Article Text
Abstract
In cases in which we must choose between either (i) preventing a woman from remaining unwillingly pregnant or (ii) preventing a fetus from being killed, we should prevent the fetus from being killed. But this suggests that in typical cases abortion is wrong: typical abortions involve preventing a woman from remaining unwillingly pregnant over preventing a fetus from being killed. And so abortion is typically wrong—and this holds whether or not fetuses are persons.
- Abortion - Induced
Data availability statement
No data are available. Not applicable.
Statistics from Altmetric.com
Data availability statement
No data are available. Not applicable.
Footnotes
Contributors PH is the sole author and also resposible for the content as guarantor.
Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests None declared.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
Linked Articles
Read the full text or download the PDF:
Other content recommended for you
- Cursed lamp: the problem of spontaneous abortion
- Four problems for the pregnancy rescue case
- Ectogenesis rescue case: a reply to Hendricks
- Abortion and Ectogenesis: Moral Compromise
- Critical notice—Defending life: a moral and legal case against abortion choice by Francis J Beckwith
- Is there a ‘new ethics of abortion’?
- Impairing the impairment argument
- Yes, the baby should live: a pro-choice response to Giubilini and Minerva
- Of souls, selves, and cerebrums: a reply to Himma
- The Two tragedies argument