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Strengthened impairment argument does not restate Marquis
  1. Bruce Philip Blackshaw
  1. Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK
  1. Correspondence to Bruce Philip Blackshaw, Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK; bblackshaw{at}gmail.com

Abstract

With Perry Hendricks, I recently outlined a strengthened version of the impairment argument (SIA) for the immorality of abortion. Alex Gillham has argued that our use of Don Marquis’ deprivation of a ‘future-like ours’ account entails we were merely restating Marquis’ argument for the immorality of abortion. Here, I explain why SIA is more than just a reframing of Marquis.

  • Abortion
  • Embryos and Fetuses
  • Ethics

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Footnotes

  • Contributors BPB is responsible for writing the entire submission.

  • Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

  • Competing interests None declared.

  • Patient consent for publication Not required.

  • Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; internally peer reviewed.

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