professed separation of Church and State to which Mr Justice Kirby draws attention in his foreword to the book under review. The book is a product of the Social Responsibility Commission of the Anglican Church in Australia. This review will concentrate, therefore, on the purported contributions to a Christian ethics of *in vitro* fertilisation and attendant practices, ignoring the chapters which outline the issues in ways now common to all such reports. It is a pity that, under this limitation, the two distinctive chapters by clinicians, W A W Walters and Gareth Jones, must be ignored.

John Henley, in a chapter headed 'The Formulation of Official Policy: Principle versus Procedure,' outlines principles to be accommodated in ethical discussion. The 'policy' of which he complains was that of a committee established in the State of Victoria which used the terms 'acceptable' and 'unacceptable' in its judgements without further explication. It is not clear, however, whether these judgements, however expressed, contravene Henley's principles.

John Morgan assays a distinctively Anglican statement of the ethics and moral theology involved. His argument amounts to a cautious endorsement of IVF within marriage, and of the experimental use of 'spare' embryos but not of ova fertilised for use in research. His conceptual tool, borrowed from modern Roman Catholic theology, is 'proportionate reasoning', combining deontological with teleological arguments as necessary. He rejects the extremes, both those who 'leave it to God' to give them a child, or accept their infertility from Him if He does not, and those who condemn any intervention which interrupts the single process of marital union and conception. In his justification for research on cleaving embryos he relies on Anglican writers in the UK and the USA, and on Roman Catholic writers – Härting and Kung – in Europe. A line or two must have dropped out of his text somewhere on pp 37f, for he is too informed a scholar not to know how different were the pronouncements on contraception in the Lambeth Conferences of 1930 and 1958; here they are confused.

Michael Hill attempts courageously a task too often evaded, to delineate 'a Biblical perspective' on IVF and the like. But does he succeed? He disowns text-chopping, and desiderates a unified and integrated biblical theology. He looks for a 'theory of moral obligation' to set beside a utilitarian one. He wobbles on whether one exists or not, and then chooses a 'teleological theory' (set against a 'deontological theory') on the ground that it is 'more capable of use in relation to contemporary issues not envisaged in the Scriptures' – and this because scripture 'is concerned with the purposes of God'. The ultimate principle (sic) thus curiously begotten is always to do that which generates or maintains love relationships with God and man. This ultimate good, obfuscated rather than clarified as an 'agape-relationship', is a psychological state. This was grounded in the family in Old Testament times, the unit of inheritance and so of the material assurance of God's blessing. Hill has to admit, on the evidence of St Paul's rhetorical championing of the Gentiles in Galatians 3: 28, that the relationship can cross genetic boundaries. But then he is betrayed by slovenly modern translations into bringing it back into the genetic family, for the purpose of putting a marital restriction on IVF. In New Testament Greek *oikos* does not mean 'the family' as we now know it; it means the household, which included servants and slaves as well as kin. His wish so to restrict the service of IVF is not contested; but his case will not stand on shallow exegesis like this. Similarly he brings in those who condemn the intentional destruction of human embryos as 'a form of murder'. But instead of examining this allegation by careful exegesis of his own Biblical material on 'the sanctity of life', he dodges the moral analysis by suggesting techniques to avoid the offence: he dodges the moral analysis by suggesting techniques to avoid the offence: either taking and fertilising only one ovum at a time, or, if more are taken, implanting the lot to let the poor mother take her chance of a multiple birth. Someone, some day, must tell us how not to use the Bible in medical ethics.

The Revd John Fleming's 'Case Against IVF' is good, swashbuckling stuff; it can only grieve those who wish to see a reasoned argument against IVF sustained. Two early sentences illustrate his treating the basic question to be examined as a closed question, self-evidently in his favour: 'One of the principal objections to IVF is that thousands of human beings are sacrificed each year in the IVF programs around the world in order to achieve relatively few pregnancies. The human beings that die are human embryos'. The IVF practitioner 'behaves with a reckless indifference' to the fate of the embryos not brought to term even in the simplest case. It would be tedious to multiply examples of such indisciplined language. Typically the moralist selected as the defender of IVF is Joseph Fletcher of the USA, who is liberally quoted, in all his absurd extravagancies, with the added insult of bogus Latinity – *gestation ex corpore*! The most serious criticism of this book, therefore, is that the case against IVF goes by default. This reviewer has no wish to argue that case; but it ought to have been argued. Some compensation is to be found in Alan Nichols's outline of 'Issues for the Family', and in Roy Bradley's 'Exposition of Pastoral Care'.

