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Stem cell-derived embryo models: moral advance or moral obfuscation?
  1. Christopher Gyngell1,2,3,
  2. Fiona Lynch2,3,
  3. Tsutomu Sawai4,5,6,
  4. Julian Savulescu2,6,7
  1. 1Department of Paediatrics, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
  2. 2Biomedical Ethics, Murdoch Children’s Research Institute, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
  3. 3Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne Melbourne Law School, Carlton, Victoria, Australia
  4. 4Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hiroshima University, Higashihiroshima, Hiroshima, Japan
  5. 5Institute for the Advanced Study of Human Biology (WPI-ASHBi), Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
  6. 6Centre for Biomedical Ethics, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore
  7. 7Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
  1. Correspondence to Dr Christopher Gyngell, Murdoch Childrens Research Institute, Parkville, Victoria, Australia; christopher.gyngell{at}mcri.edu.au

Abstract

Stem cell-derived embryo models (SCEMs) are model embryos used in scientific research to gain a better understanding of early embryonic development. The way humans develop from a single-cell zygote to a complex multicellular organism remains poorly understood. However, research looking at embryo development is difficult because of restrictions on the use of human embryos in research. Stem cell embryo models could reduce the need for human embryos, allowing us to both understand early development and improve assisted reproductive technologies. There have been several rapid advances in creating SCEMs in recent years. These advances potentially provide a new avenue to study early human development. The benefits of SCEMs are predicated on the claim that they are different from embryos and should, therefore, be exempt from existing regulations that apply to embryos (such as the 14-day rule). SCEMs are proposed as offering a model that can capture the inner workings of the embryo but lack its moral sensitivities. However, the ethical basis for making this distinction has not been clearly explained. In this current controversy, we focus on the ethical justification for treating SCEMs differently to embryos, based on considerations of moral status.

  • Embryos and Fetuses
  • Embryo Research
  • Ethics

Data availability statement

There are no data in this work.

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Data availability statement

There are no data in this work.

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Footnotes

  • Contributors JS conceived the project. CG and FL wrote the first draft, and all other authors reviewed and made significant suggestions and edits. CG made significant revisions to the document based on reviewer comments. All authors approved the final manuscript as submitted and agreed to be accountable for all aspects of the work. CG acts as the guarantor for the manuscript and accepts full responsibility for the work, and controlled the decesion to publish.

  • Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

  • Competing interests JS is a Partner Investigator on an Australian Research Council grant (LP190100841) which involves industry partnership from Illumina. He does not personally receive any funds from Illumina. JS is a Bioethics Committee consultant for Bayer and an Advisory Panel member for the Hevolution Foundation. FL, CG and TS have indicated they have no conflicts of interest to disclose.

  • Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.

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