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Unintentional deception still deceives
  1. Doug Hardman
  1. Psychology, Bournemouth University, Poole, UK
  1. Correspondence to Dr Doug Hardman, Psychology, Bournemouth University, Poole, BH12 5BB, UK; dihardman{at}bournemouth.ac.uk

Abstract

In my recent article, Pretending to care, I argue that a better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice. In an insightful and well-argued response, Colgrove highlights three problems with my account. For the sake of brevity, in this reply I focus on the first: that my definition of deception is implausible because it does not involve intention. Although I concede that my initial broad definition needs modification, I argue that it should not be modified by involving intention but by involving responsibility.

  • Ethics- Medical
  • Philosophy- Medical

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Footnotes

  • Contributors The author is responsible for all aspects of the article.

  • Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

  • Competing interests None declared.

  • Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; internally peer reviewed.

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    Doug Hardman

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