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Settling for second best: when should doctors agree to parental demands for suboptimal medical treatment?
  1. Tara Nair1,2,
  2. Julian Savulescu2,
  3. Jim Everett2,3,
  4. Ryan Tonkens4,
  5. Dominic Wilkinson2,5
  1. 1 Faculty of Medicine, Nursing and Health Sciences, Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
  2. 2 Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
  3. 3 Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
  4. 4 Centre for Human Bioethics, Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
  5. 5 Department of Paediatrics, John Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford, UK
  1. Correspondence to Tara Nair, Faculty of Medicine, Nursing and Health Sciences, Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia; trnai1{at}student.monash.edu

Abstract

Background Doctors sometimes encounter parents who object to prescribed treatment for their children, and request suboptimal substitutes be administered instead (suboptimal being defined as less effective and/or more expensive). Previous studies have focused on parental refusal of treatment and when this should be permitted, but the ethics of requests for suboptimal treatment has not been explored.

Methods The paper consists of two parts: an empirical analysis and an ethical analysis. We performed an online survey with a sample of the general public to assess respondents’ thresholds for acceptable harm and expense resulting from parental choice, and the role that religion played in their judgement. We also identified and applied existing ethical frameworks to the case described in the survey to compare theoretical and empirical results.

Results Two hundred and forty-two Mechanical Turk workers took our survey and there were 178 valid responses (73.6%). Respondents’ agreement to provide treatment decreased as the risk or cost of the requested substitute increased (p<0.001). More than 50% of participants were prepared to provide treatment that would involve a small absolute increased risk of death for the child (<5%) and a cost increase of US$<500, respectively. Religiously motivated requests were significantly more likely to be allowed (p<0.001). Existing ethical frameworks largely yielded ambiguous results for the case. There were clear inconsistencies between the theoretical and empirical results.

Conclusion Drawing on both survey results and ethical analysis, we propose a potential model and thresholds for deciding about the permissibility of suboptimal treatment requests.

  • newborns and minors
  • paediatrics
  • decision-making
  • demographic surveys/attitudes
  • right to refuse treatment

This is an Open Access article distributed in accordance with the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) license, which permits others to distribute, remix, adapt and build upon this work, for commercial use, provided the original work is properly cited. See: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

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Footnotes

  • Contributors TN, JS, DW and RT contributed to study design, drafting and editing of the original manuscript, and revising the manuscript. JE contributed to study design, statistical analysis and interpretation, editing of manuscript and revising the manuscript.

  • Funding This work was supported by the Wellcome Trust [WT104848/Z/14/Z; WT106587/Z/14/Z].

  • Competing interests None declared.

  • Ethics approval Social Sciences and Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee, University of Oxford.

  • Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.

  • Correction notice This article has been corrected since it was published Online First. Funding information has been added.

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