’ as ‘to dispose of or transfer to a purchaser in exchange for money’.

So those who give blood or organs are donors; those who sell them are sellers, and not donors of any kind. So the phrases ‘paid donations’ and ‘paid donors’ are oxymorons; the phrases ‘unpaid donations’ and ‘voluntary donors’ are tautologies.

(2) The present shortage of organs available for transplant indeed produces a vast amount of unnecessary suffering and a large number of wholly preventable deaths.

Why the shortage? Because countries presently rely on individual donation as the means of providing healthy organs and tissues to patients needing treatment. So large numbers of healthy organs and tissues critically needed by patients are being destroyed. Donor cards are not enough.

(3) What we need is a system whereby healthy organs and tissues would be routinely saved from cadavers, with legal protections for those persons who wish to dissent. Healthy organs and tissues would be presumed available for transplant unless there was express objection. They would still be obliged to dispose of bodies in a decent and seemly way after death, but they would also be required to save any organs and tissues which could be used to save life or to restore vital bodily functions.

We must abandon the failed policy based on the desirability of donation and adopt a policy based on the duty of salvation. This would do more than any alternatives to help end the current worldwide shortage of available organs and tissues.

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