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The harms of status enhancement could be compensated or outweighed: a response to Agar
- Correspondence to Dr Thomas Douglas, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Littlegate House, St Ebbes Street, Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 1PT, UK; thomas.douglas{at}philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Citation
The harms of status enhancement could be compensated or outweighed: a response to Agar
Publication history
- Received August 1, 2012
- Accepted September 5, 2012
- First published October 9, 2012.
Online issue publication
April 27, 2016
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