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Deception, intention and clinical practice
  1. Nicholas Colgrove
  1. Philosophy department and Center for Bioethics, Health and Society, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, USA
  1. Correspondence to Dr Nicholas Colgrove, Philosophy department and Center for Bioethics, Health and Society, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27109, USA; colgron{at}wfu.edu

Abstract

Regarding the appropriateness of deception in clinical practice, two (apparently conflicting) claims are often emphasised. First, that ‘clinicians should not deceive their patients.’ Second, that deception is sometimes ‘in a patient’s best interest.’ Recently, Hardman has worked towards resolving this conflict by exploring ways in which deceptive and non-deceptive practices extend beyond consideration of patients’ beliefs. In short, some practices only seem deceptive because of the (common) assumption that non-deceptive care is solely aimed at fostering true beliefs. Non-deceptive care, however, relates to patients’ non-doxastic attitudes in important ways as well. As such, Hardman suggests that by focusing on belief alone, we sometimes misidentify non-deceptive care as ‘deceptive’. Further, once we consider patients’ beliefs and non-doxastic attitudes, identifying cases of deception becomes more difficult than it may seem. In this essay, I argue that Hardman’s reasoning contains at least three serious flaws. First, his account of deception is underdeveloped, as it does not state whether deception must be intentional. The problem is that if intention is not required, absurd results follow. Alternatively, if intention is required, then identifying cases of deception will be much easier (in principle) than Hardman suggests. Second, Hardman mischaracterises the ‘inverse’ of deceptive care. Doing so leads to the mistaken conclusion that common conceptions of non-deceptive care are unjustifiably narrow. Third, Hardman fails to adequately separate questions about deception from questions about normativity. By addressing these issues, however, we can preserve some of Hardman’s most important insights, although in a much simpler, more principled way.

  • Truth Disclosure
  • Ethics
  • Ethics- Medical
  • Informed Consent

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Footnotes

  • Contributors NC is the sole author of this essay.

  • Funding This study was funded by John Templeton Foundation (61842).

  • Competing interests None declared.

  • Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.

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  • Original research
    Doug Hardman

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