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Rights, Killing, and Suffering: Moral Vegetarianism and Applied Ethics

Although Frey's primary interest is in the ethics of meat-eating, he addresses issues in practical ethics, such as the value of life, of interest to medical ethicists. His concern is with moral rather than prudential considerations leading to vegetarianism and, specifically, with animal-based arguments. Challenging the three principal arguments for moral vegetarianism, namely the wrongness of killing, the violation of moral rights and the wrongness of inflicting pain and suffering, he argues that they all fail to establish the wrongness of meat-eating. Disputes concerning the value of life, he points out, have reached an impasse, but even if agreement could be reached, one could not move from the wrongness of killing to the wrongness of meat-eating. Equally sceptical of arguments based on the moral rights of animals, Frey contends that we are 'at sea in a tide of theoretical claims and counter-claims, with no fixed point by which to steer'. Such arguments are simply 'excess baggage' to the debate, diverting us from more fundamental questions. Arguments from pain and suffering are more pressing, he says, but he seeks to establish that a concern with suffering is compatible with meat-eating. Here his
critique is aimed at Peter Singer. While sharing Singer’s commitment to utilitarianism, and welcoming his efforts to conduct the debate in terms other than rights, Frey claims to undermine his negative moral vegetarianism by ‘rendering it unnecessary’.

The claim of the effectiveness of moral vegetarianism as a boycott tactic is ‘deeply implausible’, argues Frey, and like the appeal to the value of life and to animal rights, is unlikely to secure significant changes in dietary habits. The rising number of vegetarians has paralleled, but by no means matched, the substantial increase in meat consumption. Even where improvements in farming conditions have been made these cannot, he says, be attributed to the effect of vegetarianism on market forces. Frey also comments on Singer’s disregard for the practical problems which would arise if meat production ceased. He cites a formidable range of consequences for producers and consumers, including the knock-on effect on various industries, the devastation of local economies based on meat production, the loss of the great cuisines and the adverse effects on social interaction. Singer’s assumption that the utility of an end to meat-eating in terms of the relief of animal suffering outweighs the negative consequences is therefore questioned by Frey. At the same time he argues that the meat-eater, if dissatisfied with the conditions in which animals are reared and killed for food, may – consistently and sincerely – work to eliminate abuses without changing his diet. He hypothesises a ‘concerned individual’ who takes the ‘middle way’, by actively seeking improvements, rather than accepting existing practices uncritically or seeking to abolish factory farming altogether.

Frey contrasts sharply the passive moral vegetarian who naively believes that the pain and suffering of animals will end through his or her individual act, and the more vigorous carnivore who, no doubt fortified by red meat, actively campaigns, with far greater success, for animal welfare. Yet nothing in Singer’s work precludes public protest and he urges precisely this tactic in Animal Liberation. What he seeks is an ‘expansion of our moral horizons’; new practices, such as vegetarianism, are part of that process but not its end. While Frey is right to point to the dangers of complacency, few vegetarians would see a change in diet alone as sufficient to guarantee change. Furthermore Frey’s pessimistic conclusion that a significant change in eating habits is extremely unlikely is also open to question since cultures have altered their methods of food production and dietary preferences as a result of adopting new religious beliefs, contact with colonial powers, economic pressures and other factors. As far as the disutility caused by an end to meat production is concerned, Frey does not provide convincing reasons to show why ways of life centred on exploitative and painful practices should count for more than the animal suffering or why they should be preserved. The massive expansion of the meat industry, a cornerstone of Frey’s case for meat-eating, suggests that the amount of suffering involved has reached record levels particularly as, and he himself notes this, many of the recommendations for improvement have not been implemented. Yet he offers no compelling reason why the animals’ claim should be subordinated to that of the individuals engaged in food production, why human animals should receive preferential treatment over non-human animals. Instead he offers a defence of existing arrangements without establishing why those arrangements are superior to others which might be developed. Restructuring of economies is already underway and there is no inherent reason why production should not shift into new non-exploitative areas just as, in the past, slavery-based economies have moved on to new footing, despite the predictions at the time of the social and economic costs which would be incurred by this change. Frey’s argument would therefore seem to be more persuasive to the meat-eater, in that it justifies his actions, rather than to the committed vegetarian, whose moral vegetarianism may be supplemented by human-based and prudential considerations, which form part of a broader ecological perspective.

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